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 The aim of this dissertation is to demonstrate why the theology of Edward 
Schillebeeckx provides a worthy and valuable resource for negotiating the question of 
how Christians can maintain their unique Christian identity and uphold the core tenets of 
their faith, while recognizing the need for and benefit of dialogue with non-Christian 
religions. In a world where interaction with religious others is inevitable, a perilous sense 
of superiority that excludes non-Christians from the possibility of imparting wisdom must 
be avoided. Yet, as this dissertation illustrates, a theory that all religions are equal and 
that absolute claims that contradict the beliefs of other religions (such as Jesus as God 
incarnate and the universal savior of humankind) must be given up, is equally as 
dangerous. I show that Schillebeeckx, although he never identified himself explicitly with 
one of the three paradigms of the theology of religions (exclusivism, inclusivism, and 
pluralism), maintained an inclusivist position but one that is more radical than that of 
some of his contemporaries. He upheld the unique role of Jesus Christ in human history 
while regarding religious pluralism, rather than a problem to be solved, as an opportunity 
for Christians to learn from and expand upon their conceptions of the humanum, or what 
human wholeness entails.  
 This dissertation critically examines the three major paradigms used to understand 
the relationship of Christianity to non-Christian religions. It argues that the adoption of a 
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pluralist position that regards all religions to be equal, and relinquishes any absolute 
claims, is not necessary, and can, in fact, be detrimental to fruitful interreligious dialogue. 
It traces Schillebeeckx’s development of the negative contrast experience and illustrates 
how it can serve as a universal starting point for interreligious dialogue that does not 
attempt to essentialize human nature or tie all positive responses to human suffering to a 
latent Christianity present in every person. This dissertation describes the major 
components of Schillebeeckx’s soteriology: creation as the starting point for soteriology; 
the unbreakable relationship between fragments of salvation in this world and final, or 
eschatological salvation; the role of Jesus as the assurance of final salvation; and the 
communal nature of salvation. It shows how the implication of Schillebeeckx’s 
soteriology, which starts from the premise “there is no salvation outside the world,”1 is 
“no salvation apart from religious others.” This means that our ability to experience 
fragments of salvation in our everyday lives is dependent on learning from and 
collaboration with human beings who do not share our religious beliefs, but does not 
require us to erase religious differences, or tailor our beliefs to “fit” neatly into others’ 
religious views.  
 Finally, this dissertation applies Schillebeeckx’s soteriology to concrete struggles 
faced by Muslim women and Catholic women in order to illustrate how interreligious 
dialogue can bring persons toward the fullness of the humanum.  
 
 
                                                        
 
1 See The Collected Works of Edward Schillebeeckx, Vol 10: Church, The Human Story of God, Ed. Shoof, 
Sterkens, Borgman, Shreiter (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), 12, originally published as Mensen als 
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 Today’s Catholic Christian can hardly avoid contact with followers of other faith 
traditions, not only in one’s neighborhood, school, or workplace, but even within one’s 
own immediate family. Therefore, the question of how one can maintain his or her unique 
Christian identity, faithful to the Gospel and Christian tradition, while also being desirous 
of learning about and from non-Christians, is an urgent one. Contemporary Catholic 
theologians have sought to respond to this question in various ways, many of which have 
been critiqued for not maintaining each of these poles (Christian identity and openness to 
other religions) adequately. The Flemish Dominican theologian Edward Schillebeeckx 
(1914-2009) is an oft-overlooked voice in theological discussion of this issue, but one 
that I believe offers a response that sufficiently upholds the uniqueness of Christianity, 
and not only the benefit, but the necessity, of learning from and cooperating with non-
Christian traditions.  
A. The Theology of Religions: Three Paradigms for Understanding Christianity’s 
Relationship to Non-Christian Religions 
 The theology of religions is a branch of Christian theology that seeks to describe 
the relationship of Christianity to non-Christian traditions, particularly concerning the 
question of salvation. It is widely accepted that, whether consciously or unconsciously, 
Christians come to any encounter with another tradition with an understanding that 
corresponds with one of three paradigms: exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism. The 
three paradigms were first articulated by Alan Race in 1982, as a “broad typological 
framework within which most of the current Christian theologies of religion can be 
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placed.”2 While other typologies have been proposed since 1982, this is the one that has 
remained the most prominent and popular in the theology of religions, and therefore, the 
one I work with in this dissertation. I will briefly describe each of the three paradigms 
below.  
 Exclusivism holds that there is no salvation outside of Christianity. Most simply, 
salvation is through solus Christus and requires fidex ex auditu. Salvation comes from 
Christ alone, and to be saved, it is necessary that one hears the Gospel preached and 
responds in faith. In spite of misconceptions to the contrary, not all exclusivists believe 
that every person who is not a Christian will necessarily be damned. Gavin D’Costa, for 
example, identifies two types of exclusivism, restrictive access exclusivism and universal 
access exclusivism.  
 Restrictive access exclusivism is linked to belief in predestination. It is also 
associated with a strong emphasis on the importance of missionary activity, since it holds 
that those who do not respond to the preaching of the Gospel during their lifetime cannot 
achieve salvation. Even among Christians, it cannot be known for certain who will 
                                                        
 
2 Alan Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism: Patterns in the Christian Theology of Religions 
(Maryknoll, NY, 1982), 7. Some theologians present other paradigms in addition to three mentioned, but 
since they are not as widely recognized, I do not deal with them here. Jeannine Hill Fletcher, for example, 
identifies four paradigms: exclusivism, inclusivism, pluralism, and particularism.  Particularism begins with 
the proposition that all religions speak different languages and thus, shape experience distinctively.  She 
associates this position with George Lindbeck. See Monopoly on Salvation: A Feminist Approach to 
Religious Pluralism (New York: Continuum, 2005), 51-81.  For more about Lindbeck’s position, see The 
Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1984) and 
“Fides ex Auditu and the Salvation of Non-Chrsitians: Contemporary Catholic and Protestant Positions,” in 
The Gospel and the Ambiguity of the Church, ed. Vilmos Vajta (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1974). Instead of 
the more common three-point model that I work with in this dissertation, Paul Knitter proposes a four-point 
model that underlines the positions one can adopt toward other religions. These are the replacement model, 
the fulfillment model, the mutuality model, and the acceptance model. See Paul Knitter, Introducing 




necessarily be saved. However, given that God is exclusively revealed in Jesus Christ, it 
is at least certain that non-Christians are destined for damnation. This position is 
maintained by many strict Calvinists, as well as by some non-Calvinist evangelical 
Christians. William Lane Craig is one who argues that exclusivism does not contradict 
God’s justice or mercy. He insists that no one is lost because of lack of information due 
to historical or geographical accident, since “God in His providence has arranged the 
world so that anyone who would receive Christ has the opportunity to do so.”3  
 “Universal-access” exclusivism has a more optimistic view of the salvation of 
those who are not explicitly Christian. While still upholding that salvation is through 
solus Christus and requires fides ex auditu, it insists that there are opportunities to 
confess Christ at the time of death or after death. Catholic theologian Archbishop Joseph 
DiNoia, O.P. holds this position. DiNoia claims that after death, the non-Christian will 
have a chance to hear and respond to the Gospel in purgatory.4 This position is also 
associated with the “hypothesis of a final option.” As explicated by Ladislaus Boros 
(1927-1981), in the moment of death, defined as the precise moment when the soul 
abandons the body, every person is given the possibility of deciding for or against Christ, 
with complete freedom.5  Overall, exclusivists may advocate for toleration of and 
                                                        
 
3 William Lane Craig, “No Other Name: A Middle Knowledge Perspective on the Exclusivity of Salvation 
Through Christ” Faith and Philosophy 6:2 (April 2989), 185.  
4 Purgatory, in the Catholic tradition, is the state immediately after death in which souls undergo 
purification before entering heaven. See Joseph DiNoia, The Diversity of Religions: A Christian 
Perspective (Washington DC: Catholic University Press, 1992).  
5 Ladislaus Boros, “Suffering and Death: Question and Answer.” They Way 7:1 (Winter 1967), 55. See also 
The Moment of Truth: Mysterium Mortis (London: Burns & Oates, 1965).  
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peaceful co-existence with non-Christian traditions, but see no need for dialogue apart 
from providing the opportunity for conversion. 
 Inclusivists also uphold salvation through solus Christus, but drop the need for 
fides ex auditu. Since God wills the salvation of all, non-Christians are included in the 
salvation that Jesus Christ brings, even if how this is so cannot be explained. Paul 
Griffiths thus distinguishes between open and closed inclusivism.6 “Closed inclusivism” 
holds that Christianity is wholly and exhaustively true, so that whatever wisdom or 
insights are found in another tradition are already known to Christianity in some form, or 
must be assimilated into Christian terms. “Open inclusivism,” on the other hand, allows 
for the possibility that non-Christians may have something to show Christians that is not 
explicitly understood or taught by Christianity. In other words, dialogue with non-
Christians may enrich and expand one’s understanding of God. Two theologians who 
hold this position are the Jesuit theologians Karl Rahner, S.J. and Jacques Dupuis, S.J. I 
will discuss their views in Chapter One.  
 The pluralist paradigm is more radical than open inclusivism in stating that non-
Christian religions are ways of salvation in their own right, apart from the mediation of 
Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ, rather than being God’s final and definitive revelation, is one 
revelation among many different and equally important revelations. Pluralists reject the 
application of any absolute claims to Christianity. Two theologians who espouse the 
pluralist position are Paul Knitter and Roger Haight, S.J., whose views will also be 
discussed further in Chapter One.  
                                                        
 
6 See Paul Griffiths, Problems of Religious Diversity (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 56-65, 161-69.  
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 There has been considerable debate within the theology of religions over which 
paradigm is most conducive to fruitful interreligious engagement. It has been argued that 
inclusivism is simply a more subtle form of imperialism, since it does not enter dialogue 
with a belief that all religions are equally true, and retains certain absolute claims about 
the role of Jesus Christ and the church. However, the pluralist position is equally 
criticized for diluting the truth of the Christian faith in a way that renders Christianity 
expendable. It has also been accused of tending toward a dangerous erasure of the 
distinctions between religions. As I will discuss in Chapter Three, after the Second 
Vatican Council, the position of the Magisterium toward non-Christian religions shifted 
from an exclusivist to an inclusivist one. In this dissertation I argue that the soteriology of 
the Dutch theologian, Edward Schillebeeckx (1914-2009)  provides an inclusivist view of 
non-Christian religions: one that is neither imperialistic (insisting that Christians have 
nothing to learn from non-Christians) nor relativistic (insisting that all religious truth 
claims are the same and all religions are, therefore, equal).  
B. Schillebeeckx and the Theology of Religions 
 
While Schillebeeckx never explicitly identifies himself with one of the three 
paradigms, there has been considerable debate over whether or not he is an inclusivist or 
a pluralist. Some theologians make the case that while the early Schillebeeckx may have 
been an inclusivist, in his later work, he moved beyond inclusivism into a pluralist 
position. Paul Knitter, for example cites Schillebeeckx’s claim that “there is more 
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religious truth in all the religions together than in one particular religion”7 as evidence 
that Schillebeeckx has affirmed the pluralist option. According to Knitter, Schillebeeckx 
is making a bold statement which he believes many Christians inwardly affirm but are 
hesitant to outwardly express.8  
 Roger Haight, SJ also appears to locate Schillebeeckx in the pluralist paradigm. In 
his book, The Future of Christology, Haight compares and contrasts the methods and 
soteriologies of Karl Rahner and Schillebeeckx. According to Haight, Rahner’s theology 
represents a Christology from above, while Schillebeeckx represents a Christology from 
below. Rahner is clearly an inclusivist, indicated by his statements that all grace is the 
grace of Christ, that the life of Jesus plays a role in the salvation of all of humanity, and 
that there can only be one incarnation of the Logos.9 Schillebeeckx, in contrast to Rahner, 
begins with the historical Jesus and then examines his universal relevance. Here, Haight 
indicates that he is not aware that Schillebeeckx explicitly denies Rahner’s assertions that 
all grace is the grace of Christ or that the Logos could only become incarnate once. 
However, Haight argues that Schillebeeckx’s overall Christology and view of other world 
religions do not fit with such claims.10 By implication, Schillebeeckx must be a pluralist.  
  In her 1993 dissertation, Theology in the Context of Jewish-Christian Relations: 
The Contribution of Edward Schillebeeckx, Jacoba Kuikman states that Schillebeeckx 
                                                        
 
7 Schillebeeckx, The Collected Works of Edward Schillebeeckx, Vol 10: Church, The Human Story of God, 
Ed. Shoof, Sterkens, Borgman, Shreiter (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), 165, originally published as 
Mensen als verhaal van God (Baarn, 1989). 
8 Paul Knitter, Jesus and the Other Names: Christian Mission and Global Responsibility (Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis, 1996), 29.  
9 Roger Haight, The Future of Christology (New York: Continuum, 2005), 114.  
10 Haight, 115.  
 
 7 
rejects both exclusivism and inclusivism. She contends that Schillebeeckx does not see 
Christ as an anonymous cosmic presence in other religions nor does he see Christ as their 
final fulfillment. More tentative than Knitter, however, she only states that Schillebeeckx 
“might” fall into the pluralist camp.11 Similarly, John Hick, one of the leading 
philosophers of religious pluralism, names Edward Schillebeeckx’s work as having the 
potential to form “the basis for an authentically theocentric development of Christianity 
which is compatible with genuine religious pluralism.”12  
 In response to hints that Schillebeeckx might have been a pluralist, John Dunn 
and Lieven Boeve maintain that Schillebeeckx was an inclusivist throughout his 
theological career.  According to John Dunn, the theology of the later Schillebeeckx is 
theocentric rather than Christocentric, but still inclusivist. God is the universal savior who 
wills the salvation of all, but Jesus is the normative way to God.13 Lieven Boeve asserts 
that Schillebeeckx never wanted to go so far as to say that the particularity of religion is 
relative in terms of a universally shared mystical experience. For Schillebeeckx, Boeve 
insists, “in the end the Christian truth claim is the criterion for all other truth claims.”14 
For Boeve, this means that he is an inclusivist.  
                                                        
 
11 Jacoba Kuikman, Theology in the Context of Jewish- Christian Relations: The Contribution of Edward 
Schillebeeckx (PhD Dissertation: Toronto School of Theology, 1993), 243-44. 
12 John Hick, “Trinity and Incarnation in the Light of Religious Pluralism” in Three Faiths One God: A 
Jewish, Christian, Muslim Encounter, ed. John Hick and Edmund S. Meltze (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1989), 208-209. 
13 John Dunn, Jesus Christ as Universal Savior in Edward Schillebeeckx (PhD Dissertation: Catholic 
University of America, 1992), 452-54.  
14 Lieven Boeve, “Experience According to Edward Schillebeeck: The Driving Force of Faith and 
Theology,” in Divinising Experience: Essays in the History of Religious Experience from Origen to 
Ricoeur, Ed. Lieven Boeve & Laurence P. Hemmeing (Dudley, MA: Peeters, 2004), 220-221, footnote 61. 
See also Schillebeeckx, “Identiteit, eigenheid en unversaliteit van Gods heil in Jezus,” Tijdschrift voor 
theologie 30 (1990) 259-275 
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 Diane Steele takes a position in between these two groups of theologians. In her 
estimation, “Schillebeeckx has clearly stated his intention to move beyond inclusivism, 
but he has yet to work out all the implications of this position.”15 While theologians have 
located Schillebeeckx within one of the paradigms, there is no clear consensus over 
where he truly belongs. Furthermore, most of the references to Schillebeeckx in 
relationship to inclusivism or pluralism are rather brief and do not strongly defend the 
position to place Schillebeeckx in one paradigm over the other. This dissertation 
explicitly situates Schillebeeckx within the inclusivism paradigm and seeks not only to 
demonstrate why Schillebeeckx’s work is consistent with this position, but also proposes 
that an inclusivist position holds more promise for the future of interreligious dialogue 
than does a pluralist one.  
C. Edward Schillebeeckx’s Soteriology: An Inclusivist Resource for Interreligious 
Dialogue 
 The Second Vatican Council called upon Catholics to “read the signs of the 
times.”16 A clear “sign of the times” during and since the Council is that Catholics can no 
longer take for granted that their neighbors, co-workers, friends, and even family 
members share the same beliefs. It is inevitable that Catholics will constantly interact 
with persons from non-Christian traditions and non-believers, and will want to do so in a 
way that is peaceful and enriching. For some Catholic theologians, the “signs of the 
                                                        
 
15 Diane Steele, Creation and the Cross in the Later Soteriology of Edward Schillebeeckx, (PhD 
Dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 2000), 370. 
16 Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes: The Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the Modern 
World, in Vatican Council II: Constitutions, Decrees, Declarations, ed. Austin Flannery, OP (Northport: 
NY: Costello, 1996), 4.  
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times” call for us to move beyond all forms of inclusivism and embrace a pluralism that 
radically asserts the equality of all religious traditions, thereby diminishing the unique 
role of Jesus Christ and the Catholic Church. An increasing number of people have left 
the Catholic Church altogether, skeptical of the existence of any sort of “religious truth” 
and pessimistic about the ability of religion to foster peaceful co-existence in a diverse 
world. Some have given up on the possibility that there truly can be a Christianity which 
is both faithful to the Gospel and Christian tradition, while also being open to and 
desirous of learning about and from non-Christians. In this dissertation, I will argue that 
Edward Schillebeeckx provides a resource for understanding Christian identity and 
discipleship in a religiously pluralist world, demonstrating that one can be both faithful to 
Christian revelation, while recognizing that such faithfulness requires collaborative 
interaction with non-Christian traditions. 
1. Biographical Sketch 
 Edward Cornelis Florentius Alfons Schillebeeckx was born on November 12, 
1914 in Belgium, a country where nine out of ten Belgians are still baptized as Roman 
Catholics.17 As a young man, he was educated by the Jesuits but chose to enter the 
Dominican Order at the age of twenty. Schillebeeckx was particularly drawn to 
Dominican life, which strives to hold two mutually complementary activities in creative 
equilibrium: contemplation and the ministry of preaching.18 After joining the Domnican 
Order, he came under the tutelage of the Dominican philosopher Dominic DePetter at the 
                                                        
 
17 Philip Kennedy, Schillebeeckx (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1993), 16.  
18 Kennedy, 17.  
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Catholic university in Louvain. DePetter was particularly interested in phenomenology 
and sought to reinterpret the work of Aquinas utilizing modern theories of knowledge, 
psychology, and sociology. It was thanks to DePetter that Schillebeekx read philosophers 
such as Immanuel Kant, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Edmund Husserl, and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty.  
 During his postgraduate studies in Paris during the 1940s, Schillebeeckx became 
acquainted with the work of fellow Dominicans Yves Congar and Marie Dominique 
Chenu. In particular, Chenu’s book Une Ecole de Théologie: Le Saulchoir19 made a deep 
impression. In this work, Chenu emphasized the importance of history for theology, 
arguing that speculative theories occupy a secondary place in relation to the realities 
referred to in formulas of faith. Chenu, besides being a scholar, was also the inspiration 
behind the French worker priest movement. It was during this time in Paris that 
Schillebeeckx acquired his lifelong passion for the problem of the tension between world 
and church, creation and grace.20 From his earliest years as a theologian, one can trace a 
commitment on the part of Schillebeeckx to remain faithful to the Gospel and Christian 
tradition, not through mere obedience to Magisterial pronouncements and the repetition 
of dogmatic formulas, but in expressing what revelation and tradition have to say to the 
present situation.  
Schillebeeckx returned to Louvain from 1947 to 1957 to teach dogmatic theology 
at the Dominican house of studies. During this time, he was a spiritual guide to around 
                                                        
 
19 A School of Theology: The Saulchoir was condemned by the Holy Office, a former department of the 
Vatican, in 1942. It was charged, among other things, with arbitrating doctrinal disputes in the Catholic 
Church. See Kennedy, Schillebeeckx, 22.  
20 Ted Schoof, “E. Schillebeeckx: 25 years in Nijmegen,” in Theology Digest 37: 4 (1990), 315.  
 
 11 
fifty students while simultaneously working as a pastor in the prison in Louvain, hearing 
confessions and celebrating the Eucharist there on weekends.21 In 1952, he defended his 
dissertation on sacramental theology, entitled De Sacramentele Heilseconomie. In 1957, 
he accepted a position as Professor of Dogmatic and Historical Theology at the 
University of Nijmegen (now known as Radboud University) in the Netherlands. He 
remained connected to the University of Nijmegen until his death in 2009. At Nijmegen, 
Schillebeeckx’s theology was considered “progressive.” In all of his courses and 
seminars, he told students that, “theologians have to reflect on their present situation, 
facing the problems which it raises today, otherwise they are wasting their words.”22 
The Catholic Church in the Netherlands was experiencing significant changes 
long before the opening of the Second Vatican Council. Particularly noteworthy were the 
rise of “critical communities”: small groups of Catholics who recognized the primacy of 
local churches. These communities stressed the belief that wherever the Eucharist is 
celebrated, the Church is present. Even prior to the Second Vatican Council, these 
communities began experimenting with new organizational forms and specialized 
liturgies for different needs for the Catholic population.  It is important to note that this 
movement did not begin with theologians, but with the Dutch people themselves, most 
especially laity, who were engaged in professions such as journalism and the social 
sciences.23 Schillebeeckx sympathized with this growing movement and wanted to, in his 
                                                        
 
21 Schoof, 313.  
22 Edward Schillebeeckx, I Am A Happy Theologian (New York: Crossroad, 1994), 11.  
23 Kathleen McManus, Unbroken Communion: The Place and Meaning of Suffering in the Theology of 
Edward Schillebeeckx (New York: Rowman &Littlefield, 2003), 17.  
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own words, “supervise it theologically.”24 He felt that the future of the Church could be 
found in this communities.   
 Early on in his work, Schillebeeckx adopted a method of critical correlation 
which holds that there are two sources, or poles of Christian theology:  revelation25 
(which includes the Christian tradition) and experience. According to this method, one 
must avoid identifying the source of theology with only one of the two poles to the 
neglect of the other.26  Although present early on in Schillebeeckx’s theology, the explicit 
affirmation of the relation between these two sources is consistent with his earlier work 
on the development of dogma. In God The Future of Man (1968), this is illustrated by 
Schillebeeckx’s distinction between a dogma’s unchangeable “essence” and its historical 
and therefore, variable, “mode of expression.”27 Throughout Schillebeeckx’s career, there 
is a deep structural continuity in the way that he expresses our access to the faith 
alongside the interaction between theory and praxis.28 Past Christian tradition must 
                                                        
 
24 Edward Schillebeeckx, God is New Each Moment (New York: Continuum, 1983), 82.  
25 For Schillebeeckx, revelation includes not only Scripture, but also the whole of Christian tradition. 
According to Schillebeeckx, although revelation transcends human experience and thinking, revelation can 
only be perceived in human experience. He speaks of “revelation-in-reality” and “revelation-in-word,” 
which are both aspects of one and the same divine speaking, or of the word of God. Revelation, therefore, 
is never given to us in a pure state, but in the language of faith. See  ”Revelation-In-Reality and Revelation-
in-Word,” in The Collected Works of Edward Schillebeeckx Vol 2: Revelation and Theology, Ed. Shoof, 
Sterkens, Borgman, Shreiter (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), 25-27, first published as “De dienst van het 
word in verband met de Eucharistieviering, in TL 44 (1960): 44-61.  
26 Edward Schillebeeckx, The Collected Works of Edward Schillebeeckx, Vol 8: Interim Report on the 
Books Jesus and Christ, Ed. Shoof, Sterkens, Borgman, Shreiter (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), 3, 
originally published as Tussentijids verhaal over Jezus boeken (Bloemendaal, 1978). 
27 Schillebeeckx, “Towards a Catholic Use of Hermeneutics,” in The Collected Works of Edward 
Schillebeeckx, Vol 3: God The Future of Man, Ed. Shoof, Sterkens, Borgman, Shreiter (New York: 
Bloomsbury, 2014), 6-7. 
28 Martin Poulsom, “New Resonances in Classic Motifs: Finding Schillebeeckx’s Theology in Translation,” 
Louvain Studies 38 (2014), 378.  
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continuously be related to “our contemporary socio-historical and existential situation” 
and “to the concrete praxis of present day Christians.”29  
 While Schillebeeckx’s theological approach can be termed a “method of 
correlation,” it is important to distinguish his method from the method of correlation used 
by Paul Tillich. According to Tillich, “the method of correlation explains the contents of 
the Christian faith through existential questions and theological answers in mutual 
interdependence.”30 For Tillich, experience is a medium, but not a source of revelation. 
Schillebeeckx, however, refers to the situation as a source of theology.31 He insists that 
the situation and tradition are inseparable, as the situation shapes and colors the inherited 
tradition of faith. According to Schillebeeckx, theology is not concerned with a 
correlation of human questions and religious answers, but with a correlation of answers. 
For a human question, only a human answer can be meaningful.32 By the time of his 1990 
work, Church: The Human Story of God, Schillebeeckx dropped the term “correlation 
and instead chose to speak of an “interrelationship” between the two poles of theology, 
believing that the term “interrelationship” was broad enough to cover the widespread of 
possible relations, listing correlation alongside a number of others.33 
                                                        
 
29 Edward Schillebeeckx, “Theological Interpretation of Faith in 1983,” in The Collected Works of Edward 
Schillebeeckx Vol 11: Essays: Ongoing Theological Quests, Ed. Shoof, Sterkens, Borgman, Shreiter (New 
York: Bloomsbury, 2014), 60.  
30 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology: Volume One (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 60.  
31 Aloysius Rego, Suffering and Salvation: The Salvific Meaning of Suffering in the Later Theology of 
Schillebeeckx (Dudley, MA: Eerdman’s, 2006), 134-35.  
32 Lieven Boeve, “Experience According to Edward Schillebeeckx: The Driving Force of Faith and 
Theology, “in Divinising Experience: Essays in the History of Religious Experience from Origen to 
Ricoeur, Ed. Lieven Boeve & Laurence P. Hemming (Dudley, MA: Peeters, 2004), 203.  
33 Poulsom, 377.  
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 Schillebeeckx’s reliance upon experience has not been without its critics. In fact, 
modern Roman Catholic theology has been particularly wary of this concept. In his 1907 
encyclical Pascendi Dominici Gregis, “On the Doctrine of the Modernists,” Pope Pius X 
condemned the Modernist use of experience as a criterion for theology, in which religious 
truths could be derived and interpreted under the influence of contemporary experience.34 
The conciliar document Dei Verbum listed three factors in the progress of the tradition: 
theology, experience, and the Magisterium. The insertion of “experience,”, however, was 
opposed by a number of the Council Fathers, including Cardinal Browne and Cardinal 
Ruffini who insisted that it might suggest that the tradition was made known by merely 
subjective criteria, or that dogmatic truths could originate with human consciousness.35 
After the Second Vatican Council, Belgian priest and theologian Antoine Vergote 
criticized what he saw as “the too facile appeal to experience in faith theology,” and 
named Schillebeeckx as a prime example of this trend. Accentuating the role of 
experience in faith, Vertgote insisted, runs the risk of reducing the Christian faith to a 
kind of general human faith. Vergote argued that faith is something in its own right. He 
believes that it is faith that produces experience, rather than experience that produces 
faith.36   
                                                        
 
34 See Pope Pius XI, Pascendi Dominici Gregis, Encyclical on the Doctrines of the Modernists, Available 
from http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-x/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-x_enc_19070908_pascendi-
dominici-gregis.html For a better overview of Magisterial teaching on experience, see Allesandro 
Maggiolini, “Magisterial Teaching on Experience in the Twentieth Century: From the Modernist Crisis to 
the Second Vatican Council,” Communion: International Catholic Review 23:2 (1996); 225-43.  
35 Maggiolini, 239.  
36 Boeve, 219-20.  
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Schillebeeckx expressed sympathy for the history of Roman Catholic reluctance 
toward appeals to experience, especially since, in the early twentieth century, experiences 
were often misunderstood as states of feeling, our purely subjective, inner imitations.37 
Schillebeeckx, however, defines experience as “learning through direct contact with 
people and things. It is the ability to assimilate perceptions.” 38 Quoting Gaudium et Spes’ 
assertion that “God reveals himself by revealing man to himself,”39 Schillebeeckx views 
the appeal to experience as a way of following the Council’s call to “read the signs of the 
times.”40 This is due to the realization that there can be no revelation without experience. 
Christianity began not with a doctrine, but with an experience: the early disciples’ 
encounter with Jesus Christ. Furthermore, the fact that revelation comes to us in human 
language, as in the Old and New Testaments, shows that revelation is essentially 
concerned with human experience.41 It is God’s saving action as experienced and 
communicated by human beings. Therefore, the question of whether to begin with the 
New Testament or with present day experience is a false alternative.42  
                                                        
 
37 Edward Schillebeeckx, The Collected Works of Edward Schillebeeckx, Vol 7: Christ: The Christian 
Experience in the Modern World, Ed. Shoof, Sterkens, Borgman, Shreiter (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), 
30, originally published as Gerechtigheid en liefde, genade en bevrijding (Bloemendaal, 1997). 
38 Schillebeeeckx, Christ, 17.  
39 Gaudium et Spes, 41.  
40 There is much evidence to show that historical experience played a major role in shaping the views that 
prevailed at the Second Vatican Council. Pope John XXIII, who inaugurated the council, spent almost 
twenty-three years living outside of Europe in predominantly Muslim countries where Catholics were a 
minority, an experience none of his predecessors had.  John O’Malley, SJ asserts that for “Vatican insiders 
like Cardinal Ottaviani and Cardinal Ruffini, who were not used to having their authority questioned, 
outreach to other faiths and cultures was likely a more difficult prospect. See What Happened at Vatican II 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 103-10. Similarly, John Courtney Murray, SJ, hailed as 
the leader of the “progressive movement of the Council,” was involved in interfaith organizations during 
World War II and authored the document “the Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant Declaration of World 
Peace.”  
41 Schillebeeckx, Christ, 31.  
42 Schillebeeeckx, Christ, 59.   
 
 16 
2. Method of this dissertation  
This dissertation utilizes Schillebeeckx’s method of critical correlation. The 
necessary interrelationship between revelation and experience, and theory and praxis, 
play a prominent role in my evaluation of the various approaches to the question of the 
relationship between Christianity and non-Christian religions, and explain why this 
question is crucial today.  In Chapter One, I examine the inclusivist and the pluralist 
paradigms and how each has dealt with Christianity’s relationship to non-Christian 
religions. I discuss Karl Rahner, SJ and Jacques Dupuis, SJ as examples of Catholic 
theologians who uphold an inclusivist position, and Paul Knitter and Roger Haight, SJ as 
Catholic examples of the pluralist position. While Rahner and Dupuis’ understandings of 
salvation focus primarily on the eschatological, Knitter and Haight emphasize the this-
worldliness of salvation to the neglect of the Christian revelation that holds that Jesus 
Christ as the promise and cause of Christian hope for eschatological salvation.43 
Schillebeeckx’s understanding of salvation upholds the constant interaction between 
revelation and experience, allowing for an inclusivist position that is faithful to the 
Christian tradition and responsive to the contemporary situation of religious pluralism. 
Chapter Two traces Schillebeeckx’s development of the concept of “the negative 
contrast experience.” The negative contrast experience holds that within every experience 
                                                        
 
43 Eschatological salvation refers to a definitive end that has not arrived, but of whom Jesus Christ is the 
promise and guarantor. Fragments of salvation are here and now,eschatological salvation is reserved for the 
future. However, eschatological salvation is related to and dependent upon this world. Schillebeeckx 
insisted that “eschatological or final salvation— let us call it heaven— takes shape from what men on earth 
achieve as salvation for their fellow men.” Without fragments of salvation within our current human 
existence, belief in final, or eschatological salvation would appear to be a mere illusion. See The Collected 
Works of Edward Schillebeeckx, Vol 7: Christ: The Christian Experience in the Modern World, Ed. Shoof, 
Sterkens, Borgman, Shreiter (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), 789.  
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of unjust suffering, human beings have a vague perception of what healing or wholeness 
must entail. This experience is universally shared among all human beings, whether they 
are Christians, non-Christians, or even non-believers. Therefore, I argue that it can serve 
as a starting point for interreligious dialogue. In this chapter, I also take up some critiques 
of the negative contrast experience and attempt to respond them. 
Since the negative contrast experience is common to everyone, it necessarily 
follows that fragments of this-worldly salvation can be seen in the praxis of other 
traditions, including the rituals, practices, and beliefs that motivate such praxis. Chapter 
Three demonstrates how this can be so by explaining the connection Schillbeeeckx makes 
between creation and salvation. For Schillebeeckx, salvation history begins with creation. 
Thus, he insists, “there is no salvation outside the world.”44 Schillebeeckx’s assertion that 
“there is no salvation outside the world,” I will argue, implies “no salvation apart from 
religious others.” This conclusion is necessary because, for Schillebeeckx, salvation is a 
communal reality and therefore, salvation for one group or person cannot consist of the 
denigration or neglect of others. Schillebeeckx’s inclusivist soteriology maintains that the 
wisdom of non-Christians and non-believers is essential for the praxis of bringing about 
the reign of God, but still insists that Jesus Christ still remains the guarantor of 
eschatological salvation, one who cannot simply be placed on the same level as other 
religious figures in history.  
                                                        
 
44 See The Collected Works of Edward Schillebeeckx, Vol 10: Church, The Human Story of God, Ed. Shoof, 
Sterkens, Borgman, Shreiter (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), 12, originally published as Mensen als 
verhaal van God (Baarn, 1989). 
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Chapter Four seeks to explain the meaning of the term “dialogue” and presents 
Schillebeeckx’s notion of the humanum as an essential element in interreligious dialogue. 
The humanum, or what human wholeness entails, has no uniform definition, but all 
persons can agree that the humanumm, however they may define it, is threatened and 
damaged. This acknowledgement allows for persons with different and even 
contradictory religious beliefs to cooperate in responding to the threatened humanum 
without giving up their beliefs or watering them down to avoid disagreement. I use the 
example of Islam and Christianity to illustrate this point. I choose to focus on Islam here 
for two reasons. First, in today’s political climate, Muslims and Christians are often 
believed to be in opposition to one another. Second, both Islam and Christianity make 
absolute claims. While Christians believe that Jesus plays a unique role in salvation 
history, Muslims believe that Muhammad is God’s Prophet and the Quran is literally 
God’s word.  
In Chapter Five, I apply Schillbeeckx’s soteriology to concrete struggles faced by 
Muslim and Catholic women. Patriarchy is manifest in both Islam and Catholicism, and 
this represents an example of the threatened humanum. Therefore, a comparison of the 
two traditions cannot make the simple conclusion that one tradition is irredeemably 
oppressive and the other is enlightened. Neither tradition can be said to contain all that is 
necessary to bring about healing and wholeness in this world. The response to this 
situation demands a soteriology that recognizes the necessity of dialogue with non-
Christian religions without insisting upon the adoption of a pluralist paradigm that seeks 
to eradicate religious disagreements.  
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In the conclusion, I will reiterate why Schillebeeckx’s claim “no salvation outside 
the world” implies “no salvation apart from religious others.” I will also clarify some 
possible misconceptions; namely, that those who do not engage in interreligious dialogue 
are not destined for eternal damnation, nor are Christians able to “save themselves” 
through dialogue with religious others. God  is always the primary cause of salvation. 
Human actions always remain partial and fragmentary and therefore, await eschatological 
fulfillment. Nevertheless, our hope in eschatological salvation is only possible if we 
witness glimpses of salvation in this world. The world, for Christians today, is one in 
which members of multiple faith traditions and non-believers are in constant contact. 
Thus, the salvation we experience in this world can and must be experienced in the 






IS THE PLURALIST PARADIGM THE ONLY OPTION? 
 
 In the introduction, I briefly defined each of the three paradigms in the theology 
of religions as they have been developed by Christian theologians.45 The exclusivist 
position holds that there is no salvation or religious truth outside of Christianity. 
Inclusivism holds that there is salvation outside of Christianity, but that all salvation 
ultimately comes from Jesus Christ. This position insists that there is truth and wisdom 
found in other traditions from which Christianity can learn, even if Christianity is 
considered to be the “most true” or “most complete.” Pluralism strives to move beyond 
inclusivism, stating that all religions are equally true and are ways of salvation in their 
own right without the mediation of Jesus Christ. These definitions, however, are 
extremely simplistic. In fact, there is considerable diversity and disagreement among 
theologians in each of the paradigms.  
As was also mentioned in the introduction, after the Second Vatican Council the 
official position of the Roman Catholic Church toward non-Christian religions can be 
characterized as inclusivist. However, as I intend to demonstrate in the following pages, 
the theology of Schillebeeckx illustrates that a Catholic can maintain an inclusivist 
position, while going further than official Catholic teaching does regarding non-Christian 
                                                        
 
45 When first articulated by Alan Race in 1982, the three paradigms were described as “a broad typological 
framework within which most of the current Christian theology of religions can be placed.” See Race, 
Christians and Religious Pluralism: Patterns in the Christian Theology of Religions (Maryknoll, NY, 
1982), 7. However, scholars of other traditions have made use of the three paradigms to describe positions 
among their own communities toward religious others. Both John Makransky, an inclusivist, and Rita 
Gross, a pluralist, do this with regard to Buddhism. See John Makransky, “Buddhist Perspectives on Truth 
in Other Religions: Past and Present,” Theological Studies Journal 64:2 (2003) and Rita Gross, “Feminist 
Theology as Theology of Religions,” in The Cambridge Companion to Feminist Theology, ed. Susan Frank 
Parsons (Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
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religions. This is why inclusivist theologians, like their pluralist counterparts, have come 
under suspicion, critique, or condemnation by the hierarchy of the Catholic Church.46  
In this chapter, I will first make some general comments about the shift from 
modernity to postmodernity and how it relates to issues in interreligious dialogue. I will 
briefly talk about two feminist theologians who, in light of postmodernism, offer critiques 
of universal narratives and therefore, believe the inclusivist paradigm is incompatible 
with any type of liberation theology. Next, I will consider the positions of two major 
Catholic representatives of the inclusivist position, Karl Rahner, SJ and Jacques Dupuis, 
SJ, as well as two major Catholic representatives of the pluralist position, Paul Knitter 
and Roger Haight, SJ. In this section, I will focus particularly on their understandings of 
salvation, and how each of their positions is problematic for contemporary interreligious 
dialogue. My observation is that Rahner and Dupuis’ inclusivist positions do not go far 
enough in their openness to non-Christian religions, while the pluralism proposed as a 
solution to the critiques of inclusivism sacrifices the specifics of various faiths, not letting 
others be others. Finally, I will place Edward Schillebeeckx within the discussion of these 
paradigms. I find Schillebeeckx to be a representative of the inclusivist position. 
Schillebeeckx offers an alternative narrative of inclusivism that demonstrates that 
inclusivist positions are not, as some claim, incompatible with fruitful interreligious 
dialogue and cooperation, nor with feminist or other liberationist concerns.  
                                                        
 
46 Schillebeeckx work was investigated, but never officially condemned by the Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith between 1976-1980. Among other issues, Schillebeeckx’s work was questioned for its 
“certain relativization of the ecclesial institution.” See The Schillebeeckx Case: Official Exchange of 
Letters and Documents in the Investigation of Fr. Edward Schillebeeckx, OP by the Sacred Congregation 
for the Doctrine of the Faith, 1976-1980, Ed. Ted Schoof OP, Trans. Matthew J. O’Connell (Eugene, OR: 
Wipf and Stock, 2011).  
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A. Pluralism as Necessary for Feminism? 
 
There is a general consensus among most scholars that a fundamental shift is 
occurring, particularly in Western society, from the modern to the postmodern. David 
Tracy, for example, argues that the defining characteristic of our age, caught between the 
modern and the postmodern, is its inability to name itself.47 Postmodern thought calls into 
question the modern sense of a unified, individual subject, and is suspicious of narratives 
or metanarratives of history, culture, or national identity. As a result, the rise of 
postmodern thinking has created a resistance to unified theories and stable categories. 
Another mark of postmodernity has been an increased interest in spiritualities that are not 
anchored within religious traditions. In the postmodern understanding, “spiritualty” is no 
longer tied solely to Christianity, nor exclusively based on an a priori theological 
standpoint; rather it is rooted in search, experimentation, and exploring.48  Skepticism 
toward arguments from authority and universal frameworks, and how these have 
contributed to the oppression of certain groups of people, has had a tremendous effect on 
Christian self-understanding in a pluralist world. In particular, a view of inclusivism has 
arisen that sees this paradigm as incompatible with resistance to oppression, particularly 
when perceived differences between certain groups turn into a cause for discrimination 
and violence. To illustrate, I will focus on two feminist theologians who argue that the 
inclusivist position is not suitable for engagement in the struggle for the liberation of 
marginalized persons.  
                                                        
 
47 David Tracy, On Naming the Present: God, Hermeneutics, and Church (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1994), 3-
24.  
48 Ursula King, Faith and Praxis in a Post-Modern Age (Cassell, 1998), 97.  
 
 23 
1. Marjorie Suchocki  
Marjorie Suchocki is a United Methodist professor emerita at Claremont School 
of Theology. She argues that the use of universal narratives in religion is related to the 
practice of sexism. In particular, she insists that the idea that Christianity is normative or 
universal can be related to the oppression of women in two ways. First, she points to “the 
sense in which masculine experience has been universalized in defining all that is 
human.” Second, she also finds fault with an approach that instead of erasing women’s 
experience under male norms, assigns to women those characteristics that men consider 
problematic such as dependence, emotionality, and weakness.49 Relating these two forms 
of oppression to the three paradigms, Suchocki likens the second to exclusivism and the 
first to inclusivism, though in the end inclusivism, for her, always becomes a form of 
exclusivism. She states that the second case stems from an instance of the first, “for the 
qualities assigned to women are not derived from women’s own testimony but from 
masculine experience projected upon women.”50 Similarly, inclusivist positions seem to 
assign qualities to non-Christians that are drawn from Christian experience, rather than 
the experience of the other tradition.  
From Suchocki’s perspective, the problem with the inclusivist paradigm is that it 
makes the particular universal (for Christianity, “the particular” is Jesus). This position 
allows Christians to maintain an air of superiority, since Jesus Christ is seen as “the 
                                                        
 
49 Marjorie Suchocki, “In Search of Justice: Religious Pluralism from a Feminist Perspective,” in The Myth 
of Christian Uniqueness: Toward a Pluralistic Theology of Religions, ed. John Hick and Paul Knitter 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1987), 150-51.  
50 Suchocki, 151.  
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ultimately decisive, definitive, and archetypal” man51 and therefore, is used as a norm or 
criterion of judgment by which to evaluate other religions. For Suchocki, this violates the 
integrity of non-Christian religions and “renders invisible or secondary all those in whom 
the norm is not found.”52 It also, in her view, makes Christians unable to be self-critical 
when necessary.   
Suchcoki does not explicitly go so far as to insist that all persons must adopt the 
pluralist paradigm, but some who read her work may assume that this is implied given 
her staunch rejection of inclusivism. She proposes that justice be used as a norm for 
ethical life since this makes more room for the affirmation of religious pluralism and 
“shifts the focus of dialogue to the concreteness of human well-being.”53 In using justice 
as a norm, Suchocki makes the case that common agreement could be discovered by all 
religions if one would look, not to their culture-bound concrete ethics, but to their 
projected ideals. In other words, religions should be looking at “ultimate rather than 
penultimate visions of justice.”54 This proposal presumes that the projected ideals of each 
religion are fundamentally the same, an assumption held by pluralists. 
 
                                                        
 
51 Here, Suchocki is referring to the Christian theologian Hans Kung, who has been categorized as a 
representative of the inclusivist position. See Kung, On Being a Christian, trans. Edward Quinn (Garden 
City, NY: Doubleday, 1976), 123. While Schillebeeckx’s inclusivism is different from that of Kung, 
Schillebeeckx makes similar claims about Jesus as a norm of humanity. In Jesus, Schillebeeckx insists, we 
witness “an unveiling of the true face of God and a disclosure of the true being of man.” Jesus’ humanity 
thus becomes the measure by which we ought to judge ourselves. The Collected Words of Edward 
Schillebeeckx Vol 6: Jesus, An Experiment in Christology, Ed. Shoof, Sterkens, Borgman, Shreiter (New 
York: Bloomsbury, 2014), 566, originally published as Jezus, het verhaal van een levende (Blemendaal, 
1974).   
52 Suchocki, 153-54.  
53 Suchocki, 160.  
54 Suchocki, 159.  
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2. Rita Gross  
Rita Gross (1943-2015) grew up in a Lutheran family, converted to Judaism while 
working on her master’s degree at University of Chicago, but finally found her home in 
Buddhism shortly thereafter. After completing her PhD at the University of Chicago in 
1975, she became a leading Buddhist feminist scholar and remained so until her death in 
2015.55 Like Suchocki, Gross was also critical of the inclusivist position.56 While 
Suchocki took issue with religious imperialism for its indirect relation to sexism, Gross 
called out feminism itself for being part of the problem. Gross argued that feminist 
movements often fail to pay attention to religious diversity and thus, tend to universalize 
women’s experience on the basis of white, middle-class, and heterosexual experience. 
Furthermore, she claimed that feminists tend to equate the term “religion” with 
Christianity.57 In her view, the inclusivist position bears responsibility for this situation. 
Gross also claimed that the “tendency in Western thinking to turn difference into 
hierarchy” is inherent in the inclusivist paradigm. Inclusivism, from Gross’ perspective, 
                                                        
 
55 See Rita Gross, “Autobiographical Roots to Dialogue,” in Rita Gross and Rosemary Radford Ruether, 
Religious Feminism and the Future of the Planet: A Buddhist-Christian Conversation, (New York: 
Continuum, 2001), 25- 47. Given their dialogue may lead one to question why I did not include Rosemary 
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implies competition and always leads to mutual hostility. Therefore, she concluded that 
the pluralist paradigm is the only suitable choice for any feminist theology of religions.58 
In agreement with Suchocki, she held that in evaluating religious phenomena, “ethical 
behavior is far more important than theological doctrines.” From her study of world 
religions, it was clear to Gross that many cogent theories exist, and “there is no particular 
need to rank or evaluate them against one another.”59  
According to Gross, women, particularly feminists, have thus far played a limited 
role in interreligious gatherings and have not contributed to literature on religious 
diversity and interreligious dialogue to the same degree as their male counterparts.60 
However, she claimed that “women and feminists have kept themselves out of the inter-
religious arena almost as much as they have been kept out.”61 Facing the issue of 
religious diversity, she insisted, requires each religion to give up any claims to “unique 
universal and exclusive relevance.”62 Gross noted that this is particularly difficult for 
Christians. She surmised that Christian feminists often feel vulnerable because of 
opposition to their feminism from their own communities and therefore, need to “prove 
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their orthodoxy to skeptical colleagues.”63 Moreover, in religious communities where 
women are denied access to positions of authority, interreligious dialogue is often not 
seen as an issue that is “gender urgent” enough.64 Gross argued that this should not be the 
case, since “the history of the feminist theological movement itself provides the first 
major feminist reason for being concerned with religious diversity.”65 
Feminist theology came into being because women’s experience has been 
excluded by patriarchal religion, and thus it maintains the conviction that the voices of 
the excluded deserve to be heard. If feminist theology were to silence the voices of non-
Christian religions by making itself an exclusively Christian movement, it would 
contradict itself and participate in the same type of oppression it claims to be trying so 
hard to resist. Gross’s critiques in this regard appear to be valid. One can legitimately 
make the case that feminist theology and other theologies of liberation have not 
adequately recognized the voices of non-Christian religions and what might be learned 
from them. Gross herself spoke of being questioned about whether Buddhist feminism is 
a movement in its own right with its own unique voice and contributions, or whether it is 
simply borrowing from Christian feminist theology.66 Oftentimes at feminist gatherings, 
Gross expressed that colleagues often dismissed her concerns about a lack of religious 
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diversity in feminist movements.67 Carol P. Christ speaks of widespread discrimination in 
the area of feminist theology, highlighting how non-Christian women are often passed 
over for jobs, and overlooked during the planning of conferences, among other forms of 
exclusion.68   
Gross’s position raises an important question: would abandoning all forms of 
inclusivism in favor of a pluralist position provide a sufficient solution to the issue of 
women’s exclusion from interreligious dialogue?  Or, does the exclusion of non-Christian 
women from feminist interreligious dialogue? Is the pluralist position really the only one 
capable of addressing and dealing with a lack of diversity? It would certainly behoove 
most people today to engage in more critical self-reflection and learn more about 
religious others. However, I want to argue that one can do so without giving up all 
absolute and normative religious claims, and without subscribing to the position that all 
religions are completely equal. After discussing some major Catholics articulations of the 
inclusivist and pluralist paradigms, I will argue that Edward Schillebeeckx does just that. 
B. The Inclusivist Position- Karl Rahner 
 
Karl Rahner, SJ (1904-1984) was a German Jesuit priest and theologian. During 
the Second Vatican Council, he was appointed to be a peritus69 by Pope John XXIII and 
subsequently chosen as one of the seven theologians who would develop the document 
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Lumen Gentium.70 Rahner recognized that the twentieth century was different from 
previous eras in that, due to the modern pluralism of ideas, faith could no longer be taken 
for granted. For Rahner, religious pluralism represents the “gravest element” of this 
pluralism of ideas.71 In Rahner’s view, pluralism is an unfortunate situation, which 
ideally should not exist, but nevertheless, must be thought about and dealt with by 
contemporary Catholics.  
Karl Rahner’s engagement with the reality of religious pluralism was quite novel 
for the time. The Second Vatican Council document Gaudium et Spes: The Pastoral 
Constitution of the Church in the Modern World, was considered revolutionary for 
addressing itself not just to Catholics, but to “the whole of humanity.” 72 This marked a 
break with previous church teaching. In 1832, Pope Gregory XVI called perverse, the 
claim that “it is possible to obtain eternal salvation of the soul by the profession of any 
kind of religion, as long as morality is maintained.”73 In the Syllabus of Errors, 
promulgated in 1894, Pope Pius IX condemned “indifferentism,” which included such 
beliefs as “every man is free to embrace that religion which, guided by the light of 
reason, he shall consider true;” “man may, in observance of any religion whatever, find 
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the way of eternal salvation, and arrive at eternal salvation;” and “good hope at least is to 
be entertained of all those who are not at all in the true Church.”74 
 In the face of religious pluralism, Rahner took a clearly inclusivist position. He 
insisted that there can never be an absolute positive synthesis of Christian belief and all 
other items of knowledge. Therefore, he argued that a Catholic cannot accept the 
judgment that all religions are equally justifiable and only differ on inessential points, 
since such a position would represent “the total overthrow of the Christian and Catholic 
faith.” The conviction that “Christianity is the unique and absolute religion founded by 
God through Christ and prescribed by him for all men” is an “intrinsic element” of 
Christian faith.75 Another essential aspect of explicit Christian faith is the assertion that 
Jesus Christ is the absolute Savior. Rahner held that the title “absolute” must be applied 
to Jesus since he is  
that historical person who appears in time and space and signifies the beginning 
of the absolute self-communication of God which is moving towards its goal, that 
beginning which indicates that self-communication for everyone has taken place 
irrevocably and has been victoriously inaugurated.76 
 
According to Rahner, the history of revelation has reached its “absolute climax” in Jesus 
Christ and is thus, unsurpassable.77 It is the final word of God and nothing can be said 
beyond it.78 Rahner also claimed that even during his lifetime, Jesus knew himself to be 
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the absolute savior.79 According to Jesus’ own self-understanding, “he is already before 
the resurrection the one sent, the one who inaugurates the kingdom of God through what 
he says and what he does in a way that did not exist before, but now does exists through 
him and in him”80  
Rahner’s declaration that Jesus is the absolute and unsurpassable savior does not 
mean that non-Christians are unable to attain salvation. Salvation, in Rahner’s 
understanding, is “the supernatural and direct presence of God in himself afforded by 
grace.81 However, this salvation is always dependent on Jesus Christ. Yet, because God’s 
offer of salvation through Jesus Christ is the “effective salvific design of God for all,” 
every individual must have the possibility of “partaking in a genuine saving relationship 
to God, and this at all times and in all situations of the history of the human race.”82 Thus, 
salvation is universal (communal). The human being “does not seek any heaven from 
which some other man is excluded from the outset.”83  
Rahner explained his universal understanding of salvation through the concept of 
the supernatural existential. According to this concept, God’s self-communication is 
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present in every person, implicitly, as an offer. At the same time, this offer is the 
necessary condition for a person’s acceptance of it, in other words, for an explicit 
response to God. The supernatural existential enabled Rahner to speak of the possibility 
of an “anonymous Christian,” who, after the Christian mission, “lives in the state of 
Christ’s grace through faith, hope and love, but has no explicit knowledge of the fact that 
his life is oriented in grace-given salvation to Jesus Christ.”84  
 Rahner appealed to the doctrine of the Trinity in order to explain the concept of 
“anonymous Christianity,” or how Christ is present in non-Christian religions through the 
Spirit. This notion implies that other religions contain some truth and make a positive 
contribution to one’s spiritual well-being. Rahner maintained that “when a non-Christian 
wins salvation through hope and love, the non-Christian religions cannot be thought to 
have played no part, or only a negative one, in this winning of justification and 
salvation.”85 Therefore, he thoroughly opposed any form of exclusivism, including forms 
of “universal access exclusivism,”86 as expounded by Joseph DiNoia and Ladislaus 
Boros.87 Furthermore, he held that suggestions such as “private revelations and 
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extraordinary illuminations, especially at the hour of death” are “arbitrary and improbable 
postulates,” which contradict the basic social character of Christian revelation and human 
nature. Rahner asserted that, “even in one’s most personal history, the human is a social 
being whose innermost decisions are mediated by the concreteness of one’s social and 
historical life, and are not acted out in a realm which is separate.”88  
 In contemporary society, Rahner pointed out, Catholics no longer live in a 
sphere that is homogenously Catholic and thus, non- Christian religions “no longer 
constitute an area of foreign folklore which has no bearing upon the course of life modern 
man maps out for himself.”89 Rather, non-Christians have become our neighbors, 
neighbors in whom the Christian cannot fail to recognize just as high a degree of 
intelligence as his or she possesses. Christians must always recognize that “even 
Christianity and the Church themselves are constantly in process of seeking the 
perfection of their own nature.”90 This puts them in a position to recognize the religiously 
positive tendencies in other religions, which, though not yet explicitly Christian, the 
church must absorb. In particular, Rahner proposed that Christian and non-Christian 
theists can and must learn from one another through their common struggle against 
atheism.91  
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 However, one must not mistake Rahner’s statements as implying that other 
religions are “on par” with Christianity, or that other religious figures are “on par” with 
Jesus Christ.92 Even though anonymous Christianity is prior to explicit Christianity, it 
does not render the latter superfluous. Rahner claimed that the church still has a 
missionary task, though its theology of mission must be interpreted anew. Mission can no 
longer be regarded as necessary on the grounds that individuals would be lost without 
hearing the gospel, since such persons can still be saved. However, Rahner explained that 
the self-realization of a previously anonymous Christianity is still demanded for two 
reasons. The first is the incarnational and social structure of grace and of Christianity. 
Grace is incarnational and “of its very nature seeks its historical embodiment in the word 
and above all in the sacrament.”93 Second, all else being equal, the explicit Christian, 
according to Rahner, has a “still greater chance of salvation than someone who is merely 
an anonymous Christian.”94 Non-Christian religions are provisional in character and 
await their fulfillment in Christianity. They are lawful in different ways and to varying 
degrees depending on the circumstances without thereby, denying the “error and 
depravity” contained in them.   
 Rahner defined a lawful religion as an institutional religion whose use at a 
certain period of time can be regarded “as a positive means of gaining the right 
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relationship with God and thus for attaining salvation, a means which is therefore 
positively included in God’s plan and salvation.”95 Non-Christian religions are only 
lawful “until the moment when the gospel really enters into the historical situation of an 
individual”96 Nevertheless, Rahner always maintained that it is impossible to determine 
precisely when such a moment occurs and the absolute obligation of Christianity comes 
into effect for each person.97  Even when Christianity is brought to someone through the 
preaching of the church and he or she rejects it, Christians are never in any position to 
decide whether this rejection signifies a grave fault or an act of faithfulness to one’s 
conscience.98 Furthermore, no one, not even the explicit Christian, can pinpoint with 
exact certainty whether or not we said “yes” or “no” to God.99 Therefore, Christians 
cannot go around pointing fingers at individuals of other traditions and insist that they are 
in any way morally culpable.  
In response to claims that anonymous Christianity is patronizing to non-Christians 
who do not identify themselves as such, Rahner clarified, “there is no problem in my 
treating someone as an anonymous Christian, even if he energetically denies my 
interpretation and rejects it as false or incoherent.” To defend this statement, Rahner 
referred to an exchange he had with the well-known Japanese philosopher Nishitani. 
Nishitani asked Rahner what he would think of being called an anonymous Zen Buddhist. 
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Rahner replied that Nishitani may refer to him as such and that he would feel “honored 
by such an interpretation.”100 For Rahner, the term “anonymous Christian” is meant to 
help Christian self-understanding and is really the only way to adequately describe how 
the Christian can maintain both the possibility of supernatural salvation for non-
Christians, and the belief that salvation cannot be gained without reference to God and 
Christ.101 He never posed any objection to those wishing to avoid the terms “anonymous 
Christianity” or “implicit Christianity” but he did insist that those persons must provide 
another term.102  
Karl Rahner’s “anonymous Christianity” has continuously been critiqued.103 
Edward Schillebeeckx, in his later work, sought to distance himself from the use of the 
term “anonymous Christianity.”104 In his 1968 book, God the Future of Man, he argued 
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that the church today must understand herself as a church in dialogue. Such dialogue, he 
insisted, cannot be regarded as possible solely because the church can recognize 
something of herself in others and can interpret others as anonymous Christians. 
Schillebeeckx did not wish to deny the reality of what is called anonymous Christianity, 
but wanted to affirm that “it is necessary, if dialogue is to be sincere, for others to be 
involved in that dialogue precisely as others and therefore precisely as non-Christians.”105 
Schillebeeckx stated that it would be pointless, for example, to tell an atheist that he or 
she is an implicit theist or an anonymous Christian, since such a statement would imply 
that we are not taking the atheist dialogue partner seriously.106  
Catholic theologian Jeannine Hill Fletcher also believes that the term anonymous 
Christianity inhibits dialogue. She writes, “it seems as though Christians know in advance 
what to expect in faith perspectives of other religions because they are looking for Christ 
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present there.” Thus, such a theology “promotes a search for sameness that ignores the 
distinctive affirmations that might be found in the lives and experiences of persons of 
other faiths.”107 
C. The Inclusivist Position- Jacques Dupuis 
 
 Jacques Dupuis (1923-2004) was a Belgian Jesuit priest who spent thirty-four 
years of his life in India. His encounter with Hinduism made it clear to him that God had 
revealed God’s self in the Hindu religion, and prompted his lifelong reflections on 
religious pluralism. Dupuis’s reflections on non-Christian religions were more grounded 
in firsthand experience than those of Rahner. Dupuis spent much of his career in direct 
interaction with the Hindu population in India, which required him to read and familiarize 
himself with the Hindu Scriptures. Still, Dupuis sought to maintain an inclusivist 
position, though one which differed from Rahner’s and which ultimately led to trouble 
with the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith later in his career.  
 While Rahner insisted that pluralism is an unfortunate situation that ideally 
should not exist, Dupuis sought to defend the claim of “religious pluralism in principle.” 
As Dupuis explained,  
The question raised by the term “in principle” is whether the religious pluralism 
in which we are living today is simply to be accepted and tolerated as a de facto 
reality of our current world that must be taken into account, rather than as 
something unwelcome; that is, received gratefully as a positive factor that at the 
same time attests to the sovereign generosity with which God has manifested 
himself in many ways to humankind and to the manifold responses that 
humankind has made to God’s self-revelation in different cultures.108 
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Rahner can be described as representing the first position, which merely recognizes 
religious pluralism de facto. Dupuis, on the other hand, aligned himself strongly with the 
second position, stating confidently that religious pluralism in principle is based on the 
“immensity of a God who is Love and communication.”109 According to Dupuis, there is 
more truth and grace available and discoverable in the entire history of God’s relations 
with humankind, than in the Christian tradition alone.110The Congregation of the 
Doctrine of the Faith’s 2000 declaration Dominus Iesus: On the Unicity and Salvific 
Universality of Jesus Christ and the Church explicitly condemned “relativist theories 
which seek to justify religious pluralism, not only de facto but also de iure (or in 
principle).”111 Given the timing of its release, some believe that this document was 
composed in response to Dupuis’s 1997 work Toward a Christian Theology of Religious 
Pluralism.112  
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Nevertheless, Dupuis asserted that the recognition of religious pluralism in 
principle does not necessarily mean one must place all religions on the same level.113 He 
maintained that Jesus is the only mediator between God and human beings.114 However, 
he departed from Rahner by refusing to call Jesus the “absolute savior.” According to 
Dupuis, the term absolute can only be predicated of God, never of a finite being. Instead, 
Dupuis referred to Jesus as the “constitutive” Savior of humankind, meaning that, “Jesus 
has saving significance for all of humankind and the Christ event (in particular, the 
paschal mystery of his death and resurrection), is truly the cause of salvation for all 
human beings.”115  
  Like Rahner, Dupuis also drew upon Trinitarian theology to explain the presence 
of Jesus Christ in non-Christian religions, although he does not use the term “anonymous 
Christianity” and he ultimately reached different conclusions than Rahner. Inspired by the 
prologue to John’s Gospel, Dupuis claimed that the Logos (Word, or Second Person of 
the Trinity) is not exhausted by the historical reality of Jesus Christ, but rather was 
present and working in the world prior to the incarnation. According to Dupuis, the 
mystery of the Son is displayed in the humanity of Jesus but not limited to it; nonetheless, 
“no one is capable of communicating to human beings the mystery of God with greater 
depth than does the Son himself, who has become a human being.”116 The revelation of 
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God in Christ is complete, but not fully achieved. Its fullness is unsurpassable in history, 
but that does not mean it exhausts the entire mystery of God, which will remain hidden 
until the eschaton. Using this logic, Dupuis deduced that “the religious tradition of others 
is indeed for them a ways and means of salvation.” Christians must ascribe a certain 
mediation of grace to the religious practices and sacramental rites of other religions, even 
if, as Dupuis held, these “are not on the same footing as the Christian sacraments 
instituted by Christ.”117  
 Dupuis proposed that there is a mutual and asymmetrical complementarity 
between Christianity and other religions. Dialogue, defined as the exchange and sharing 
of saving values, is where mutual enrichment can take place.  Dupuis insisted that, “there 
are true and authentic aspects of the divine Mystery that are more deeply accented in 
other traditions than they are in the Christian tradition.” Nevertheless, although other 
traditions may provide “additional and autonomous values of truth and grace,” he upheld 
that these traditions cannot be understood as necessary for completing or fulfilling 
Christianity, since God’s revelation in Jesus Christ is ultimately “unsurpassable.”118   
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Aware of the critiques leveled against the inclusivism of Karl Rahner, Dupuis 
preferred to label his own position as a “pluralistic inclusivism,” or an “inclusive 
pluralism,” because it upholds the universal constitutive character of the Christ event, as 
well as the positive significance of non-Christian religious traditions.119 However, he 
consistently refrained from adopting a pluralist position due to his firm belief that the 
authenticity of dialogue requires that partners enter into it with the integrity of their 
faith.120 In dialogue, Dupuis insisted, one cannot bracket his or her beliefs. Dialogue 
cannot allow a syncretism that attempts to overcome contradictions among the faiths 
through reduction of their content.  Dupuis felt that his position in no way demeaned the 
non-Christian dialogue partner; rather, “it is in this fidelity to personal, non-negotiable 
convictions, honestly accepted on both sides, that the interreligious dialogue takes places 
between equals in their difference.”121  
From Dupuis’s perspective, dialogue with religious others is an end in itself. For 
neither side does it intend the conversion of one partner to the religious tradition of the 
other; but rather, its purpose is to bring about “a more profound conversion of each to 
God.”122 Nevertheless, Dupuis rejected Paul Knitter’s proposal to identify the 
evangelizing mission of the Catholic Church with dialogue.123 Although dialogue, which 
implies learning new truth, is an authentic expression of the evangelizing mission, it 
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cannot exhaust it. For Dupuis, there must remain room, “if God so wishes, for inviting 
others to become disciples of Jesus in the Church.”124 While Knitter sees a contradiction 
between dialogue and the notion that each religion has its own validity and is an end in 
itself, 125 Dupuis believed that ends in themselves can be diversified as stages in a 
process: 
Surely, God’s covenant with Moses was an end in itself; this did not prevent it 
from being oriented to God’s covenant in Jesus Christ in which it finds its full 
realization. Similarly, the Kingdom of God already present in history is an end in 
itself; nevertheless, it remains oriented toward the eschatological fullness of the 
kingdom of God.126 
 
While dialogue’s only or main goal should not be the conversion of others to Christianity, 
one need not rule out conversion as a possible outcome.  
 Dupuis adopted what he called a “kingdom-centered model” to explain the 
relationship between non-Christian religions and the church. Such a model shows how 
the Kingdom of God includes more than simply the church, explaining that “through 
opening themselves up to the action of the Spirit, [non-Christians] share in the reality of 
the Reign of God in the world and in history.”127 Therefore, the central focus of this 
model is building of the kingdom of God, rather than the institution of the church itself.  
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Dupuis did not intend for this model to replace the Christocentric (or Christ-
centered) perspective.  Here, he referenced John Paul II’s 1990 encyclical Redemptoris 
Missio: On the Permanent Validity of the Missionary Mandate. In this encyclical, the 
pope declared that the Kingdom of God is the concern of everyone, but it cannot be 
detached from Jesus Christ or the Church.128 At the same time, John Paul II expressed 
some concerns regarding kingdom-centered approaches such as the one used by Dupuis, 
which the encyclical stated, “stress the image of a Church which is not concerned about 
herself, but which is totally concerned with bearing witness to and serving the kingdom.” 
While these conceptions contain some positive aspects, the pope insisted that they are 
silent about Christ and the mystery of redemption, and end up undervaluing the church.129 
John Paul II’s concerns were echoed ten years later in Dominus Iesus, which faulted 
kingdom-centered approaches for denying the “unicity of the relationship which Christ 
and the Church have with the kingdom of God.”130 Yet, according to Dupuis, the 
kingdom-centered and Christocentric perspectives are interconnected since “one cannot 
separate the Reign of God in history from the Jesus of history, in whom it was instituted, 
nor from Christ whose present kingship is its expression.”131 
 Dupuis’s combination of the Christocentric and regnocentric (or kingdom-
centered) perspectives allowed him to show that “one can attain the reality of the Reign 
of God without recourse to the sacraments of the Church and without belonging to the 
                                                        
 
128 See John Paul II, Redemptoris Missio: On the Permanent Validity of the Church’s Missionary Mandate, 
http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_07121990_redemptoris-
missio.html, 18.  
129 Redemptoris Missio, 17.  
130 Dominus Iesus, 19.  
131 Dupuis, Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism, 345.  
 
 45 
Church.”132 According to Dupuis, “while the believers of other religious faiths perceive 
God’s call through their own traditions and respond to it in the sincere practice of these 
traditions, they become in all truth – even without being formally conscious of it – active 
members of the Kingdom.”133 However, he still asserted that the Church is necessary. 
The Church, for Dupuis, remains “the efficacious sign, willed by God, of the presence in 
the world and in history of the reality of the Reign of God.” 134 As such, all persons are 
oriented toward the Church, since the church must be understood as “the point toward 
which non-ecclesial grace is tending.”135 As an efficacious sign, the church is not 
identical to the Reign of God, but a sacrament of the Reign of God. Its role is not a 
universal mediatory function, since the mediator of the Reign is not the church, but Jesus 
Christ. The church’s task is to bear witness to the Reign of God and serve it.136 The 
church is thus a provisional reality, which will exist only until the coming fulfillment of 
the Reign of God.137  
So, from Dupuis’ perspective, not only can followers of other traditions belong to 
the kingdom of God in history without being members of the church, they can also “share 
in the fullness of the Kingdom without having to be linked at the last stage to an 
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eschatological church.138 For this statement, Dupuis’s theology has been subject to 
critique along the same lines as Rahner’s anonymous Christianity. According to James 
Fredericks, since other religions do not claim to be building up God’s kingdom, to assert 
that this is what they are doing “distorts the teaching of these religions.”139 The 
Magisterium, took issue with Dupuis’ claim from a different perspective, insisting that 
“according to Catholic doctrine, the followers of other religions are oriented to the 
Church and called to become a part of her.”140 
D. The Pluralist Position-Paul Knitter 
 
 Paul Knitter is currently retired as the Paul Tillich Professor Emeritus of 
Theology, World Religions, and Culture at Union Theological Seminary in New York. At 
the young age of thirteen, he felt a calling to the priesthood, entered minor seminary, and 
spent the next fourteen years of his life studying to be a priest. During his college years, 
he joined the Divine Word Missionaries, whose main invocation was the prayer “May the 
darkness of sin and the night of heathenism vanish before the light of the Word and the 
Spirit of grace.”141 Yet, upon learning and interacting with Hinduism and Buddhism as a 
missionary, he found much that was rich and beautiful in these traditions rather than 
“darkness and sin.” By the time he graduated college, he was convinced that “an 
exclusivist model of Christianity as light and other religions as darkness did not fit the 
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facts.”142 After coming to this realization, he came into contact with Rahner’s anonymous 
Christianity. Knitter has called the inclusivism of Karl Rahner a “bridge” in Catholic 
theology’s treatment of religious pluralism. While Rahner’s theology allowed for a 
positive evaluation of other religions, Knitter’s encounter with a Muslim friend during his 
doctoral studies in Germany made him realize that he could not uphold the belief that his 
friend needed to be “fulfilled” through Christianity, or was somehow an “anonymous 
Christian.”143 Thus, Knitter became convinced that Catholic theology must go beyond the 
inclusivist paradigm. Knitter, like Dupuis, has also engaged in comparative theology, in 
particular, with the Buddhist tradition.144 
 Knitter describes his approach to comparative theology as a “globally responsible, 
correlational dialogue of religions.”145 It is globally responsible in that it is aware that 
interfaith encounter must “include a concern for and attempt to resolve the human and 
ecological suffering prevalent throughout the globe.” It is correlational in that it “affirms 
the plurality of religions, not because plurality is good in itself but because it is a fact of 
life and the stuff of relationships.”146 Knitter insists that this dialogue must take place 
within an egalitarian community, which means dropping any notion that other religions 
are subordinated to or fulfilled by Christianity. 
                                                        
 
142 Knitter, Jesus and the Other Names, 5.  
143 Knitter, Jesus and the Other Names, 7-8.  
144 See Paul Knitter, Without Buddha I Could Not Be A Christian (London: Oneworld, 2009).  
145 Knitter prefers this term to simply using the word “pluralism.” However, although he is slightly 
uncomfortable with the term, he acknowledges that he is a pluralist. See Jesus and the Other Names, 18. 
Also see One Earth Many Religions: Multifaith Dialogue & Global Responsibility (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 
1995), 16.  
146 Paul Knitter, Jesus and the Other Names, 17.   
 
 48 
 Although once an inclusivist himself, Knitter now claims that inclusivism is a 
threat to dialogue, and “a threatened dialogue is (or should be) just as serious a problem 
as a threatened Christian identity.”147 Christians, he believes, cannot first work out a 
Christology and then see how it applies to dialogue, but rather the reality of other 
religions and interreligious dialogue must be part of the preconditions for understanding 
who Jesus is.148 
According to Knitter, Christians must give up three terms when talking about 
Jesus. These are full, final/definitive, and unsurpassable. Fullness refers to the belief that 
in Jesus, Christians possess the totality of divine revelation. This must be rejected, Knitter 
argues, since identification of the Infinite with anything finite is idolatry. The flesh of 
Jesus cannot be made into a total container of the divine. Definitiveness refers to the 
belief that there can be no other norms for Divine Truth outside of Jesus. This conflicts 
with the essentially eschatological nature of the truth Jesus made available to humanity. 
Knitter insists that the truth Jesus revealed, “while utterly reliable and demanding our full 
commitment, was not a finished product.”149 Unsurpassable refers to the belief that God 
cannot reveal more of God’s fullness in other ways at other times. When Jesus is 
absolutized as unsurpassable, Knitter states, he is often mistaken to be the kingdom of 
God himself, and Christian existence is seen mainly as a “confession of a personal 
relationship with Jesus rather than a commitment to work with him for the kingdom of 
God.”150  
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 Knitter’s definition of the kingdom of God focuses less on the eschatological than 
that of Rahner and Dupuis, and more on the praxis of everyday life. Salvation is not just 
about getting to heaven. It is “not a transaction that takes place outside us, but an 
empowering awareness that pervades our entire being, the discovery of our divine nature 
as “children of God.”151 He concludes that if salvation is a matter of revealing and 
embodying the deepest and already existing truth about ourselves and the world, then it 
will be “probable and maybe even necessary that there be many teachers, revealers, and 
saviors, each speaking to different cultural or historical contexts, each making known 
different and deeper depths of what Christians call the divine.”152 Thus, other religions 
are ways of salvation in their own right, apart from and not in need of fulfillment by the 
mediation of Jesus Christ.  
Unlike Dupuis or Rahner who understand all religions as somehow oriented 
toward the Church, Knitter adopts a “soteriocentric perspective.” This soteriocentric 
approach is based on the common ground of global responsibility for eco-human well-
being.153 For Knitter, this is even more inclusive than “kingdom-centrism.”  What unites 
religions, he argues, is not how they are related to the church or how they are related to 
Christ, but rather to what extent they are promoting Soteria, or “ineffable mystery of 
salvation.”  One promotes Soteria by being engaged in promoting human welfare and 
bringing about liberation with and for the poor and nonpersons. Knitter proposes that 
Soteria be used as the common starting point for religious encounter, rather than Theos, 
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or the “ineffable mystery of divine.”154 For Knitter, orthopraxis, or right practice, has 
primacy over orthodoxy, or right belief.155 Knitter still claims that Jesus is unique, but 
this is a relational uniqueness, in that “Jesus is a Word that can be understood only in 
conversation with other Words.”156 Jesus is unique alongside other unique liberators, and 
the universal savior alongside other universal saviors. His universality and uniqueness is 
not inclusive, or exclusive, but complementary.157 This assertion leads Knitter to concede 
that incarnation extends beyond Jesus of Nazareth, and we must recognize that “Buddha 
and Muhammad and others may be enfleshments of Ultimate Reality.”158  
Clearly, Knitter’s position contrasts sharply with the inclusivist one taken by 
Rahner and Dupuis. For Rahner, savior figures in other religions can only be seen as 
signs that point toward Christ.159 Dupuis, however, went a step farther than Rahner. 
Taking Islam as an example, he insisted that Christians could acknowledge Muhammad 
as a genuine prophet of God. Nevertheless, he still upheld that the Quran and other sacred 
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texts are not perfect and complete, even though they contain some “divine truth.”160 
Although other saving figures may be inspired by the Spirit to “become pointers of 
salvation for their followers,” they are, for both Rahner and Dupuis, always subordinate 
to Jesus Christ.161 
 Knitter vigorously defends his pluralist position against critics who claim that it 
conflicts with Sacred Scripture. He explains that the “one and only language” conveyed 
by the use of titles such as Son of God, Savior, and Word of God, which put Jesus in a 
category separate from and superior to all other religious founders and leaders, can be 
described as “love language.” Such language, Knitter argues, came from the early 
Christian community’s experience of and commitment to Jesus and is misused if taken 
literally. He likens these titles to terms of devotion, to the love between two spouses in 
marriage, who may tell each other “you are my one and only.”162  
 Knitter’s pluralist convictions have had a deep impact on his own spiritual life. In 
2008, he officially became a Buddhist as part of the Dzogchen community in the United 
States and now calls himself a “Buddhist Christian.” At first, Knitter continued to give 
primacy to his Christian identity, but he now claims that he cannot attribute primacy to 
either identity. He uses the Christian term hypostatic union163 in describing himself as a 
double-belonging human being.  He writes, “two very different spiritual operational 
principles come together in a single hypostasis or person – but without being confused or 
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changed or divided or separated for the property of each is preserved.”164 From Dupuis’ 
inclusivist perspective, such a state of being would be impossible. Dupuis held that 
“every religious faith constitutes an indivisible whole and calls for a total commitment of 
the person. It seems a priori impossible that such an absolute engagement might be 
divided, as it were, between two objects.”165  
E. The Pluralist Position- Roger Haight 
 
 Roger Haight is an American Jesuit priest and theologian. Unlike Knitter, he does 
not claim to do comparative theology, but writes on the relationship of Christianity to 
non-Christian religions from the perspective of a systematic theologian working in 
Christology and ecclesiology. He taught at the Weston Jesuit School of Theology until he 
resigned in 2003, shortly before the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF) 
issued a notification of his 1999 book, Jesus the Symbol of God.166 Haight then began 
teaching Union Theological Seminary. Haight never recanted what he wrote in his 1999 
work and in 2009, the Vatican barred him from publishing and teaching theology, even at 
non-Catholic institutions. However, Haight still remains a scholar in residence at Union. 
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The board of directors of the Catholic Theological Society of America, of which Haight 
was a past president, sought to defend Haight with a public statement to the CDF, but to 
no avail. Without necessarily agreeing with all that Haight had written, the statement said 
that Haight’s book “has done a great service in framing crucial questions that need to be 
addressed today.”167 
 Following the call of the Second Vatican Council to read the signs of the times, 
Haight strives to work in dialogue with postmodern culture. Pluralism, for Haight, is not 
necessarily positive or negative, but a given in contemporary society, since one of the 
main characteristics of postmodernity is “a consciousness of pluralism at every level of 
thinking about humanity: its nature, its history, its God.”168 According to Haight, this 
pluralism “spells the loss of any special group identity.” It means “the loss of an 
overarching framework that encompasses the frameworks of others.” 169 Postmodernity, 
therefore, calls for “a new and deeper penetration into the meaning of Jesus Christ that 
genuinely transcends the past.”170 As Haight shows, this means going beyond 
exclusivism and inclusivism toward a pluralist position regarding the relationship of 
Christianity to non-Chrisitan religions. It was this pluralist position that the CDF found to 
be problematic in their notification of his 1999 book. Haight’s critical correlation 
between the data of the Christian faith, and the data and norms of postmodern thought, 
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results, according to the CDF, “in a subordination of the content of faith to its plausibility 
and intelligibility in postmodern culture.”171  
 Like Knitter, Haight strives to emphasize the this-worldly dimension of salvation 
more than Rahner and Dupuis. Haight states that the meaning of salvation remains 
elusive and cannot be confined in any single definition. He describes Christian salvation 
simply as “the encounter with God in Jesus of Nazareth.” Yet, taking into account 
postmodern concerns, he insists, “one must satisfy the demand of historical plausibility in 
one’s construal of the salvific work of Jesus Christ.”172 The salvific character of Jesus’s 
action must be found in his historical, this-worldly activity. Salvation cannot be seen as 
solely a promise or a future reality, but rather must be something that can be experienced 
now. This calls for a new understanding of the place of Jesus Christ and of Christianity in 
the history of religions. Haight argues that in today’s postmodern world, people “have 
come to appreciate more deeply that God alone effects salvation and Jesus’ universal 
mediation is not necessary.”173  
Haight, along with Dupuis, states that, “as the Jewish and Christian Scriptures 
testify, God as Spirit has been present and at work in the world for human salvation from 
the beginning without a causal connection to the historical appearance of Jesus.”174 
However, unlike Dupuis, who concludes that Jesus, as constitutive savior, is truly cause 
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of salvation for all human beings, Haight asserts that Jesus is constitutive and the cause of 
salvation for Christians, but not constitutive of salvation universally, or for all persons.175  
Haight describes Jesus as the “symbol of God” who is the “mediation of God’s 
presence to Christianity.”176 Jesus still has universal relevance,177but Jesus is not the 
completion of other religions. Haight’s discussion of other religious figures is similar to 
that of Knitter. While Jesus is truly divine, he is not the only divine mediation and 
Christians can imagine other religious mediations as “on par” or “on the same level” with 
Jesus.178 This insight leads Haight to call for a shift in the Christian concept of mission. 
Interreligious dialogue, he insists, rules out any sort of proselytism or evangelization. 
Rather than seeking converts, the overarching mission of the church is to be a public 
witness to the mission of God manifested in Jesus.179 Like Knitter, Haight also calls for 
going beyond Dupuis’s recommendation of dialogue for dialogue’s sake. For Haight, “a 
concern for human suffering and liberation forms a context for interreligious 
dialogue.”180  
While Haight does not explicitly affirm religious double-belonging as does 
Knitter, he seems to imply that it is a very real possibility. He recognizes that critiques of 
pluralism stem from the widespread affirmation of the principle of non-contradiction, 
which states, “one cannot affirm as true a particular proposition and its simple negation.” 
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According to this principle, “the Christian cannot accept that what is contradictory to or 
less than that mediated through Jesus is true in the same respect or measure.”181 But, 
Haight asserts that the principle of non-contradiction does not function in matters of 
religious experience and knowledge, where the object is strictly transcendent, because 
“the transcendent object is not present and available for comparison with competitive 
propositions about it.”182 Therefore, a seemingly contradictory conviction or belief from 
another need not necessary be contradictory of the Christian vision and can even be, in 
some measure, true.183 
F. Edward Schillebeeckx- Answering the Critiques of Inclusivism Without Adopting 
Pluralism 
 As stated in the introduction, Edward Schillebeeckx stressed the necessity of 
recognizing two sources of theology: revelation184 and experience. Neither can be 
subordinated to the other. This method bears fruit in Schillebeeckx’s soteriology, which 
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three. In this chapter, I will just briefly 
discuss Schillebeeckx in relation to the two paradigms under consideration.  
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Grounding salvation in the doctrine of creation, Schillebeeeckx insisted that 
creation is the foundation for redemption.185 He articulated the interdependence and 
unbreakable connection between partial experiences of salvation in this world and 
eschatological salvation, or that which is to come. While the inclusivist positions of Karl 
Rahner and Jacques Dupuis were welcome alternatives to the pre-Vatican II position of 
Extra ecclesiam nulla salus,186 both of their positions have been subject to criticism. One 
major argument is that these positions hold on too tightly to revelation and do not speak 
enough to contemporary experience. On the other hand, the pluralist position, which has 
been proposed in response to the critiques leveled against inclusivist positions like those 
held by Rahner and Dupuis, seems to overemphasize experience to the neglect of 
revelation and tradition. According to Schillebeeckx, through God’s divine revelation in 
Christ, Christians understand that God intended that all persons should be saved through 
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Christ.187 This aspect of Christian faith cannot be denied for the sake of accommodating 
all religions under an umbrella of sameness. With regard to their soteriologies, I argue 
that the inclusivist positions of Rahner and Dupuis place too strong of an emphasis on 
salvation’s eschatological dimension, while the pluralist positions put too much stress on 
salvation’s this-worldly, practical dimension to the neglect of eschatological hope.  
 From Rahner’s description of the supernatural existential and anonymous 
Christianity outlined earlier, it is clear that he understood salvation in a way that is more 
eschatological and supernatural, rather than this-worldly and interpersonal. He defined 
salvation as the supernatural and direct presence of God afforded by grace, but without 
connection this “supernatural presence” to concrete circumstances that demand healing in 
this world.   
Rahner’s focus on salvation as a transcendental concept leaves out the element of 
praxis, or concrete actions to ameliorate real world problems. For Rahner, salvation 
meant “the final and definitive validity of a person’s true self-understanding and true self-
realization in freedom before God by the fact that he accepts his own self as it is 
disclosed and offered to him in the choice of transcendence as interpreted in freedom.”188 
Such a definition fits into what Johann Baptist Metz referred to as a “transcendental-
idealist” approach to Christianity, which tries to explain Christianity’s historical identity 
in an exclusively idealist way without recourse to the constitutive function of Christian 
praxis.189 According to Metz, the salvation for all people that is grounded in Christ does 
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not become universal by means of an idea, but by the power of the praxis of discipleship. 
It is not a concept, but an invitation. By interpreting faith as an existential choice, Rahner 
washes away its socially critical power.190 For Schillebeeckx, salvation “comes about 
first of all in the events of human history and not [as Rahner claimed] primarily in the 
consciousness of believers who are aware of it.”191  
 Dupuis’s theology can also be said to place a stronger emphasis on salvation as an 
other-worldly concept. Although he asserts that the Reign of God is already present in 
history, he explains that other religions “contribute in a mysterious manner to the 
construction of the Reign of God in the world.”192 In my estimation, a “mysterious 
manner” fails to provide a way for Christians to truly recognize and label particular 
instances of healing, and struggles for liberation inspired by other religions, as salvation. 
Dupuis also promotes interreligious dialogue as an end in itself. Dialogue, he insists, need 
not serve as a means to a further end, but rather it simply tends to a more profound 
conversion of each dialogue partner to God.193 This is a very individualistic conception of 
conversion. As we will see, Schillebeeckx points out that a true conversion to God must 
bear fruit in one’s actions on behalf of suffering others. Instead of grounding salvation in 
the doctrine of creation, Dupuis insists that salvation must be always be understood in a 
Trinitarian manner.194 Schillebeeckx objects to such a use of Trinitarian theologies, 
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which he describes as overly speculative and thus, “do not say anything about the 
mystery of God… they are pure rationalization; perhaps very interesting, but cold.”195 
Thus, for Schillebeeckx, appeals to Trinitarian theology do not do enough to speak to 
specific instances of human suffering and injustice.  
 The pluralist positions of Knitter and Haight tend toward the other extreme. They 
answer the call for a more this-worldly definition of salvation, but fail to adequately 
connect such a definition with its eschatological dimension. In over-emphasizing 
experience, they abandon crucial aspects of Christian revelation and tradition. Knitter 
likens salvation to the Buddhist concept of “Awakening.” Buddhism, for him, provides 
“an inspiring reminder that when we Christians talk about being saved we’re not simply 
talking about getting to heaven.” He explains that while in Buddhist terms, Awakening is 
a matter of realizing one’s Buddha-nature, for Christians, salvation is a matter of “waking 
up to our own unity with God, or oneness with the Spirit.”196 “Waking up” is not an 
individual existential decision in the manner of Rahner, but an empowering awareness. It 
is a matter of embodying the already existing truth about ourselves and the world. As 
mentioned earlier, Knitter proposes Soteria, or salvation, as a starting point for 
interreligious encounter. This means that each tradition has its own understanding of 
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Soteria, but what they all have in common, is that Soteria concerns a fundamental option 
for, and commitment to, the oppressed.197 Praxis, therefore, is always more important 
than right belief.  
Knitter strongly emphasizes Jesus’ words in Luke 17:20, “the Kingdom of God is 
among you” and insists that they serve as a wake-up call for Christians to prioritize “the 
present already.”198 While Christians believe that the Kingdom of God is both a reality 
that is here and a reality that is yet to come, he states that Buddhists get along without 
eschatological hope. Instead of establishing this as a point of difference or disagreement 
between Buddhism and Christianity, Knitter implies that eschatological hope is not 
necessary for Christians either. He writes, “we can have hope, but we don’t really need it, 
and certainly our present actions should not be dependent on it. We don’t need hope for 
the future because the not-yet future that we’re hoping for is already here, in this 
moment.”199 
While Schillebeeckx wanted to stress that salvation takes place here and now, he 
acknowledged that “there is human suffering which does not allow itself to be stilled with 
social and political measures.”200 For Schillebeeckx, belief in eschatological salvation, or 
final salvation that takes place beyond this life, if it is not be a mere illusion, is dependent 
upon the experience of salvation here and now. Thus, the latter is always only partial or 
fragmentary. Schillebeeckx wrote, “the liberation of Christian freedom is not identical 
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with the emancipatory program and process of human liberation.”201 We cannot turn 
human programs into idols. The Christian belief that “Jesus’ life, death, and resurrection 
is the divine promise that the future can and will be realized in and through our 
commitment to faith, despite all failure”202is crucial when faced with the inevitable fact 
that not all of our efforts to end suffering will be successful.  Furthermore, as will be 
shown in the discussion of Schillebeeckx’s concept of the negative contrast experience in 
the next chapter, Schillebeeckx maintained that within every experience of unjust 
suffering lies “at least a vague consciousness” of what “human integrity or wholeness 
should entail.” Thus, activity designed to overcome suffering is only possible “by virtue 
of an at least implicit or confused anticipation of a possible meaning yet to come.”203 
Hope is not just something nice to have, it is essential to the work of liberation. Even if 
one does not have hope for communion with God after death, one must at least have hope 
in one’s self and one’s fellow human beings. One must be able to envision “something 
better” in order to be able to work towards it. 
 Haight actually quotes Schillebeeckx extensively when defining salvation, since 
he too, explicitly links partial experiences of salvation in this world to eschatological 
salvation.  Haight concurs with Schillebeeckx that salvation must be described in a way 
that corresponds intelligibly to what people actually experience.204 However, like Knitter, 
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Haight seems to downplay the role of the specifically Christian assurance of 
eschatological hope. While one may insist Jesus is divine, Haight claims that, “he is not 
the only divine mediation.”205 Haight also seems to imply that the ability of the Christian 
to see other religions as ways of salvation requires the removal of any absolute claims 
that may pose sharp disagreement. As was mentioned earlier, Haight insists that the 
principle of non-contradiction does not apply to matters of religious experience.206 This 
means that when it comes to religious matters, one can mutually affirm two seemingly 
contradictory statements, or in other words, a particular proposition and its negation. One 
must wonder how such a claim would work when applied to concrete comparisons 
between religions. For example, could a Christian genuinely claim that his or her belief in 
a personal God is equally as true as the Buddhist affirmation that there is no personal 
transcendent deity, or vice versa?  
  Schillebeeckx provides a way for the Christian who does not share Haight’s 
pluralist approach to see salvation (defined as healing in this world) in another tradition, 
while still disagreeing with (and perhaps even contradicting) that other tradition 
regarding the role of Jesus in eschatological salvation.207 Finding a way to see salvation 
in other traditions even amidst disagreement is crucial. James Fredericks states that 
besides being unfaithful to the tradition in not honoring the uniqueness of Christ, 
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Haight’s position distorts the teachings of other traditions. Almost all Muslims, he insists, 
would find the claim that Muhammad is a mediation of God, equal to Jesus Christ in his 
power to save, as very objectionable, if not blasphemous. Looking at the Buddhist Heart 
Sutra, which erodes the very notion of a Creator-God, as a mediation of God “imposes a 
religious worldview on the text that is very foreign to it.”208 Haight’s position also has 
implications for Christian teaching. As Fredericks asserts, “if there are mediations equal 
to Christ in other traditions, we might ask if there are other mediations equal to Christ, 
within Christianity, as well. For example, is Mary, mother of Jesus and mother of God, a 
mediation of the Divine?”209 
Schillebeeckx’s theology goes further than Rahner and Dupuis, while not 
abandoning the inclusivist position in favor of pluralism. Schillebeeckx had a positive 
view of religious pluralism. He emphasized that there is more religious truth present in all 
religions together than in Christianity alone.210 Christianity, for Schillebeeckx, is not a 
categorical imperative incumbent upon all who have come into contact with the gospel 
[as it is for Rahner]; rather, it is an offer, and thus, in its distinctiveness, is also “dialogue 
with and possible criticism and provocation of other religions, which in turn put equally 
critical and provocative questions to Christianity in the dialogue.”211 Given that 
Christianity originated with an experience, namely, the experience of the first disciples of 
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Jesus of Nazareth, Christianity is historically particular, and therefore, needs to learn 
from religious others. “God is too rich and too super-substantial to be exhausted in 
fullness by one distinct and thus limited tradition or experience.”212 Nevertheless, 
Schillebeeckx never indicated that the need for interreligious learning necessarily 
requires the Christian to give up all absolute claims, nor to hold a position in which other 
religions and other religious figures are equal to Christianity or Jesus Christ. 
In response to Paul Knitter, Schillebeeckx wrote that while the statement ‘all 
religions are equal’ is understandable to postmodern sensibilities, he believed that it 
indicates a cheap form of toleration and is therefore, fundamentally wrong.213 According 
to Schillebeeckx, one cannot completely disregard the confessional language that arose 
from the New Testament and the Christian tradition. Throughout history, the Christian 
confession of Jesus’s uniqueness was not merely an expression of a subjective 
conviction. Rather, the vision that Christians “only find their rescue in Jesus confessed as 
Christ” has to do with something real. “It is true, although it is an affirmation of faith and 
not a scientifically provable and verifiable truth; thus it can never be used in a discussion 
as a weapon against non-Christians.”214 Statements in Scripture, which refer to Jesus as 
the Christ, or God’s only beloved Son, and which stress the essential bond between the 
coming reign of God and Jesus the Christ, cannot, in the manner of Knitter, be rendered 
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harmless or reduced to “elegant flourishes of rhetoric, such as when lovers say to one 
another ‘you are the most beautiful and only one in the world.’”215  
Along with Dupuis, Knitter, and Haight, Schillebeeckx argued that Jesus is not 
absolute, since “no historical particularity can be called absolute” and “the risen Jesus 
keeps pointing beyond himself to God.”216 Schillebeeckx also granted that there are 
intermediaries for getting to God outside of Christ. “In the other religions, one has direct 
access to God.”217 Thus, Schillebeeckx went beyond the Second Vatican Council in 
affirming non-Christian religions as valid ways of salvation,218 while still affirming the 
“absolute uniqueness of Christ in the history of religions.”219 In referring to Jesus as “the 
one, the definitive eschatological revelation,” Schillebeeckx regarded Jesus as God’s 
“unequivocal yes” to humankind, since “God hands himself over to us in Jesus and that 
gift is salvation for us and our salvation.” Thus, what is made clear in Jesus is that God is 
salvation for all people.220  It cannot be said that Jesus is the direct cause of all true 
salvation, but in Jesus, God is eschatologically and definitively revealed in an irreversible 
                                                        
 
215 Schillebeeckx, “The Religious and Humane Ecumene,”179.  
216 Schillebeeckx, “The Religious and Humane Ecumene,”184.  
217 Schillebeeckx, I Am A Happy Theologian (New York: Crossroad, 1993), 59.  
218 After Vatican II, the question of the role of other religions in the salvation of their followers was left 
open. Disagreement among scholars has persisted as to whether or not the Council implicitly affirmed other 
religions as ways to salvation or implicitly refused to acknowledge them as being possible salvific 
structures. Jacques Dupuis maintained the position that conclusions were never firmly drawn. See 
Catherine Cornille, “Soteriological Agnosticism in Interreligious Dialogue,” in From Vatican II to Pope 
Francis: Charting a Catholic Future, ed. Paul Crowley, SJ (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2014): 112-24. 
However, Dominus Iesus, in 2000, clearly states, “it would be contrary to the faith to consider the Church 
as one way of salvation alongside those constituted by other religions.” While prayers and rituals of other 
religions may “assume a role of preparation for the gospel,” one cannot attribute to them “a divine origin or 
an ex opere operato salvific efficacy, which is proper to the Christian sacraments. Furthermore, objectively 
speaking, non-Christians are in a gravely deficient situation in comparison with those who, in the Church, 
“have the fullness of the means of salvation.” See Dominus Iesus, 21.  
219 Schillebeeckx, I Am A Happy Theologian, 59. 
220 Schillebeeckx, God is New Each Moment (New York: Continuum, 1983), 26-27.  
 
 67 
manner. Schillebeeckx, therefore, was unable to concur with the pluralist theologians that 
Jesus is merely one incarnation among many.221  In other words, Jesus is still necessary, 
both for Christians and non-Christians, since Jesus’s death and resurrection alone is the 
assurance that amidst a world filled with suffering, God promises salvation for 
humankind.  
Schillebeeckx demonstrated a way to dialogue with non-Christians as they are, 
without merely regarding them as implicit Christians. The church can enter into such a 
dialogue, however, without abandoning “her claim to exclusiveness.” Although the 
church may assert that “the fullness of the Promises rests on her, as a service to the world 
and that she has the task of guarding this and preserving this and of making it historically 
true, she cannot assert that she is always right.”222 In fact, the church’s “claim to 
exclusiveness on the basis of Christ’s promise, is made relative by the fact that she is still 
eschatologically oriented, still on the way, in history, towards the kingdom of God.”223 
Christians, as members of the church, can hold that the fullness of God’s plan of 
salvation for humankind rests in Jesus, a conviction that is not found in other religions. 
To the Christian (but obviously not to those of other religious persuasions or those 
belonging to no religion at all), therefore, Christianity holds a special place over (but not 
over and against) other religions. Nevertheless, by virtue of the fact that the church is not 
identical with the kingdom of God but, along with the rest of humanity, still moving 
toward it, the church is not a complete package containing all the wisdom necessary for 
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healing humankind nor for developing a relationship with God. Christianity has much of 
importance to learn from the perspectives and insights of other religions, which it would 
not be able to know or figure out on its own.  To put it simply, the Christian can declare 
his or her religion is the best of all possible choices, while also affirming that one cannot, 
in Christian terms, bring about the kingdom of God on earth, without the unique wisdom 
of other religions.  
As will be explained further in Chapter Three, by maintaining an inclusivist 
position, Schillebeeckx did not neglect the social justice concerns of pluralists like Rita 
Gross, Paul Knitter, and Roger Haight. Rather, he insisted upon the unbreakable link 
between partial experiences of salvation in this world and eschatological salvation. 
“Eschatological or final salvation – let us call it heaven – takes shape from what men on 
earth achieve as salvation for their fellow men.”224 Without such experiences of salvation 
within human existence, the Christian belief in final salvation from God would appear a 
mere illusion. Being a disciple of Christ must bear fruit in concrete action to relieve the 
suffering of the poor and oppressed.  
Taking a pluralist position can actually hinder efforts to ameliorate real world 
problems. For example, S. Mark Heim points out that claims such as the one made by 
Gross, which insists that all views other than pluralist ones will lead to strife and 
violence, repeat an exclusivist dynamic.225 In rejecting that inclusivist positions can also 
work to overcome religious chauvinism, pluralist theology seems to regard itself “as the 
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crown and fulfillment of every religious tradition.”226 While not requiring conversion to a 
particular religious tradition, it requires conversion to a particular paradigm, which may 
not be compatible with one’s deep commitment to his or her faith tradition. The pluralist 
paradigm has also primarily emerged from Western culture, making it particular in 
character.227 According to Heim, such theologies make Western critiques of Christianity 
the norm for all religion.228  
Religious faith can and should be enlisted in the struggle for liberation. However, 
according to Heim, “faith can only be expected to have an effect in that struggle if 
religion is an independent and significant force in its own right to shape individual and 
social life. And it is such a force presumably only because of the believer’s conviction 
that it makes a decisive difference.”229 The socially critical power of religious faith often 
stems from particular devotions, to Jesus as the eschatological prophet, or to the Quran as 
the literal Word of God.  
  Perhaps, the greatest danger of pluralist appeals to justice can be found in 
Knitter’s theology. Knitter acknowledges his indebtedness to Latin American liberation 
theology, and he continuously reiterates the importance of the “preferential option for the 
poor.”230 However, in the preface to his book Without Buddha I Could Not Be A 
Christian, Knitter writes, “I do not have major problems with the controversial ethical or 
practical teachings of my church dealing with matters such as birth control, divorce, the 
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role of women, homosexuality, clerical celibacy, episcopal leadership, and transparency.” 
Instead, he says, he struggles with the “big stuff,” what applies to all Christians, not just 
the Roman Catholic community.231 Yet, for the Roman Catholic woman feeling a call to 
the priesthood or the openly gay couple who is seeking acceptance in their parish, such 
ethical and practical teachings are “big stuff.” The same argument could likely be made 
for the Muslim woman who is told she cannot pray in the same room as men, or the 
openly gay Muslim who desires to belong to his community. In a pluralistic society, how 
individual religious communities treat certain groups of people matters and bears 
influence on society as a whole. Calling all religions equal does not necessarily lead to 
affirming all people as equal, and in fact, it can detract from doing so. Likewise, not 
accepting the premise that all religions are equal does not automatically mean that one 
rejects the notion that all persons are equal in terms of human dignity.  
 This chapter has sought to answer the question of whether or not the inclusivist 
paradigm must inevitably lead to oppression and strife, and if the adoption of the pluralist 
paradigm is the only or best option for an interreligious dialogue that attentively deals 
with liberationist concerns, such as feminism. Here, I provided a brief overview of the 
inclusivist paradigm as represented by Karl Rahner, SJ and Jacques Dupuis, SJ, and the 
pluralist paradigm as represented by Paul Knitter and Roger Haight, SJ with a particular 
attention to their understandings of salvation. Sensing the limitations found in all four of 
these theologians’ articulations of the relationship between Christianity and non-Christian 
religions, I proposed that Edward Schillebeeckx’s soteriology offers a particularly fruitful 
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basis for engaging religious others. Schillebeeckx’s soteriology, though it does go further 
than Rahner and Dupuis, remains thoroughly inclusivist and therefore, demonstrates that 
maintaining an inclusivist position need not be a hindrance to dialogue and even may be 
preferable to the pluralist position, which can easily exhibit exclusivist tendencies. In the 
following chapter, I will specifically focus on the relevance of Schillebeeckx’s notion of 
the “negative contrast experience” for religious pluralism. The negative contrast 
experience as one that is common to all human beings and can be seen as a starting point 
for interreligious dialogue that avoids the problems of Rahner’s “anonymous 
Christianity” and Dupuis “anonymous members of the kingdom of God,” while also not 










In this chapter, I intend to argue that what Schillebeeckx called the “negative 
contrast experience” can serve as a universal starting point for interreligious dialogue. 
For Schillebeeckx, the concept of the negative contrast experience holds that within every 
experience of unjust suffering lies “at least a vague consciousness” of what “human 
integrity or wholeness should entail.”232 Out of this experience, comes a call to protest, 
leading to a rise of praxis that will work toward building a better future. Such experiences 
speak to the incredible capacity of every human being, regardless of religious belief or 
lack thereof, to imagine a better alternative, or, in other words, to hope. Erik Borgman 
notes that this concept emerged in Schillebeeckx’s writing just after Vatican II, though in 
various formulations.233  Its active presence in Schillebeeckx’s work first appears during 
his engagement with the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School.234 In other words, this 
concept did not spontaneously and suddenly arise in Schillebeeckx’s writings, but rather, 
it had a gradual development that is indicative of an important shift in Schillebeeckx’s 
thinking during his theological career.  
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I will first trace Schillebeeckx’s development of the negative contrast experience, 
since it illustrates Schillebeeckx’s reliance on what he regards as two sources of 
theology: revelation and experience. Next, I will argue that the negative contrast 
experience can serve as a universal starting point for interreligious dialogue, since the 
capacity to hope belongs to all human beings, inclusive even of non-theistic traditions 
and atheists. I will then deal with some of the major critiques that scholars have made of 
Schillebeeckx’s articulation of the negative contrast experience, and attempt to respond to 
them.  
A. Tracing Schillebeeckx’s Development of the Negative Contrast Experience 
 
 A constant concern in Schillebeeckx’s theology has been the question of how 
human beings can make cognitive contact with God.235 The aim of Schillebeeckx’s 1952 
doctoral dissertation, De sacramentele heilseconomie, was to work out a contemporary 
connection between the church and the world, especially taking into consideration the 
problem of the relationship between grace and nature.  At this time, Schillebeeckx was 
influenced by the work of Marie-Dominique Chenu and Yves Congar. Like Chenu and 
Congar, he presented the sacraments as “efficacious signs of God’s intimate bonds with 
the world.”236 His presentation would have a major impact on Dutch theology, so much 
so that he eventually was asked to provide the entry on sacrament for the Theologisch 
Wooredenboek (Theological Dictionary). Schillebeeckx’s earliest sacramental theology 
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was expanded into the book Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God, which first 
appeared in 1957.237  However, Schillebeeckx’s mode of thinking about the cognition of 
faith would undergo a number of shifts throughout his career.  
1. The Early Schillebeeckx: The Dogmatic Period238 
 In his early work, prior to 1965, Schillebeeckx explained human knowledge of 
God using the ideas of his teacher and mentor, the Dominican philosopher Dominic De 
Petter. DePetter’s philosophy upheld the notion of an “implicit intuition” which 
maintained that something of the absolute meaning of reality lies implicitly imbedded in 
the relative meanings of human cognition. Thus, a human being could know something of 
the totality of reality.239 Applying this to the question of “divine knowability,” 
Schillebeeckx understood cognitive contact with God in terms of an implicit intuition of 
reality and an interior life of grace. People come into contact with God in a purely 
supernatural way, through an inner address, or the impulse of the light of faith. Along 
with de Petter, in his 1962 essay “The Concept of Truth,” Schillebeeckx affirmed that 
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concepts cannot reach truth, but rather a non-conceptual aspect is the basis for the 
validity of our conceptual knowledge. Through this non-conceptual consciousness, which 
de Petter called an “objective dynamism” in the contents themselves that refers to the 
infinite, we become aware of the inadequacy of our concepts, and thus transcend our 
conceptual knowledge and approach reality. Thus, “the value of our conceptual 
knowledge of God is situated in a projective act in which we reach out toward God via 
the conceptual contents.” This understanding reasserted Aquinas’ affirmation that the 
highest human knowledge is to be found in “conscious unknowing.” 240 Human beings 
know truth in an imperfect way that is always open to refinement, but nevertheless they 
still grasp “objective truth.”  
Daniel P. Thompson aptly describes this period of Schillebeeckx’s work (his work 
prior to and during Vatican II) as “perspectivalism and phenomenological Thomism.” In 
the 1950s and early 1960s, Schillebeeckx defined knowledge as the noetic connection 
between a subject and a known object, which is dependent upon the ontological 
connection of all being with God.241 Schillebeeckx’s perspectivalist epistemology, as 
Thompson names it, led Schillebeeckx to argue for the logical distinction between “the 
real essence of the dogmatic affirmation—that is, what is necessary if we are to move 
toward the inexpressible content of faith in a true and authentic way—and the secondary 
aspects relating to the form in which the definition is couched.”242 Dogmas, in their 
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earthly formulations, are never fully sufficient, but they are nevertheless expressions of 
absolute truth. Thus, this stage in Schillebeeckx’s career has sometimes also been 
referred to as his “dogmatic period,” since the starting point for his theological reflection 
was the dogma of the church.243 Unlike his later theology, to be discussed further along in 
this chapter, praxis did not play a significant role in Schillebeeckx’s theology at this time. 
In fact, in 1961, when reflecting on the “appeal to existential experience” as a new 
development in dogmatic theology, Schillebeeckx affirmed the need for theology to have 
a certain distance from action and praxis. He wrote,  
Faith and reflection about faith are, however, two completely different 
orientations of the spirit. Although faith is an existential act, theology as a science 
is not. As reflection, theology is an act which, as such, stands outside man’s 
affective and practical attitude toward the reality of faith. Although it does come 
within the sphere of living faith, it nonetheless preserves a certain distance from 
life, partly so as to stress the orientation of religious practice toward reality.244 
 
Thompson describes Schillebeeckx’s epistemology at this time as having “an 
idealistic and intellectual bent,” separated from both the theologian and ordinary 
believers. Nevertheless, Schillebeeckx still displayed a profound concern for concrete 
human experience. He pointed out that the devaluation of faith caused by the 
phenomenon of secularization can have a purifying function, given that “we have tended 
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to see God too much as a function of our own life, rather than seeing our life as 
something in his service.”245  
Schillebeeckx also expressed a re-thinking of the term “layman,” which, in 
theological terms, is defined as a “baptized member of the community of faith of the 
church,” who along with the clergy, shares in the essential function “to give visible form 
to grace in their whole lives, and thus to be themselves an effective and visible sign of 
grace in the world.”246 All human beings have a meaningful task to fulfill in this world, 
which is that of “working for a more humane world order.” However, this is not a task 
possessed by virtue of one’s baptism, but rather one’s baptism into the Christian 
community gives one the duty of incorporating one’s worldly task into his or her 
religious attitude toward life.247 The baptized Christian, in being aware of his or her 
intimate association with the world, is not prevented from “co-operating with anyone if 
this co-operation is directed towards the preservation and development of human values 
and does not involve him in evil.”248 Here, we already see Schillebeeckx expressing 
Christianity as not simply “belief,” but a responsibility that involves secular concern for 
the world.  
During this period, Schillebeekx’s methodology takes its starting point in the 
dogmatic formulations of the Magisterium, rather than experience. 249 Yet, it must be 
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remembered that Schillebeeckx never identified revelation with dogma, always insisting 
that dogmas are never fully adequate in expressing the fullness of truth to which they 
point.250  
2. The Encounter with Secularization and the Hermeneutical Turn 
 Schillebeeckx’s approach to the reality of secularism highlights important shifts in 
his theology. In the 1950s and early 1960s, during what was described above as 
Schillebeeckx’s “dogmatic period,” he fully recognized the inevitability of the process 
secularization, particularly in Europe. Many sociologists at this time proposed what 
Lieven Boeve calls the “zero-sum theory of secularization,” which holds that as 
modernization increases, the role of religion in the construction and legitimization of 
individual and social identities decreases.251 However, the presumption of an essential 
incompatibility of Christianity and the modern world was not without its fair share of 
critics, especially from Catholicism. Schillebeeckx’s mentor Dominic de Petter, in 
particular, paved the way for a more critical engagement with the phenomenon of 
secularization. His project “sought to retrieve and appropriate the Catholic theological 
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tradition precisely by way of a critical conversation with the epistemological 
developments of modern philosophy.”252  
Schillebeeckx also sought to make theological sense of the modern process of 
secularization, and turned to the category of eschatology to do so. Concerned with the 
crisis of faith in Europe, he personally felt accountable to those who denied the existence 
of God in the face of secularization.253 Schillebeeckx saw secularization as a “merciful 
dispensation,” a great opportunity for the church to give up problematic assumptions 
about God. In particular, Schillebeeckx argued that secularization exposed the myth of an 
interventionist God of the gaps, used to explain what was, prior to the advancement of 
science and technology, inexplicable.254 It also revealed a common but unfortunate 
passivity among Christians in the face of political and social responsibilities. 
Secularization encouraged a renewal of Christian ways of thinking about God and 
responding to the problems of the modern world. Steven Rodenborn calls Schillebeeckx’s 
engagement with secularization at this time (1958-1964) “a project in apologetics.”255 
Schillebeeckx’s views on secularization were further influenced by his lecture 
tour in the United States from 1966-1967.256 By the mid-1960s, Schilllebeeckx was 
convinced that reality is characterized by an illimitable pluralism and thus, he broke with 
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the “implicit intuition” of the school of de Petter.257 This process has often been called his 
“hermeneutical turn.”258 In a 1968 article “The New Image of God, Secularization, and 
Man’s Future on Earth,” Schillebeeckx discussed his dialogue with the “death of God 
movement.”259 Here, Schillebeeckx witnessed a new problem, namely, that of skepticism 
with regard to the very possibility of revelation. Modern theologians could no longer 
assume the starting point of belief, rendering de Petter’s Thomistic language unable to 
provide an intelligible basis to explain Christian faith. The Thomistic- de Petterian 
language of the “participation of the total meaning in every particular experience” made 
sense in the medieval society in which Thomas Aquinas lived, where “a single (Christian) 
destiny for the life of man—the beatific vision of God— was a self-evident social 
truth.”260 However, it no longer spoke to a society with a plurality of outlooks on life, 
where not all persons can be assumed to believe in God. Schillebeeckx had come to the 
conclusion that dePetter’s epistemology, because it lacked roots in everyday life, tended 
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too much in the direction of epistemological idealism.261 It lacked appreciation of the 
historical and social character of human knowledge.262  
During this time, Schillebeeckx’s perspective on secularization also shifted. 
Steven Rodenborn points out that by 1966, Schillebeeckx no longer saw secularization as 
a theological challenge that merited an apologetic response, but rather he came to view it 
as a sociological phenomenon, or new interpretation of the world and the human 
person.263 In particular, secularization points to a conception of the human person as the 
subject and author of the future, rather than the passive recipient of a pre-established 
destiny. Thus, Schillebeeckx no longer defined secularization in negative terms as a 
“merciful dispensation in which the church is given an opportunity to renew its 
theological vision” but began to see it as a “latent hope.”264 Secularization was no longer 
merely a corrective force, but a positive development in which “historical progress 
became a real possibility” and men and women were freed work for a more humane 
world with a better future.265 In his earlier work, Schillebeeckx held that history was only 
oriented toward a “God who is to come” prior to the incarnation.  While he never 
wavered from the belief that the salvific character of history was indeed established with 
the incarnation, in his later work, he emphasized that it was established in the mode of a 
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promise. The future is still to come and brought about by human action, but its 
meaningfulness is guaranteed by Jesus Christ.266  
The late 1960s also marked a radical shift in Schillebeeckx’s methodology. As 
noted by Mary Catherine Hilkert, “if Schillebeeckx’s earlier methodology had been to 
probe the meaning of dogma in order to point towards the deeper mystery of the human 
encounter with God (revelation-in-reality), now the theological task was to probe 
concrete human experience in order to locate the same mystery there.”267 In his 1968 
essay “Toward a Catholic Use of Hermeneutics,” Schillebeeckx thus explicitly rejected 
his earlier distinction between the “dogmatic essence” and its historical “mode of 
expression” as an “unassailable datum.” This distinction now only functions, for 
Schillebeeckx, retrospectively. Only over time, after new interpretations have been 
accepted, can one recognize the historically and culturally conditioned nature of older 
dogmatic formulations. Furthermore, the “essence” of dogma is never given to us as pure 
essence, but always concealed within a historical mode of expression. Therefore, it is 
impossible to make a distinction between the true, unchangeable essence and the 
changeable modes of expressing it. Schillebeeckx insisted, “the absolute penetrates all 
relative interpretations, the one is never without the other. Believing always comes about 
through interpretive understanding.”268  
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Also at this time, Schillebeeckx turned to the hermeneutics practiced in the 
humanities. Influenced, in particular, by Heidegger’s work on the ontological aspects of 
language, Schillebeeckx shifted to the view that all experience is interpreted experience. 
In his 1969 article on “Linguistic Criteria,” Schillebeeckx discussed how Heidegger has 
“defined the act of speaking as a mode of being in which being is so constituted that it 
can be said or expressed.”269 For Heidegger, the linguistic event is identical to the 
ontological difference, or the distinction between an individual being or beings, and 
being, which is not a being, but the ground of all beings. Schillebeeckx explained,  
This ontological difference is an event of being itself, an act which allows the 
being to move into the foreground, which throws light on the being. What is 
above all remarkable is that there is something rather than nothing and that this 
appears to us charged with meaning and demanding to be expressed. This 
presupposes the possibility of appearing, of thinking, and of speaking, and this 
possibility is man.270 
 
What can be correctly deduced from Heidegger’s teaching is the hermeneutical function 
of language. “Something else is echoed in interpersonal conversation- what is not said 
and what cannot be said.”271 Language, therefore, functions as a medium of revelation, 
the revelation of all being in the world. According to Schillebeeckx, this ontology of 
language has clear consequences for theological hermeneutics. 
There can be no meaningful understanding of Christian revelation without a pre-
understanding of the real datum that man lives, in his speech, from a ‘revelation.’ 
Christian revelation presupposes a sphere of understanding, an explicit or implicit 
understanding of what the manifestation of being in the word really means. The 
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ontological aspect of language is therefore at least implicitly the prior condition 
for a Christian pre-understanding.272 
 
Five years later, Schillebeeckx further discussed his break with de Petter in his 
1974 book Jesus: An Experiment in Christology, which also demonstrates the impact of 
secularism and pluralism on his theology. Schillebeeckx asserted that in a society where 
“divergent ideologies and outlooks on life compete in the common market of world 
history,” Christian claims of knowledge of the total meaning of history must be replaced 
by the idea of an anticipation of a total meaning amid history still in the making.  What is 
universal can only be partially anticipated in human actions. Therefore, the thesis of faith 
must be capable of finding support in the human being’s historical experience.273 Direct, 
empirical verification of the claims of faith is not possible, but religion can and must be 
tested by its own implications. 
Already in 1968, Schillebeeckx had publicly declared before Dominican students 
in Nijmegen that he wanted to give de Petter’s philosophy a more existential basis.274 In 
the Jesus book, the “existential basis” for de Petter’s philosophy took the form of the 
negative contrast experience, which instigates “types of ethical praxis that can result in a 
mystical cognizance of God’s reality.”275 In the negative contrast experience, knowledge 
of reality comes through resistance to what destroys human flourishing. However, the 
concept of the negative contrast experience does not have a particularly religious origin. 
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Rather, its development was deeply influenced by Schillebeeckx’s engagement with the 
critical theory of the Frankfurt School.  
The Frankfurt School comprised a group of German-Jewish scholars from the 
Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt, who came to Columbia University in New 
York to escape National Socialism. Most prominent among them were Max Horkheimer 
(1895-1973), Theodor Adorno (1903-1969), Walter Benjamin (1892-1973), Herbert 
Marcuse (1898-1979), and Erich Fromm (1900-1980). These theorists sought to explain 
the failure of Marxist theory and practice to transform society and attempted a revision of 
Marxism which they called “the critical theory of society.”276 “Critical theory” is also 
referred to as an expression of Western Marxism. While Classical Marxism sought to 
explain the driving forces of history mainly in terms of economic production, Western 
Marxism argued that in order for societies to be altered politically, concepts such as 
culture, ideology, socialism, consciousness, and subjectivity, must be examined. To do 
this, critical theory relied upon a wide array of intellectual disciplines including 
economics, politics, culture, and aesthetics.277 
It was Schillebeeckx’s contact with the political theology of Johann Baptist Metz 
that directed him toward the study of the Frankfurt School. Like Metz, Schillebeeckx 
sought to engage in critical dialogue with modernity.  However, Schillebeeckx work was 
criticized in the late 1960s by a group of young, mostly Belgian and Dutch theologians 
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known as the “theologians of contestation.”278 These theologians critiqued the theologies 
of secularization, to which Schillebeeckx and Metz contributed in the 1960s, for creating 
“a dualism of church and world which accepts the secularized world as a natural result of 
the historical dynamics of the Christian faith.”279 According to these theologians, 
Schillebeeckx was not sufficiently critical of the phenomenon of secularization and 
remained too idealistic.280 Metz’s student Marcel Xhaufflaire echoed these concerns. In 
his dissertation, published in 1970, Xhaufflaire sought to critique contemporary 
theologies of secularization for uncritically capitulating to modern culture, thereby 
offering a reinterpretation of the Christian faith that re-inscribed secular mores and the 
dominant culture.281  While Schillebeeckx never explicitly stated whether or not he 
agreed with Xhaufflaire’s critique, Rodenborn writes that, “it appears to be through this 
exchange that Schillebeeckx came to recognize that a hermeneutic retrieval of the faith 
would need to be critical as well as contemporaneous and creative.”282 
As a result of the influence of the theologians of contestation and Xhaufflaire, as 
well as his dialogue with the Frankfurt school, Schillebeeckx came to reject his earlier 
reliance on the hermeneutics of the humanities (particularly Heidegger, Gadamer, and 
Ricoeur) because, in his estimation, such hermeneutics aimed at a purely theoretical grasp 
of truth. Although the hermeneutics of the humanities take into account the conditions of 
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history and language, Schillebeeckx saw that these very conditions also contain the 
possibility of ideological distortion.283  
This explains Schillebeeckx’s particular interest in the negative dialectics of 
Adorno and Horkheimer. Negative dialectics opposed the dominance of scientific and 
Enlightenment rationality in favor of a continuous critical posture against any attempt by 
modernity to provide an ultimate and positive definition of humanity.284 Concurring with 
Walter Benjamin, it stressed that the universal can only be grasped within the particular.  
It saw in the Enlightenment a dangerous emphasis on the creation of unity to be achieved 
at all costs, even through techniques of domination. This totalitarianism of the 
Enlightenment turned thought into a “thing” or “instrument” and perceived the process of 
reality as “always decided from the start,” thus rendering human beings as mere 
instruments whose lives were determined by the dominant order.285 For the Frankfurt 
theorists, “the act of knowing involves the whole person and thus has to encompass the 
reality of human suffering.” Their enduring contribution lies in the “passionate insistence 
that suffering be given a voice and that other voices be raised in a solidarity of urgent 
protest against all structures of oppression and domination.”286 As gleaned from Walter 
Benjamin’s notion of “redemptive memory,” this voice must not only be given to the 
suffering of the present, but to “all who suffered at the slaughter-bench of history.”287  
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Both Schillebeeckx and Theodor Adorno affirmed that in spite of our inability to 
conceptualize in the present what human life should be, it is nonetheless possible to know 
what it should not be.288 Influenced by negative dialectics, the notion of the contrast 
experience first appeared in Schillebeeckx’s writing in 1967. Schillebeeckx began to 
define the negative contrast experience in his 1968 article “The Church, Magisterium, 
and Politics.” According to Schillebeeckx, the term “contrast experience” was first 
coined by Joseph (later Cardinal) Cardijn, the Flemish founder of Young Christian 
Workers. Young Christian Workers (YCS) was a youth organization associated with 
Catholic Action that was prominent throughout Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. It sought to integrate the work of Catholic laity with the work of the 
hierarchy.289 
The vocation, the concrete ethical decision of Cardijn (later Cardinal Cardijn) as 
to what he thought should be done here and now about some social problems, 
emerged, as he said himself, from such a “contrast experience:” his fellow 
workers’ bitter resentment of the fact that he, a worker like themselves, was lucky 
enough to get money to study.290  
 
Schillebeeckx, therefore, insisted that negative experiences imply an awareness of values 
that move the conscience to protest current situations of suffering and injustice. 
While Schillebeeckx adopted critical theory’s understanding of itself as the self-
consciousness of an emancipative, critical praxis, he saw the work of critical theory as 
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beginning and ending in critical negation. This critical negation was not only materially, 
but also substantively atheistic. Schillebeeckx warned that Adorno’s commitment to 
negative dialectics was restricted to the deferment of meaning exclusively, and thus he 
insisted that such purely negative dialectics were “incapable of providing any positive 
contribution to the improvement of the condition of mankind.”291  It is eschatology that 
really distinguishes Schillebeeckx’s notion of contrast experiences from Adorno’s 
negative dialectics. According to Schillebeeckx, neither Christians nor non-Christians 
have any idea of what is worthy of man, either ultimately or here and now.292  Human 
values are never realized once and for all, but are continuously sought and discovered. 
The Christian message does not provide a direct program of action, and thus, concrete 
ethical decisions arise from contrast experiences, which imply an awareness of values 
that are veiled and not yet articulate, but nonetheless, lead to a vague but real perception 
of what should be done here and now.293 However, what differentiates the Christian 
eschatological hope from purely negative dialectics is that  
the Christian is not simply seeking what is humanly desirable, the unknown, what 
is completely worthy of man- he knows, in his eschatological faith, that the God 
of promise has bound himself to the realization of this also in Christ, even though 
the Christian cannot formulate the content of this promise in a positive way.294 
 
The Christian promise is a source of hope and a summons to go forth and make 
this eschatological future begin to become a reality in our human history. Schillebeeckx 
warned, “without the dynamism of Christian hope straining toward an absolute future we 
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are left with an ideological design of man which limits what is humanly desirable in 
advance.”295 What Christianity brings to the secular world, wrote Schillebeeckx, is the 
notion that “humanity is possible!”296 
Schillebeeckx’s critiques of purely negative dialectics led him to dialogue with 
the early writings of Jürgen Habermas, the representative of the second generation of the 
Frankfurt School, which produced what is known as “new critical theory.” Habermas, 
while committed to carrying on the critical negativity of Horkheimer and Adorno, points 
out that critical negativity’s inability to make positive proposals for political 
transformation renders it an ideology in which critical theory becomes the scholar’s only 
form of praxis.297 Habermas offers the theory of communicative action as a means of 
transformative praxis.298 For Habermas, the model of communicative action is a process 
by which individuals achieve common understanding and coordinate group action 
through reasoned deliberation and consensus, rather than solely through the pursuit of 
their own interests. This is in contrast to instrumental action and strategic action, which 
are both oriented to success, rather than understanding.299  
 Schillebeeckx was particularly drawn to Habermas’ assertion of the “inner bond 
between theory and praxis, in which praxis determines theory.”300 While Schillebeeckx’s 
earlier theology proposed that orthopraxis should be a criterion of orthodoxy, it was not 
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until his engagement with the Frankfurt school in the late 1960s and early 1970s that he 
began to really consider praxis as a source of knowledge. In 1969, Schillebeeckx 
concluded that orthopraxis, or action, must be an inner element in the principle of 
verification of Christian beliefs.301 He now explained that a purely theoretical verification 
of orthodoxy is not possible in this life, but can only be an eschatological event.302 Later, 
in 1974, Schillebeeckx spoke of the contrast experience, especially in recollection of the 
human being’s actual history of accumulated suffering, as having “a critical cognitive 
value and force of its own.”303 
While Schillebeeckx was obviously influenced by Habermas, there are some 
crucial differences between them. Unlike Habermas, Schillebeeckx does theology, not 
social analysis.304 Critical theory was a tool in his theological thinking, not his 
foundational framework.305 Schillebeeckx’s main argument with Habermas was that 
Habermas’s theory of communicative action is based on a tacit philosophical 
anthropology derived from the Enlightenment’s commitment to the liberal values of 
individual freedom, tolerance, etc. Thus, as noted by William Portier, the ideal of 
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freedom toward which Habermas’ theory strives remains empty, pointing only to an 
abstract utopia.  Habermas does not identify a concrete historical subject to enact a 
program of social change. Schillebeeckx, on the other hand, cited “faith in the God 
revealed in Jesus Christ” as “a basis for political proposals which have both a specific 
direction and a concrete subject or carrier group."306 According to Schillebeeckx, 
“emancipative or critical praxis is the only way in which what is possible and rational can 
be realized.” While theory and praxis are interrelated, “praxis must be regarded as taking 
precedence over any theory on which a religious, ethical or philosophical image of man is 
based.”307 Critical theory, Schillebeeckx said, can never be formalized. It is a science 
without orthodoxy, not measured against any consistent philosophical or utopian 
values.308 
For Schillebeeckx, Christian communities can become the concrete agents for 
social change. These are the actors missing from Habermas’s theory. Here, one can 
observe how critical theory shaped Schillebeeckx’s understanding of the fundamental 
connection between mysticism and politics, which will become a major theme of 
Schillebeeck’s later work. This connection involves a re-understanding of the term 
“mysticism.” Schillebeeckx acknowledged that the traditional notion of mysticism 
involves a void or a nothing of over-determined fullness that cannot be contained in 
concepts or images. It is a cognitive union with God, which always contains a “dark 
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night” or “dark light.”309 However, genuine mysticism is never a flight from the world, 
but rather a resource, from which “out of a first disintegrating source experience arises 
integrating and reconciling mercy with everything.”310 Mysticism is not simply an 
interior way of knowing that can only be accessed by a privileged class of persons set 
apart from the rest of society,311 but rather it is a way of life, or a way of salvation. Prayer 
and worship are not incompatible with, but in fact, should lead to, a call to social and 
political action on behalf of those who are suffering. Thus, Schillebeeckx wrote, 
“mysticism and solidarity with the poor form a single whole! Mysticism on its own, 
without any socio-political consequences, can come to nothing.”312  
For Schillebeeckx, the Christian engagement with the socio-political world 
requires a balance between the acknowledgement of senseless suffering and the 
acknowledgment of hope. The influence of Metz, mentioned earlier with regard to 
Schillebeeckx’s interest in the Frankfurt school, is especially prevalent in Schillebeeckx’s 
1980 book Christ: The Experience of Jesus as Lord.  For Metz, salvation history and 
history cannot be identified, given that there is too little salvation in our history. History 
is a history of suffering, and therefore, in Schillebeeckx’s words, Metz “seeks a political 
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outline of the future from the Christian eschatological remembrance of Jesus Christ.”313 
Schillebeeckx was especially intrigued by Metz’s notion of the “past as subversive 
memory”314 as a balance to the idea of the primacy of the future.315 Concern for the 
present must not be neglected in light of either the future or the past. For Metz, 
Christianity makes the memory of the crucified Lord a dangerous memory, a memory 
that unleashes new “dangerous” insights for the present. According to Metz, every 
resistance to oppression is nourished by the subversive power of the memory of suffering. 
This subversive memory, however, cannot be mere good news to those who are living, 
but must be salvation for even the most long-forgotten persons in our history.316 
However, while expressing deep admiration for Metz, Schillebeeckx found 
Metz’s articulation of the memoria passionis as a dangerous memory to be deeply 
lacking. According to Schillebeeckx, Metz does not reflect on the concept of God as 
understood in light of Jesus, as the God of pure positivity, as the author of good and 
enemy of evil. This concept of God is necessary for a correct theory of the narrative 
communication of the history of human suffering. Thus, Schillebeeckx wrote, 
“sometimes one can hardly avoid the impression that for Metz, suffering man becomes 
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something like the universal subject of human history,” leading him to conclude that 
Metz’s political theology still appears to be “unfinished.”317  
Rodenborn insists that while Metz held an apocalyptic eschatology, Schillebeeckx 
held a prophetic eschatology, with a greater hope in the capacity of humankind for future-
oriented praxis. For Metz, the purpose of the memoria passionis was not to respond to the 
extant hope of the human person, but to disrupt the human person’s existing 
consciousness in order that hope might emerge. Schillebeeckx, however, believed that the 
memory of the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ served to give direction to the 
praxis of the human person’s hope-filled consciousness already operative and revealed 
through negative contrast experiences.318  In fact, Schillebeeckx insisted that Jesus’ 
address to God as Abba was rooted in a personal awareness of contrast: on the one hand, 
the “incorrigible, irremediable history” of human suffering and on the other hand, Jesus’ 
particular awareness of God, his Abba experience, his relationship with God as one who 
refuses to allow evil to have the last word. It was his religious experience of contrast, 
Schillebeeckx wrote, that informed Jesus’ conviction and proclamation of God’s 
liberating rule.319 Such experiences of contrast, however, although informative for the 
Christian understanding of Jesus’ relationship to God, are not limited to Christians nor 
need they be interpreted religiously. This will be taken up in the next section. 
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B. The Negative Contrast Experience: A Universal Starting Point for Dialogue 
 
 Not only does suffering, according to Schillebeeckx, have a “critical cognitive 
value,” but it is also an inescapable reality that transcends age, race, gender, sexual 
orientation, socioeconomic status, level of education, moral behavior, and religious 
affiliation or lack thereof. As a reality to which no one is immune, suffering is a topic for 
which interreligious dialogue is not only possible but also vital.  
In his 1980 book Christ: The Experience of Jesus as Lord, Schillebeeckx 
provided a brief overview of how various traditions throughout history, both religious 
and non-religious, have responded to suffering. All religions, Schillebeeckx claimed, 
have made a “zealous quest” for the causes of suffering precisely in order to remove 
them.320 The challenge of suffering is just as strong for non-believers, since they too are 
called to responsibility in the face of the history of suffering.321 Many have found in their 
religious faith ways of coping and finding comfort in the midst of suffering, as well as 
ways of resisting it. While cooperation between members of different religious 
persuasions is necessary when confronting suffering in the world today, attempts to 
remove contradictory beliefs and doctrinal disagreements among the world’s religions are 
not only futile, but threaten to reduce the resources particular religious beliefs and 
practices have to offer. Not all persons can agree on the existence of a personal God or 
                                                        
 
320 Schillebeeckx, Christ, 707 According to Schillebeeckx, the history of suffering is a constant theme in 
every account of life, every philosophy and religion, and even of science and technology. Schillebeeckx 
provides a brief overview of how various traditions, including the ancient Greeks and Romans, Hinduism, 
Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, the Enlightenment, and Marxism have responded to suffering. See Christ, 
663-714. 
321 Schillebeeckx, Christ, 713.  
 
 97 
the role of Jesus Christ in salvation history, but all persons can and do have negative 
contrast experiences. 
Echoing Adorno, Schillebeeckx asserted that we do not have a pre-existing 
definition of humanity at our disposal, nor is there any sort of “universal human nature” 
to which one can appeal.322 However, Schillebeeckx did affirm that there is a basic pre-
religious experience accessible to all human beings, called the “negative contrast 
experience.” The negative contrast experience consists of a “no” to the world as it is.323 
Within every experience of suffering, namely due to the fact that we perceive such an 
experience as harmful or wrong, lies “at least a vague consciousness” of what “human 
integrity or wholeness should entail.”324 Believers and non-believers alike experience 
contingency,325 but interpret it differently: “one picks up the gratuitousness of God and 
the other experiences nothing, the void.”326 Yet, for both, out of this negative contrast 
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experience, there comes a call to protest and a rise of praxis that will work toward 
building a better future. In other words, such experiences disclose the possibility of an 
alternative situation that deserves our “yes.” According to Schillebeeckx, 
“Believers see the face of God in the history of human liberation. Unbelievers do 
not, but at the level of human liberation (the material of God’s revelation)327 that 
process can be discussed by both believers and unbelievers in a common 
language. Here understanding and indeed collaboration are possible. So, the 
deciding factor is not the explicit confirmation or denial of God, but the answer to 
the question, ‘Which side do you choose in the struggle between good and evil, 
between oppressors and oppressed?’”328 
 
In Schillebeeckx’s work, suffering humanity has a universal authority: “the 
suffering person raises a challenge to every fellow person.”329 So, rather than speaking of 
a “struggle against atheism,”330 Schillebeeckx preferred to speak of the necessity for 
dialogue with non-believers. Schillebeeckx noted that some forms of atheism are a 
justified criticism of traditional concepts of God, even Christian ones. For example, he 
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alluded to the criticisms made by Ludwig Feuerbach, which have taught us that a concept 
of God as wholly Other has no liberating and productive significance, and can legitimate 
oppression and dictatorship.331 Instead of speaking of God as “wholly Other,” 
Schillebeeckx, starting in 1968, began to refer to God as “Wholly New, the One who is 
our future.”332 It is no longer fitting, he insisted, to speak of a “God of the gaps,” invoked 
to explain baffling phenomena and incomprehensible suffering as if it was “God’s will.” 
According to Schillebeeckx, “it is better that there should no belief in eternal life than a 
God should be presented who diminishes people in the here and now.”333 Thus, 
Schillebeeckx believed that concept of God as “Wholly New” was fruitful for a Christian 
response to the death of God theologians who see the rejection of “divine transcendence” 
as the necessary condition for liberation. Rather than attacking these theologians as 
people who undermine the Christian faith, Schillebeeckx insisted that “we would do 
better to examine what it is in theological theories of redemption as actually proposed 
that has had such a man-alienating effect as to enable a lot of people to find in a denial of 
divine transcendence an experience of liberation.”334  
Schillebeeckx’s acknowledgment of atheism here is significant, and distinguishes 
him from the four other Catholic theologians discussed in Chapter One. Karl Rahner, like 
Schillebeeckx, did admit that, “the struggle against atheism” reflects “the inadequacy of 
our own theism.”335 However, he stressed that an alliance among theistic traditions might 
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be the impetus for Christianity to reappraise its own theism, rather than emphasizing the 
need to dialogue with non-believers themselves. Jacques Dupuis also seemed to focus 
solely on dialogue between religious traditions, all of which, in the process of mutual 
learning, tend to “a more profound conversion of each to God.”336 He did not explicitly 
state where non-believers stand in this dialogue, or whether or not they are “active 
members of the Reign of God.”337 The pluralist theologians, Paul Knitter and Roger 
Haight, similarly focus on the equality between all religions without mentioning atheism. 
For Schillebeeckx, negative contrast experiences, happen to believers and non-believers 
alike. He provides a basis for dialogue that is inclusive of non-theistic traditions, even if 
Schillebeeckx himself, as a Christian, interpreted the negative contrast experience 
religiously and applied it to the experience of Jesus. 
 Schillebeeckx took a position in which Christianity has something essential to 
offer, but without insisting that all that brings about healing or salvation is somehow tied 
to Christianity in a way that patronizes non-Christians. As was mentioned in the previous 
section, in his later theology, Schillebeeckx asserted that the negative contrast experience 
has a “critical cognitive value.” Bringing together both contemplative knowledge and 
manipulative scientific knowledge,338 the negative contrast experience comes to be a 
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unique force in society that is practical and critical. According to Schillebeeckx, it is 
“more certain, more evident than any verifiable or falsifiable knowledge that philosophy 
and the sciences can offer us.” Indignation, which Schillebeeckx admitted is not a 
scientific term, seems to be a basic experience of our life in this world.339 Ethical 
imperatives, therefore, are rarely discovered by philosophers, theologians, or the 
ecclesiastical Magisterium. As early as the late 1960s, Schillebeeckx insisted that “they 
arise spontaneously out of the concrete secular experiences of life; they impose 
themselves with the evidence of experience.”340 This is an important consideration for the 
Catholic Church. The Church cannot fulfill its prophetic task regarding the problems of 
society purely in light of divine revelation, but rather “must listen to the ‘foreign 
prophecy’ addressed to her from the secular situation.”341 Thus, healing praxis involves 
work with non-Christians as true cooperators who have something valuable to offer 
humanity that stems from their own particular situation, not simply from their status as 
“implicit” or “anonymous Christians.” In fact, in 1970, Schillebeeckx specifically stated 
that speaking of “anonymous Christians” was an impossibility. He wrote: 
Man’s history, which is God’s creation, is thus the condition for understanding 
Christian revelation and at the same time the answer given by revelation. The 
abundance of meaning, which is contained in the meaning man has already 
discovered in the world is manifested in the light of revelation. It is therefore not 
really possible to speak of ‘anonymous Christians,’ even though it is certainly 
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necessary to express in one way or another the fact that non-Christians are not, 
because of their orthopraxis, deprived of salvation.342 
 
Given the special authority it has, the negative contrast experience can and must shape 
the meaning of the term “salvation.” Salvation is not simply a future destiny dependent 
on confession of a certain creed or the practice of moral behavior in one’s earthly life. It 
is not merely associated with “heaven” or something beyond this world. Rather, it is 
healing from concrete situations happening right now. Given that experiences of suffering 
vary based on one’s historical and cultural context, salvation must be understood as a 
fluid concept, whose definition is always dependent upon our experience of its opposite. 
Salvation is safe refuge for those fleeing violence, proper medical care for those 
struggling with illness, and nourishment and shelter for those who are homeless. In other 
words, it is a response to any situation that should not be, and can never be given one 
ultimate definition. 
For the Christian, such earthly instances of healing are only partial experiences of 
salvation, since salvation’s fulfillment lies in the eschaton. However, Schillebeeckx 
insisted that, without at least partial experiences of salvation within human existence, 
Christian belief in final salvation from God would appear to be a mere illusion. The 
question of salvation, therefore, is not just the theme of Christianity and other religions, 
but is “more than ever the great stimulus throughout the whole of present-day human 
existence, even explicitly outside religion.”343 Yet, the topic of “salvation” can still serve 
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as a common basis for dialogue, even for those who do not affirm an afterlife, since all 
human beings have the capacity to hope.  
C. Critiques of the Negative Contrast Experience 
 
 If the negative contrast experience is to be upheld as a universal starting point for 
dialogue, then one must address how other theologians have engaged with this aspect of 
Schillebeeckx’s theology. While the negative contrast experience has been regarded as 
useful for navigating issues from sexism and racism, to climate change and sexual abuse, 
some scholars have found the concept to be lacking in important respects. I will address 
these critiques here. 
1. Schillebeeckx’s Use of “Tradition” 
 Although Schillebeeckx insists that experiences of contrast are pre-religious and 
that faith is not necessary for praxis (or actions that can be described as “fragments” of 
salvation), some scholars pose that Schillebeeckx is not inclusive enough. This is due to 
the fact that he is often described as a “modern theologian” in a culture that has become 
increasingly “postmodern.” According to Lieven Boeve, “it seems that the late-modern 
manner of theologizing has lost some of its credibility and that the plausibility of a 
theological project of engaging in critical dialogue with modernity has somehow 
lapsed.”344 
 Dutch Professor Erik Borgman is the author of the first initial biography to be 
written about Schillebeeckx. Borgman re-affirms Schillebeeckx’s theological approach, 
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which is based on the intuition that the Catholic tradition can become “surprisingly 
significant” in confrontation with the contemporary situation and culture.345 Nevertheless, 
according to Borgman, Schillebeeckx’s theology does not penetrate to the concrete level 
of human existence. In other words, he is unable to make the Christian tradition relevant 
for contemporary readers.346 Borgman takes issue with Schillebeeckx’s unquestioned 
presupposition of church and tradition. Precisely here, argues Borgman, is where 
Schillebeeckx’s theology becomes problematic in a postmodern society.347 According to 
Borgman, 
Theologians need to abandon the fiction that the truth of the tradition and the 
authority of the church form a firm foundation on which they can build further, up 
to and including the last remnants and traces. Theology has no other foundation 
than the God of salvation, whose mystery it may and must constantly decipher 
and clarify. If it takes that completely seriously, it will inevitably change 
fundamentally, time and again.348  
 
 Australian theologian similarly Dennis Rochford raises the question of the 
adequacy of Schillebeeckx’s approach given the postmodern rejection of grand 
narratives.349 Schillebeeckx strives to develop the Christian tradition in light of new 
experiences, yet, for Rochford, this creates a dilemma since Schillebeeckx still subjects 
new experiences to existing Christian frameworks of interpretation. According to 
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Rochford, while Schillebeeckx intends to maintain the primacy of experience, “he 
remains accountable to the role of tradition and its frames of reference, especially the 
New Testament language and conceptuality that, after secularization and de-
traditionalization, shows increasingly less overlap of with present-day cultural 
experiences.”350  
 In the last book of his Christological trilogy, Church: The Human Story of God, 
Schillebeeckx argued that there is an experience that applies to all human beings 
universally and does not necessarily demand a religious interpretation. This is the 
experience of radical finitude and contingency.351 Yet, the agnostic’s experience of 
contingency is fundamentally different from that of the believer. For Schillebeeckx, this 
means that there is no uninterpreted experience of contingency. While a pre-linguistic 
element of experience is universally human, this experience is ultimately experienced and 
interpreted in a religious way by Christians and in an agnostic way by humanists.352 For 
Schillebeeckx, the term tradition includes both believers and non-believers, both stand 
within a tradition with which their personal convictions are connected.353 
Rochford disagrees with Schillebeeckx’s assessment here that all of our 
experience exists within a pre-existing framework of interpretation. This notion makes 
the tradition of interpretation “too independently, potentially adrift or even out of touch, 
from the experience-receiving human persona and community.”354  
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 Because of what he detects in Schillebeckx’s work as “an unconscious 
intellectualism” and “strong bias toward connecting experiences with the existing 
tradition,” Rochford argues that Schillebeeckx appears to be unable to analyze a wider 
range of human experience outside Christian interpretation.355 Thus, he concludes, 
Schillebeeckx remains part of “the grand Catholic hegemony that struggles to retain its 
identity through an interpretation of human experiences.”356 The Flemish philosopher 
Leo Apostel maintains that Schillebeeckx’s thought can ultimately only be fulfilled by 
putting it into a Christian perspective. What Schillebeeckx should have done, in Apostel’s 
view, was define religious experience in itself (and in a quality of its own), rather than 
binding the interpretation of experience so closely to the Christian framework and thus, 
hindering the possibility of real dialogue.357 Lieven Boeve locates Apostel’s position as 
representative of a pluralist standpoint in which 
all religions would seem to be partial, incomplete cultural mediations or 
expressions of a universally shared (mystical) experience. This implies that the 
truth of a religion can only be accounted for in relation to this experience. To the 
extent that religion is able to completely express this experience, no religion can 
claim absolute truth. In other words: the particularity of religion is relative in 
terms of the universality of the (mystical) experience. Schillebeeckx is not ready 
to go that far, and does not want to go that far.358 
 
What seems to be the major issue for these critics is Schillebeeckx’s articulation of the 
relationship between the universal and the particular. Schillebeeckx maintains that the 
negative contrast experience is universal and non-theistic interpretations of human 
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limitations and contingency are not only plausible, but also capable of producing praxis 
that exhibit fragments of salvation in this world. Yet, ultimately, for Schillebeeckx, the 
belief that through Jesus Christ, God’s definitive position is revealed (namely, that God is 
universal salvation for all people) is the only interpretation that is totally meaningful.359 
He is not willing to intimate that humans can get along just as well without the 
eschatological hope found in Jesus Christ as they could without it.   
John Dunn, in his essay, “Negative Contrast Experience and Edward 
Schillebeeckx: Critical Reflections” asserts that Schillebeeckx’s claim that the negative 
contrast experience is both fundamental and universal needs further examination. 
Schillebeeckx speaks of a fundamental human experience from which every human “no” 
arises in the face of suffering and evil. Dunn asks what difference it makes if one is 
contemplating one’s own experience of suffering, or that of another person or group. 
While it would seem self-evident in the case of one’s own experience that the “no” would 
arise every time, in the case of the suffering of others, it would seem to depend on 
whether one is an observer or participant in the event. According to Dunn, it is clear that 
all observers of suffering do not experience it in the same way or arrive at the same “no.” 
The “no” to suffering can be subverted or oppressed, or at the very least, denied, 
repressed, or ignored. Dunn draws upon three examples to illustrate this 
Apartheid in South Africa was sustained for decades by a society which 
overlooked the suffering that its policies inflicted. In Europe, the question of how 
the holocaust eventuated in Christian societies can also be asked. In colonized 
countries, colonists could long overlook the negative contrast between their 
lifestyle and that of those they colonized and accept the contrast as a given.360 
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Given that Schillebeeckx claims the negative contrast experience is fundamental and true, 
one must ask: “how long is a reasonable time to wait for the ‘no’ to emerge?”361  
According to Dunn, there is no guarantee that people will respond in the same 
way in different contexts to a particular phenomenon of suffering, and this raises the 
question of how to evaluate specific responses to suffering. For example, Dunn mentions 
cultures in which the practice of revenge is a common expectation in the face of evil, or 
cultures in which the death penalty is seen as a moral response to evil, to illustrate that 
not all responses to suffering are capable of creating a better future.362 It is certainly 
conceivable, from Dunn’s perspective, that the “no” to suffering can be co-opted by the 
interests of those who caused the suffering, preventing the revelation of a situation that 
deserves our “yes.” Since one person’s data and resulting ethical response may not 
correspond with those of another, Dunn expresses that there are limitations to the 
application of the negative contrast experience as articulated by Schillebeeckx to concrete 
situations of suffering or injustice. 
As was shown above, scholars have questioned whether Schillebeeckx’s use of 
tradition is inclusive enough of non-Chrisitians and non-believers, although 
Schillebeeckx would certainly claim it to be. Mary Catherine Hilkert raises the question 
of whether Schillebeeckx’s use of tradition is inclusive enough of marginalized persons 
and movements within Christianity itself. Schillebeeckx’s later theology, as mentioned in 
the first section of this chapter, recognized the historically and culturally conditioned 
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nature of dogmatic formulations and subsequently, the possibility of dogma being 
formulated or used ideologically. While his later writings clearly insisted upon the 
necessity of ideology critique, Schillebeeckx’s critical method was certainly not turned 
against the dogma of the church. In fact, his method identifies ideology critique with the 
“critical perspective of faith” and “locates the critique within a more fundamental 
hermeneutical perspective of the critical retrieval of living tradition.”363 However, Hilkert 
still asks “by whom is authentic tradition determined? And if tradition is ultimately a 
tradition of lived experience, whose experience counts?”364  
The question of what constitutes “the great Christian tradition” is vital, especially 
since, as Schillebeeckx himself admits, history has too often been told by the “authority 
of the victors.”365  The narratives we receive about the past are not “pure stories” handed 
down in perfect form from generation to generation, but are shaped by the perspectives of 
those who tell them. This means that the views and contributions of marginalized or 
oppressed groups can easily be forgotten or pushed aside as irrelevant. Christianity is by 
no means immune from this phenomenon.  
Hilkert acknowledges that Schillebeeckx includes the writings of Tertullian in his 
pre-Montanist period as part of his historical development of the church’s living tradition 
of ministry. Yet, she asks, “why not the Montanist period? Who is to say that the naming 
of Montanism as heretical is not the result of ideological distortion of the tradition?”366 
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The same question can be posed regarding any person, movement, or position that was 
labeled heretical or erroneous. Feminist theologian Rosemary Radford Ruether speaks of 
“usable tradition,” which encompasses traditions that can be drawn upon as foundations 
for the formation of more egalitarian communities and the development of attitudes that 
value the full humanity of women. In her definition of “usable tradition” here, Ruether 
includes: Scripture, both Hebrew and Christian; marginalized or “heretical” Christian 
traditions, such as Gnosticism, Montanism, Quakerism, Shakerism; the primary 
theological themes of the dominant stream of classical Christian theology- Orthodox, 
Catholic, and Protestant; non-Christian Near Easter and Greco-Roman religion and 
philosophy; and critical post-Christian world views such as liberalism, Romanticism, and 
Marxism.367 One’s notion of “tradition” includes what one has been taught to consider 
tradition. What constitutes the living Christian tradition, however, may include elements 
that have been suppressed and therefore, remain unknown by many. Schillebeeckx, 
according to Hilkert, does not satisfactorily answer the question of how to determine 
what in the past was truly a harmful distortion of the faith, and what was labeled as such 
due to historical and cultural biases. He does not tell us whose experience counts now, 
nor whose experience can be considered part of tradition.368 
2. The Negative Contrast Experience and Human Sin 
 Another set of critiques avers that Schillebeeckx does not take the reality of 
human sinfulness sufficiently into account. In his articulation of the negative contrast 
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experience, Schillebeeckx appears to endorse an optimistic view of humanity. In 1967, he 
stated that, “mankind as a whole is at this moment experiencing an almost irresistible 
desire to make this world a better place.”369  Schillebeeckx’s contemporary Johann 
Baptist Metz did not have this same optimism, describing modernity as a “golden age of 
apathy.”370 While Metz shared Schillebeeckx’s turn to the concrete suffering of humanity 
as a necessary starting point for theology, he did not share Schillebeeckx’s confidence in 
the spontaneous resistance that arises in response to the violation of the human.371 Other 
theologians since Metz have critiqued Schillebeeckx for paying too little attention to 
human apathy and participation in oppression. 
 Gabriel Fackre, in his assessment of Schillebeeckx’s concept of the negative 
contrast experience, critiques Schillebeeckx for focusing too much on “the problem of 
evil” to the neglect of human sin and guilt. He is troubled that the question raised by the 
contrast experience is not “given our guilt how are we to find forgiveness but, rather, 
given our suffering, how are we to find assurance?’”372 He finds Schillebeeckx’s 
description of the early disciples’ Easter experience as incomplete. 
Schillebeeckx describes the Easter experience in terms of a contrast experience 
for the disciples. The death of Jesus left Peter and the disciples in doubt and disarray, 
especially since many of them abandoned Jesus at the time of his crucifixion. However, 
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according to Schillebeeckx, the disciples, in their abandonment of Jesus at the cross, did 
indeed fail, “but had not in the end lost their faith in Jesus. They had been thrown off 
balance rather than been deliberately disloyal.”373 Jesus’s appearance to the disciples, he 
insists, can be understood along the lines of a Jewish conversion model. What happens in 
the Easter appearance is “a conversion to Jesus as the Christ, who now comes as the light 
of the world.”374 The disciples were reconciled with Jesus whom they had let down. In 
the re-gathering of the disciples after the horror of the crucifixion, the early Christian 
church began. Schillebeeckx believes that all Christians can and must have their “own 
Easter experience.” The resurrection is not a formula to be believed, but an invitation and 
appeal to us to attain this experience personally in our own life.375  
Fackre adds that there is another dimension to the experience presupposed in the 
disciples’ Easter encounter that needs be emphasized. As a conversion vision, it entails 
repentance. Here, the contrast problem is “neither suffering inflicted by other persons nor 
events colliding with good experienced or expected, but the sin done by oneself over 
against the good experienced from and expected by Another.”376 According to Fackre, 
Schillebeeckx underemphasizes the disciples’ experience of guilt and their need for 
forgiveness. Schillebecckx’s references to our own Easter experience, Fackre states, are 
consistently made in terms of the framework of hopelessness and hope. Jesus is to be 
understood and interpreted along the lines of the threat of meaninglessness and its 
resolution, rather than the peril of guilt and its reconciliation. While Fackre acknowledges 
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that themes of meaningless and meaning, and despair and hope, are familiar in modern 
theology, he challenges the perception that the questions a culture asks should determine 
the answer faith gives. Certainly, the Christian community cannot simply give answer to 
questions that are not asked, but “it is equally true that profound questions may never be 
asked by a culture because they are too threatening to it.” For Fackre, the negative 
contrast experience does not push human beings to “come to the unasked question of our 
own complicity in the cause of suffering, both human and divine.”377 Faith cannot just 
address human pain and suffering, but also the sins of omission and commission that 
contribute to it.378  
 LaReine-Marie Mosely also critiques Schillebeeckx’s concept of the negative 
contrast experience for not giving enough account of human sin. In her article “Negative 
Contrast Experience: An Ignatian Appraisal,” Mosely focuses specifically on the sin of 
omission, or human inaction. According to Mosely, the concept of the negative contrast 
experience retains the problematic assumption that human beings will be naturally 
outraged in the face of suffering and automatically be prompted to work toward ending it. 
However, in reality, she writes, “people often do not perceive human suffering and may 
even participate it.”379 This is often due to unconscious or implicit bias. Implicit bias 
consists of “attitudes or stereotypes that affect our understanding, decision making and 
behavior, without our even realizing it.”380 All human beings have been tainted by 
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implicit bias, and these biases cloud our ability to say, “this should not be” in the face of 
suffering.  
Mosely names anti-black racism as one of the most prevalent and pernicious 
examples of implicit bias today.  She points out that while most people do not consider 
themselves to be racist persons, the implications of unconscious bias are real and demand 
our attention. For example, Mosely mentions that legal analysts have shown that human 
lives are at stake if judges and members of juries are influenced by unconscious bias.381 
In other words, a choice does not have to be conscious in order to do a great deal of harm. 
Unconscious bias may prevent humans from recognizing particular situations as negative 
contrast experiences, or may inhibit them from responding to the suffering of others in 
ways that do not exacerbate their suffering. Therefore, Mosely asserts, “without ways of 
providing an account for humanity’s inaction in the face of evil and suffering, the 
negative contrast experience risks losing its important role.”382 
 Mosely proposes the consciousness Examen as a way forward. The Examen, a 
prayer attributed to the sixteenth century founder of the Jesuits St. Ignatius of Loyola, is 
described as a way of focusing on the manner in which God is leading a person. It 
consists of five steps, though these may vary slightly in different versions of the prayer. 
In the first step, the individual focuses on gratitude to God. This should be extensive, not 
only including the obvious major things like life, health, and loved ones; but also the 
beauty of the sunrise when waking up in the morning or the smile given by a young child 
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when walking down the street that brightened one’s spirits. The second step consists of 
asking for God’s guidance so that one may see as God sees. The third step is a prayer 
review of the events of one’s day, focusing on times when one may have been 
particularly open to God and times when one was not. This may be discerned by paying 
attention not only to particular events and actions, but also to one’s feeling and 
inclinations at different moments. Step four asks the individual to express sorrow for the 
times one was not choosing God or acting in accordance with God’s will. At this time, 
one may also ask God for healing and strength. In the last step, the individual prays to 
acquire a spirit of availability to God in the future, so he or she may be better able to 
discern and choose God’s will. For many practitioners of the Examen, this part concludes 
with the Our Father. According to Mosely, through praying the Examen, especially Step 
Three, one may come to recognize unconscious thoughts and inclinations against certain 
persons or groups that are harming their relationships.383 Such an examination, Mosely 
concludes, “can deepen the efficacy of Schillebeeckx’s concept of negative contrast 
experiences as an important pathway to the amelioration of suffering and evil.”384 
D. The Enduring Strength of the Negative Contrast Experience: Responding to 
Schillebeeckx’s Critics 
 
 Scholars have raised some very important and interesting questions in response to 
Schillebeeckx’s use of the negative contrast experience. Certainly, as Schillebeeckx 
himself would admit, the idea of the negative contrast experience will need to be 
articulated differently in response to historical and cultural shifts, and in its application to 
                                                        
 
383 Mosely, 92-93.  
384 Mosely, 95.  
 
 116 
particular issues and instances of suffering in today’s world. However, I do not see any of 
the critiques given above as reason to discredit or discount the negative contrast 
experience as a universal starting point for interreligious dialogue. In this section, I will 
attempt to answer some of these critiques.  
1. Does Schillebeeckx Acknowledge Human Sin?  
 Schillebeeckx, in his work, does acknowledge the reality of human sinfulness and 
speaks about the truth of the Christian dogma of “original sin.” In his later reflections 
upon dogma, Schillebeeckx asserted that “any infallibility that a dogma may possess 
derives solely from infallible divine revelation, which is, however, expressed in language 
by humans and ecclesiastic authorities.” This phrasing in human language is never 
infallible.385 Therefore, dogma always demands redefinition and reformulation of the 
truth it presents. Schillebeeckx cites the dogma of original sin as an example to prove this 
point. The Council of Trent expressed this dogma with the assertion that the personal sin 
of Adam and Eve was passed on to all of their descendants. Today, due to advances in 
science as well as biblical studies, the notion of sin inherited by birth seems absurd to 
most of us. Nevertheless, Schillebeeckx explains, the dogma of original sin says 
“something quite real about our human condition.”386 Every human being is born into a 
society which is “in a state of sin” and therefore, “the sin of the world precedes our free 
will. Even before we embark on a voluntary act we are already in a situation that willy-
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nilly prompts—but does not compel—us to sin.”387 Schillebeeckx recognized sin as a 
pervasive reality, whose effects no one can fully escape. However, Schillebeeckx favors 
an understanding of sin as a social reality that manifests itself in oppressive systems and 
social structures, rather than the result of innate corruption of the human soul.  
Schillebeeckx’s understanding of original sin here captures the reality of implicit 
bias. As Jesuit scholar and activist Dean Brackley explains, “our cultural formation (by 
family, school, church, and the media), our location, experience and past choices 
circumscribe our imagination and intelligence. Along with many benefits, we also inherit 
the biases and blind spots of our social class, race, age group, sex, religion, and 
nation.”388 Every human enters the world hearing messages from their surroundings about 
who or what is considered valuable, beautiful, or holy. Our limited perceptions can block 
our ability to consider the feelings and needs of others prior to our actions, and therefore, 
we may behave in ways that are harmful toward ourselves, or other individuals or groups.  
While sin and bias are real and need to be addressed, the persistence of racism, 
sexism, or other types of oppression cannot be used to disprove the value of the negative 
contrast experience, or the “no” that persists in the human heart in response to suffering. 
According to Schillebeeckx, contemplative and liberating action always stands under “the 
finite conditions of our history of suffering.”389 In other words, human action cannot nor 
is expected to ameliorate all human suffering. No political project of liberation be laid out 
perfectly once for and all as a universal solution to current issues and issues to come. 
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Suffering will still persist, and the praxis that responds to suffering will constantly need 
to be critiqued and developed. As Schillebeeckx states, “we experience redemption and 
liberation only in finite fragments, in a history that stands open towards eschatological 
consummation.” Any positive experience of meaning, or fragment of redemption that 
occurs in this life “takes place in ‘unredeemed’ conditions.”390 In other words, there are 
fragments of salvation taking place, even amidst a world where human bias still persists 
and demands further attention. These fragments of salvation do not lessen the urgency for 
bias to be addressed, but the reality of bias and the occurrence of horrific events do not 
necessarily discredit the notion that in the face of suffering, there exists fundamental 
human “no” to what threatens the humanum. For Schillebeeckx, human beings are never 
able to fulfill a role he reserves for God, that of total redemption. Schillebeeckx says that 
our reactions to suffering contain “glimpses of what human wholeness entails.” The key 
word here is “glimpses.” We never arrive at a perfect vision of the humanum, which 
explains why human praxis is never flawless, and can be filled with errors and influenced 
by biases that need correction in the future.  
As La Reine Mosely points out, engagement in practices like the Examen are 
certainly worthwhile and should be strongly encouraged. However, I would hesitate to 
argue that such a practice is necessary for the negative contrast experience to be an 
effective motivator for liberating praxis, although it can certainly help in guiding a 
person’s actions in response to suffering.  
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As Schillebeeckx states, total redemption is beyond human capabilities, and even 
the most devout practitioner of the Spiritual Exercises will never be rid of his or her 
biases, even if he or she has perhaps come to a better recognition of some of them.  Also, 
biases often shape our spiritual practices and the communities with whom we choose to 
pray and worship. While there are some persons who engage in spiritual practices of 
multiple traditions simultaneously, for many, the choice to pray the Examen reflects 
one’s Christian social location and preference for the resources of the Christian tradition. 
One may ask, for example, what about Shamatha-Vipashyana Meditation (Open-
Awareness Meditation) or Tong-len meditation391 from the Buddhist tradition? I am not 
saying that Mosely herself, or all Christians for that matter, would be opposed to 
meditations from other traditions. However, we must recognize that persons who engage 
in religious practices, Christian or otherwise, often do so in a state of ignorance about the 
realities of other traditions or with assumptions about which religious traditions and 
practices are more powerful, effective, intellectual, etc. Second, just as persons may be 
inactive in the face of suffering, there is no guarantee that one will be not also remain 
inactive once becoming aware of bias.  
Schillebeeckx himself recognizes that experiences which call into question the 
status quo are often manipulated and their critical force is blocked by forces who fear 
change. However, new experiences can never have authority simply because they are 
new. He maintains, “we have no guarantee at all that the history of human experience is 
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only progressive and not at the same time also regressive.” He acknowledges that the 
discerning of spirits is, therefore, an essential part of what we call the authority of 
experiences.392 
While Fackre argues that Schillebeeckx places too little emphasis on guilt and 
forgiveness, I would reply that these themes are necessary aspects of Schillebeeckx’s 
theology, given that our human praxis is never fully sufficient and we are incapable of 
anything more than “glimpses” of salvation. As was stated in Chapter One, Schillebeeckx 
held that the Christian belief that “Jesus’ life, death, and resurrection is the divine 
promise that the future can and will be realized in and through our commitment to faith, 
despite all failure”393is crucial when faced with the inevitable fact that not all of our 
efforts to end suffering will be successful. Schillebeeckx recognized that just as Jesus’s 
ministry ended with the cross, so too will our efforts to address and ameliorate suffering 
meet with resistance, which can turn harsh and violent. He claimed that to follow Jesus, 
we must become “the partisan of the oppressed and humiliated,” knowing that in doing 
so, we run the risk of becoming “oppressed and done away with by this world.”394 This 
statement shows Schillebeeckx’s awareness that not all will respond to the negative 
contrast experience in the same way, and that human beings themselves are not only 
complicit in but may exacerbate conditions of suffering by opposing efforts at change or 
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reform. Yet, true salvation cannot simply be a defeat or disregard of the position of those 
who disagree with us, or whose actions have been the cause of a great deal of a pain, but 
rather must be a reconciliation. As Schillebeeckx states, Jesus clearly refused any 
messianic ideology that “liberates the oppressed” but “mercilessly annihilates the 
oppressor.”395 Praxis for human wholeness at some point requires forgiveness of 
ourselves and of others for our complicity in suffering.  
It is perhaps true that Schillebeeckx does not stress guilt and repentance very much 
in his theology. Yet, this does not mean that he believed they should be absent from 
human experiences of contrast. When one experiences a radical “no” to the current 
situation, this does not preclude that one might see him or herself as part of the problem, 
although we are sometimes blocked from recognizing this, at least right away. Praxis for 
the humanum can include self-improvement or at least an openness or vulnerability to 
letting one’s previous actions and thoughts be critiqued and expanded. Indeed, feeling 
like we have done wrong, or have failed to stand up for those in need, or that we are not 
fully in communion with another person or group of people, is itself an experience of 
suffering. For Schillebeeckx, however, the guilt itself cannot be the main focal point, but 
rather the meaning that comes from one’s experience of guilt. Feeling guilty in and of 
itself does not bring healing. Guilt needs to move beyond shame and remorse into action. 
Jesus did not want the disciples to sit and feel guilty for abandoning him, he wanted them 
to go out and preach the good news. The disciples did need to repent and experience 
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forgiveness from Jesus, but their reconciliation with him would be futile if it did not 
produce further action to demonstrate their commitment to Jesus.   
2. Is the Negative Contrast Experience Universal or an Example of Catholic 
Hegemony? 
Borgman, Rochford, and Dunn problematize Schillebeeckx’s negative contrast 
experience in light of the rise of postmodernism, which is strongly suspicious of grand 
narratives on the basis of any tradition or authority. Schillebeeckx never denied that 
Christianity is historically particular. Recalling Chapter One, Schillebecckx argued that 
Jesus is not absolute, since “no historical particularity can be called absolute” and “the 
risen Jesus keeps pointing beyond himself to God.”396  Yet, according to Schillebeeckx, 
the absolute can only be revealed through the particular. This is apparent in 
Schillebeckx’s understanding of revelation, namely, that revelation can only be perceived 
in human experience, and humans experience the world through their own historical and 
social context.  Schillebeeckx insisted that “if there is a unique universality in Jesus, then 
it must lie in Jesus’ actual being-as-man, not above or behind it.” In other words, God’s 
offer of salvation to humankind is revealed through the historically particular person 
Jesus, in his life and ministry, although this “truth” is one that can only be apprehended 
by faith.397  
Schillebeeckx does not set out to “prove” the universality of Jesus or of 
Christianity, nor is the purpose of his work to convince the world that all must accept 
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Jesus as the guarantor of total salvation or meaning in light of our history of negative 
contrast experiences. We can only know Jesus as such by faith, not empirical evidence. 
“The Christian claim to universality will have to prove itself in the phenomenon of ‘being 
human’ as that actually transpires.”398 Nevertheless, what is known by faith is not 
necessarily unable to contain what is universally true. This must give the Christian both 
confidence and humility. One may consider the way Schillebeeckx ultimately interprets 
the negative contrast experience to be hegemonic, yet there is no stopping non-believers 
or religious others from interpreting contrast experiences in another way. Would it not 
also be considered hegemonic to attempt to enforce a position in which all religions must 
rid themselves of any beliefs that resemble “grand narratives?”  
Given his Christian faith convictions, Schillebeeckx cannot see Jesus in any other 
way but as the one who reveals God’s promise of salvation in light of the inevitable 
imperfections of human praxis. For him to say otherwise would be inauthentic. 
Schillebeeckx maintained that, “truth is not to be found in a system, but in a dialogue,” 
since the truth “transcends all our thoughts and yet lives among us.”399  Therefore, 
“existential problems are rightly subjected to the criticism of Christianity, but in the same 
way Christian forms of life are subject to criticism in the light of new existential 
experiences.”400 What Schillebeeckx believes is not that Christianity is the truth, but that 
Jesus manifests the universal truth of God-for-us in his praxis on behalf of the kingdom 
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of God. This gives Christians a hope that Schillebeeckx regards as indispensable, but it 
does not give them access to the truth or even make them better responders to human 
suffering.  
Furthermore, Schillebeeckx’s articulation of the humanum seems to take seriously 
the postmodern rejection of absolute visions or narratives. The humanum, described as 
what human wholeness entails, is never given an actual definition. We receive glimpses 
of what the humanum entails through the witness of the human being “who has already 
been damaged.”401 Suffering, which tells us what “should not be” provides impetus for 
our discovery of what should. The meaning of history remains open, still has to be 
created.402 Of course, for Schillebeeckx, the humanum is not disconnected from Christian 
revelation. According to Schillebeeckx, “Jesus unmasked a concept of God which 
enslaves people; he fought for a view of God who liberates mankind, a view which has to 
be expressed in specific action.” Jesus, he states, simultaneously shows in word and deed, 
both what it can mean to be a truly human being, and who and how God is.403 For the 
Christian, indeed, the humanum may be identified with the kingdom of God spoken of by 
Jesus. Yet, this means that the kingdom of God cannot be positively identified once and 
for all, but what the kingdom of God entails is still being worked out by human beings in 
their responses to concrete instances of suffering. A non-believer or non-Christian may 
object to the term “kingdom of God,” but this does not prohibit Christians and non-
Christians from working together, or signify that their visions of human wholeness are 
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opposed. No person is in possession of the fullness of what human wholeness entails now 
or in the future. If negative contrast experiences belong to all human beings regardless of 
religious tradition or lack thereof, then this means that the voices of various traditions 
must contribute to the building up of the humanum. The special authority of the negative 
contrast experience is not hierarchical. Christianity has no special privilege in defining 
the humanum over non-Christians.  
Elizabeth Johnson characterizes Schillebeeckx’s soteriology as “postmodern.” She 
describes postmodern thinking as being “conscious of the ambiguous character of 
progress advanced through so much suffering and defeat and it questions the claim to 
universality of thought patterns that are in reality the result of privilege.”404 As opposed 
to the “totalizing historical narrative” characteristic of the modern mentality and 
associated with Karl Rahner, Johnson says that Schillebeeckx, along with Metz, as well 
as other liberation and feminist theologians, construe a “contingent historical 
narrative.”405 The contingent historical narrative, according to Johnson, does not claim to 
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know an ideal pattern of the whole even though it expresses desire for it. It “expresses 
hope beyond the disruptions of history, which it cannot tame.”406 Johnson says, 
Contingent historical narrative tells the story of the joyous, Spirit-filled ministry of 
Jesus, his unjust suffering and death, and his rising to new life in such a way that 
God can be seen to draw near in the midst of historical discontinuities, rather than 
bypassing them. Historically there is no discernible pattern that makes either 
Jesus’s life or its outcome either preordained or absolutely predictable. It happens. 
Indeed it happens amid the confluence of historical forces as all lives happen. But 
this narrative generates such hope because it signals divine mystery unpredictably 
present in the very midst of contingent events of suffering, community, struggle, 
and joy, present where least expected, even with the disinherited and 
brokenhearted, irrepressible in vitality.407 
 
Schillebeeckx’s use of a Christian interpretive framework need not be considered 
incompatible with postmodern thought, unless one wanted to make the claim that 
postmodernity and religious commitment are irreconcilable. As Johnson explains, the 
contingent historical framework, “reveals a deep structure of being within history 
whereby life and communion remain possible even in the midst of discontinuity, 
repression, and suffering because of God who comes in historical contingency, ineffable 
but close, bringing forth being.”408 The negative contrast experience is not meant to be a 
theory about suffering or a prediction of what will happen in the future, nor is it meant to 
be an illustration of “history as a march of progress, from darkness to light.” Rather, it 
illustrates the universal human experiences of suffering and the universal human capacity 
to hope. The negative contrast experience does not belong to Schillebeeckx alone. 
Interpretations outside the Christian framework are not only possible, but necessary and 
worthy of being heard.  
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 The question Hilkert raises about who gets to determine authentic tradition and 
whose experiences counts is a fair and vital one. Schillebeeckx conception of what 
constitutes “the great Christian tradition” does not appear to be as vast as the “usable 
tradition” articulated by Rosemary Radford Ruether above, which comprises sources 
deemed heretical in the past. Yet, Schillebeeckx’s position on alternative and dissenting 
communities during his own time makes me believe that he would not be closed off to the 
possibility brought up by Hilkert that perhaps the naming of some marginalized 
traditions, such as Montanism, as heretical, is the result of ideological distortion of the 
tradition.409  
In a 1980 article entitled “The Christian Community and Its Office-Bearers,” 
Schillebeeckx remarked that at present, “we are witnessing within the Church throughout 
the world a wave of alternative praxis and this in itself is a clear indicator that the 
existing order in the Church has lost its credibility and is in urgent need of revision.”410 
There is a dynamism to be found in this alternative praxis, writes Schillebeeckx, not 
because it is alternative, but because Christians can identify themselves with it, and it 
inspires the lives of many. Therefore, Schillebeeckx concludes, we cannot claim that such 
alternative praxis does not possess an “inherent apostolicity even before it is recognized 
publicly by the official church” nor that “it will only acquire that apostolicity when it has 
been sanctioned by the Church.”411 According to Daniel Thompson, Schillebeeckx’s 
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ecclesiology “provides a way for seeing dissenting or alternative communities as part of 
the nature of the sacramental church itself.”412  
While Schillbeeckx’s treatment of contemporary alternative praxis may not apply 
directly to alternative praxes during early Christianity, one could argue that such 
movements are part of Christian tradition if they, like more modern movements, resonate 
with and animate Christian praxis today. Montanism, for example, understood the 
prophetic gifts of the Spirit as being poured out on men and women alike, and thus gave 
women not only equal prophetic authority but also equal participation in the ordinary 
ministry.413 Shakerism taught that the creation of humanity, male and female, in the 
image of God points to the androgyny of God.414 Ruether herself acknowledges that these 
traditions cannot be considered simple substitutions for Christianity in its current form, 
since “neither orthodox nor heretical Christianity brings together the wholeness of vision 
that feminist theology seeks.”415 Nevertheless, these traditions may belong to the “usable 
past,” and a deeper study of them may reveal the connection between heresy and 
women’s roles.  
Throughout his career, Schillebeeckx displayed a sense of openness to learning 
from the critiques not only of secularism, but of movements like feminism and liberation 
theology.416 Schillebeeckx would not see the questions of “what constitutes tradition” and 
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“whose experience counts” as ever being capable of having a definitive answer, since we 
are continuously in the process of learning more about the past and gaining more insight 
into how certain experiences have been forgotten or not given enough attention 
throughout the history of Christianity.   
E. Conclusion 
 
 This chapter attempted to explain how Edward Schillebeeckx’s notion of the 
negative contrast experience might be an appropriate starting point for interreligious 
dialogue. Rather than relying on an understanding of all persons as anonymous Christians 
or persons oriented toward the Church, Schillebeeckx starts with the basic reality of 
human suffering and how this reality brings forth the human capacity for hope. In this 
chapter, I provided a brief overview of how the concept of the negative contrast 
experience developed during Schillebeeckx’s career. Some scholars have critiqued 
Schillebeeckx’s articulation of the negative contrast experience, particularly with regard 
to his use of tradition and his treatment, or lack thereof, of the themes of sin and guilt. I 
sought to demonstrate how these critiques should not disqualify the negative contrast 
experience from being a universal starting point for dialogue across religious boundaries, 
as well as between believers and non-believers.  
 Schillebeeckx’s strikes an important balance in his approach to the relationship 
between Christianity and non-Christian religions. Namely, he refuses to regard 
Christianity as dispensable or irrelevant, but also strongly insists that what is necessary 
for human liberation cannot be found by looking to the Christian tradition alone. He does 
not strive to abandon the Christian tradition, but demonstrates how devotion to a 
particular religious tradition can co-exist with a more postmodern way of thinking that 
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does not simply accept arguments from authority, and rejects absolute visions or 
narratives that attempt to make sense of history. For Schillebeeckx, the future is not to be 
theorized, but brought about by the performance of human praxis. In the next chapter, I 
will focus specifically on Schillebeeckx’s soteriology as informative for Christian 








EDWARD SCHILLEBEECKX’S SOTERIOLOGY: CREATION AND SALVATION  
 
AS ONGOING PROJECTS 
 
As was discussed in Chapter Two, Schillebeeckx regarded the negative contrast 
experience as having “a critical cognitive value and force of its own.” The knowledge 
implicit in our reactions to suffering anticipates a better future and leads to new action. 417 
Given his recognition of suffering humanity as a source of knowledge for the 
development of human praxis, it is no surprise that soteriology is the driving question 
behind all of Schillebeeckx’s theology.418 According to Schillebeeckx, the question of 
salvation has expanded in recent history, even beyond theological interest. No longer 
solely the preoccupation of the world’s religions, it has become the concern of a variety 
of humane sciences, technologies and activities.  Although other disciplines may not 
specifically refer to this concern as “salvation,” it is “more than ever the great stimulus 
throughout the whole of present-day existence.”419 Thus, Schillebeeckx wanted to define 
salvation in a way that could incorporate the whole person, not just one’s soul or one’s 
state of existence after his or her earthly life.   
 The purpose of this chapter is to gain a deeper understanding of Schillebeeckx’s 
soteriology. Each section of this chapter will be devoted to discussing a particular aspect 
                                                        
 
417 Schillebeeckx, The Collected Words of Edward Schillebeeckx Vol 6: Jesus, An Experiment in 
Christology, Ed. Shoof, Sterkens, Borgman, Shreiter (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), 582, originally 
published as Jezus, het verhaal van een levende (Blemendaal, 1974).   
418 One of the first works on Schillebeeckx’s soteriology claims that Schillebeeckx’s entire theological 
enterprise is soteriological. See Tadahiko Iwashima, Menschheitsgeschichte und Heilserfahrung: Die 
Tehologie von Edward Schillebeeckx als methodisch reflektierte Soteriologie (Dusseldorf: Patmos, 1982). 
419 Edward Schillebeeckx, The Collected Works of Edward Schillebeeckx, Vol 7: Christ: The Christian 
Experience in the Modern World, Ed. Shoof, Sterkens, Borgman, Shreiter (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), 
787, originally published as Gerechtigheid en liefde, genade en bevrijding (Bloemendaal, 1997). 
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of Schillebeeckx’s soteriology. It will cover: 1) creation as the foundation of 
Schillebeeckx’s soteriology; 2) Schillebeeckx’s articulation of the relationship between 
fragments of salvation in this world and eschatological, or final, salvation; 3) the role of 
Jesus in Schillebeeckx’s soteriology, in which Jesus himself becomes the assurance of 
eschatological salvation; 4) the communal nature of salvation. In the last section, I will 
explore how Schillebeeckx’s soteriology might aid interreligious dialogue. Here, I will 
propose that it allows one to maintain the uniqueness, universality, and definitiveness of 
Jesus Christ while still affirming non-Christian religions as necessary for becoming a true 
disciple of Jesus in the contemporary world. If, as Schillebeeckx asserted, “there is no 
salvation outside the world,” and the world is religiously pluralist, then a Christian 
understanding of salvation must include relationships of mutual learning and exchange 
with non-Christian traditions. 
A. No Salvation Outside the World: The Indissoluble Link Between Creation and 
Salvation 
 
 As was outlined in the introduction to this dissertation, each of the three 
paradigms of the theology of religions deals with the question of salvation in its own 
way. These paradigms provide ways of answering the question of whether or not there is 
salvation outside of Christianity and if so, how. The exclusivist position maintains that 
there is no salvation outside of Christianity. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the 
pluralist position holds that there is not only salvation outside of Christianity, but that 
other religions are ways of salvation in their own right, apart from the mediation of Jesus 
Christ.  The inclusivist position lies in between these two. It affirms the possibility of 
salvation outside of Christianity, but that this salvation comes, in some way, through 
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Jesus Christ. From these simple definitions, one can sense a preoccupation with salvation 
in each of these paradigms, since all three strive to form a theoretical explanation of 
salvation both inside and outside of Christianity. 
 The paradigms can also be used in describing the evolution of the Magisterium’s 
attitude toward non-Christian religions. The Second Vatican Council shifted the 
Magisterium’s position from an exclusivist to an inclusivist one. However, even when 
tracing the very long development of the Magisterium’s position on non-Christians420, 
one can see that much of the focus is on salvation as something that is given to human 
beings by God, and this is believed to be experienced in the afterlife. According to Kevin 
Considine, Gauidum et Spes provides a vision of salvation and reconciliation with God 
that is “primarily eschatological and connected to the mystery of death.”421 While 
Schillebeeckx also affirms this eschatological dimension of salvation, his soteriology 
aims to avoid a one-sided emphasis on the other-worldliness of salvation and therefore, 
lead us beyond the question “who is saved and who is not?” Without giving up belief in 
the necessity of Jesus Christ for salvation, Schillebeeckx shifts from the phrase extra 
ecclesiam nulla salus (no salvation outside the Church) to extra mundum nulla salus (no 
salvation outside the world). 
 
 
                                                        
 
420 For a survey of the Catholic Church’s teaching on this issue from the New Testament up until just 
before the Second Vatican Council, see Louis Capéran, Le Probléme du salut des infidels (Paris: 
Beauchesne, 1912).  
421 Kevin Considine, Salvation for the Sinned-Against: Han and Schillebeeckx in Intercultural Dialogue 
(Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2015), 19.  
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1. What Does Extra Ecclesiam Nulla Salus Mean? 
The well-known phrase Extra ecclesiam nulla salus or “no salvation outside the 
Church,” was first used in the third century by Cyprian of Carthage as a warning against 
Christians in danger of falling into heresy or who had already been separated from the 
church. Cyprian conceived of the church as a unity of love. Therefore, he felt that anyone 
who violated this unity was guilty of a sin against charity and could not be saved. It was 
not until the fourth century, after Christianity became the official religion of the Roman 
Empire, that extra ecclesiam nulla salus shifted from being simply an admonition, made 
out of pastoral concern, for erring Christians, to being a warning to members of other 
religious traditions.422 St. Augustine argued that even unbaptized infants and those who 
had never heard of Christ were included among the condemned and this was justified due 
to the reality of original sin.423  In 1442, the Council of Florence issued the following 
decree: 
[The Church] firmly believes, professes, and preaches that all those who are 
outside the Catholic Church, not only pagans but also Jews or heretics or 
schismatics, cannot share in eternal life and will go into the everlasting fire which 
was prepared for the devil and his angels, unless they are joined to the Catholic 
Church before the end of their lives.424 
 
                                                        
 
422 Robin Ryan, Jesus and Salvation (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2015), 170.  
423 Ryan, 171 See also Augustine of Hippo. A Treatise on the Soul and Its Origin, trans. Philip Schaff (New 
York: Christian Literature Publishing Co, 1886), Book II, Chapters XIII-X. 
424 Council of Basel, Florence, and Ferrara, Session 11 February 4, 1442, Available at 
http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Councils/ecum17.htm Accessed May 31, 2016. This statement is also 
discussed by Schillebeeckx. See The Collected Works of Edward Schillebeeckx, Vol 10: Church, The 
Human Story of God, Ed. Shoof, Sterkens, Borgman, Shreiter (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), xvii. This 
expression of extra ecclesiam nulla salus was originally authored by the sixth century North African bishop 
and disciple of Augustine, Fulgentius of Ruspe. See Fulgenius of Ruspe, De fide, ad Petrumm 38 (79), 
cited in Ryan, 171.  
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 Even as late as 1863, Pope Pius IX, in his encyclical Quanto Conficiamur 
Moerore (On the Promotion of False Doctrines), still declared that it is a well-known 
Catholic dogma that “no one can be saved outside the Catholic Church.”425 Nevertheless, 
it was at this time that the church began to hint (it is important to emphasize the word 
“hint” here since these were not explicit affirmations) at the possibility of salvation for 
those who have no knowledge of the Christian religion. Thus, in the same encyclical, 
Pius IX also stated that “sincerely observing the natural law and its precepts inscribed by 
God on all hearts and ready to obey God, [non-Christians] live honest lives and are able 
to attain eternal life by the efficacious virtue of divine light and grace.”426  However, this 
ability to attain salvation through obedience to natural law strictly applied to those who 
lacked proper knowledge of the Gospel. In 1864, Pius IX explicitly condemned the 
beliefs that “every man is free to embrace that religion which, guided by the light of 
reason, he shall consider true” and that “man may, in observance of any religion 
whatever, find the way to eternal salvation, and arrive at eternal salvation.”427  
Almost a century later, in 1943, Pope Pius XII stressed the strict identity between 
the Mystical Body of Christ and the Catholic Church. While Catholics could be 
considered members of the Mystical Body, Pius XII suggested that non-Christians might 
be related to the Mystical Body by an implicit desire. The notion of implicit desire was 
not new to Catholic thought in the twentieth century. Pius XII was likely influenced by 
the sixteenth century Spanish Jesuits Francisco Suarez and Juan De Lugo. Suarez argued 
                                                        
 
425 Pope Pius IX, Quanto Conficiamur Moerore: Encyclical Letter on the Promotion of False Doctrines, 
Promulgated August 10, 1863, http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Pius09/p9quanto.htm, 8 
426 Pope Pius IX, Quanto Conficiamur Moerore: Encyclical Letter on the Promotion of False Doctrines, 7.  
427 See Syllabus of Errors Condemned by Pius IX, http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Pius09/p9syll.htm, III. 
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that a person’s faith in God and sincere repentance for sin constituted an implicit faith 
that entails an implicit desire for baptism, enabling him or her to be saved.428 De Lugo 
went even further by stating that implicit desire may also belong to those who do not 
believe in Christ or hold unorthodox views about him, such as Jews and Muslims. Such 
persons, he argued, may have “invincible ignorance” of the truth. They may have heard 
about the message of Christ, but were not convinced of its truth.429 Nevertheless, Pius 
XII’s attitude toward these persons is still pessimistic. In the encyclical Mystici Corporis 
Christi, he insists that “from a heart overflowing with love,” Catholics must ask non-
Christians to 
seek to withdraw from that state in which they cannot be sure of their salvation. 
For even though by an unconscious desire and longing they have a certain 
relationship with the Mystical Body of the Redeemer, they remain deprived of 
those many heavenly gifts and helps which can only be enjoyed by the Catholic 
Church. 430 
  
 In 1950, Pope Pius XII’s encyclical Humani Generis lamented that “some reduce 
to a meaningless formula the necessity of belonging to the true Church in order to gain 
eternal salvation.”431 Thus, prior to the Second Vatican Council, the Magisterial position 
toward non-Christian religions could be best described as exclusivist. Even when the 
possibility of salvation was acknowledged for those who remain ignorant of the “true 
                                                        
 
428 Francisco Suarez, De fide theological, disp. 12, sect. 4, n22, ed. Vives, vol. 12 (Paris, 1858), 359, cited 
in Ryan, 173.  
429 Juan De Lugo, De virtue fidei divinae, disp. 12, nn50-51, cited in Ryan, 173.  
430 Pope Pius XII, Mystici Corporis Christi: Encyclical on the Mystical Body of Christ, Promulgated June 
29, 1943,http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xii_enc_29061943_mystici-
corporis-christi.html, 103.  
431 Pope Pius XII, Humani Generis: Concerning Some False Opinions Threatening to Undermine the 
Foundations of Catholic Doctrine, Promulgated August 12, 1950, Available from 
http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xii_enc_12081950_humani-
generis.html, 27.  
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faith,” non-Christians were still considered to be in a state of deprivation and the positive 
characteristics of their traditions were not formally recognized.  
 In the documents of the Second Vatican Council, one notices a Magisterial shift 
from an exclusivist position to an inclusivist one. The Second Vatican Council (1962-
1965) was considered revolutionary, as the Church began to recognize its responsibility 
for “reading the signs of the times.”432 The Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the 
Modern World, Gaudium et Spes, was addressed not just to Catholics, but to “the whole 
of humanity,” admitting that the Church alone cannot respond to the problems of the 
modern world.433 In Dignitatis Humanae, the Church explicitly declared that all human 
beings have the right to religious freedom and that this right is “based on the very dignity 
of the human person as known through the revealed word of God and by reason itself.”434 
In just the century prior to Vatican II, Gregory XVI had condemned as “absurd and 
erroneous” the proposition that “liberty of conscience must be maintained for 
everyone.”435  
                                                        
 
432 Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes: The Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the Modern 
World, in Vatican Council II: Constitutions, Decrees, Declarations, ed. Austin Flannery, OP (Northport: 
NY: Costello, 1996), 4. Although it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss this issue, it is 
important to recognize that there was and still to this day is no unanimous consensus as to what reading 
“the signs of the times” should mean. A more traditional view held that the church’s current issues 
stemmed from the rise of secularization in the world and a decreased respect for authority. Thus, they 
believed that the Council’s task was “to repeat and clarify the traditional teaching.” A more progressive 
group held that the church needed restricting and reform because it was too detached from humanity. Thus, 
the church bore the responsibility to “reclothe the church’s teahcings and disciplines to meet the modern 
world and its needs” and to “reform the liturgy.” See Timothy G. McCarthy, The Catholic Tradition: 
Before and After Vatican II 1878-1993 (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1994), 63-7.  
433 Gaudium et Spes, 2.  
434 Second Vatican Council, Dignitatis Humanae: Declaration on Religious Liberty, in Vatican Council II: 
Constitutions, Decrees, Declarations, ed. Austin Flannery, OP (Northport: NY: Costello, 1996), I.2. 
435 Gregory XVI, Mirari Vos: Encyclical Letter On Liberalism and Religious Indifferentism, 
http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Greg16/g16mirar.htm, 14.  
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 At Vatican II, for the first time, the Magisterium officially recognized the many 
positive qualities found in non-Christian religions, and put forth the possibility that 
members of these traditions (and even non-believers) may experience salvation in Jesus 
Christ. Gautium et Spes asserted that “since Christ died for all men, and since the 
ultimate vocation of man is in fact one, we ought to believe that the Holy Spirit in a 
manner known only to God offers to every man the possibility of being associated with 
this paschal mystery.”436 Nostra Aetate encouraged Christians to “enter with prudence 
and charity into discussion and collaboration with members of other religions,” and to 
“acknowledge, preserve, and encourage the spiritual and moral truths found among non-
Christians.”437 It reproved “as foreign to the mind of Christ, any discrimination against 
people or any harassment of them basis of their race, color, condition in life or 
religion.”438  
 Nevertheless, the Second Vatican Council did not relinquish the belief that the 
Church has a privileged place in the economy of salvation. Lumen Gentium, the 
Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, taught that all people are “called to belong to the 
new people of God.”439 Yet, it distinguished those who “belong” (pertinent) to this new 
people of God from those who are “related” (ordinatur) to it. The Catholic faithful and all 
those who believe in Christ are said to belong to the people of God, while all others are 
                                                        
 
436 Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes: The Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the Modern 
World, in Vatican Council II: Constitutions, Decrees, Declarations, ed. Austin Flannery, OP (Northport: 
NY: Costello, 1996), 25.  
437 Second Vatican Council, Nostra Aetate: Declaration on the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian 
Religions, , in Vatican Council II: Constitutions, Decrees, Declarations, ed. Austin Flannery, OP 
(Northport: NY: Costello, 1996), 2.  
438 Nostra Aetate, 5.  
439 Second Vatican Council, Lumen Gentium: Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, in Vatican Council II: 
Constitutions, Decrees, Declarations, ed. Austin Flannery, OP (Northport: NY: Costello, 1996), 13.  
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related to the people of God. Lumen Gentium mentioned five groups of people who are 
included in the latter group: 1) Jews; 2) Muslims; 3) “those who in the shadows and 
images seek the unknown God,” which likely refers to traditions like Hinduism and 
Buddhism; 4) those who sincerely seek God; and 5) those who, through no fault of their 
own, have never arrived at explicit knowledge of God.440 It still insisted that those who 
“refuse to enter the church, or to remain in it, while knowing that it was founded by God 
through Christ as required for salvation” cannot be saved.441 However, recalling the 
words of Karl Rahner mentioned in Chapter One, the time at which the absolute 
obligation of faith in Jesus and Christianity comes into effect for each person is 
impossible to determine.442 What it means for a person to truly know that the church is 
required for salvation remains ambiguous.  
 The Second Vatican Council also did not de-emphasize the need for missionary 
activity, “the gospel must be preached to all everyone before the Lord comes.” It 
recognized “elements of truth and grace” among non-Christian religions that are a “secret 
presence of God.”443 It urged missionaries to immerse themselves in the social and 
cultural lives of the people to whom they are sent. Missionaries should familiarize 
                                                        
 
440 Lumen Genitum, 16, cited in Ryan, 175.  
441 Lumen Gentium, 14.  
442 According to Rahner, a non-Christian religion is considered to contain “ supernatural elements arising 
out of grace which is given to men as a gratuitous gift of Christ” up until the moment when the gospel 
really enters the life of an individual. “Whether this point is the same, theologically speaking, as the first 
Pentecost, or whether it is different in chronological time for individual peoples and religions, is something 
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Non-Christian Religions, Theological Investigations X.6, Trans. David Bourke (New York: Crossroads, 
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443 Second Vatican Council, Ad Gentes Divinitus: Decree on the Church’s Missionary Activity, in Vatican 




themselves with the surrounding national and religious traditions to uncover “those seeds 
of the word which lie hidden among them.”444 These “seeds of the word” are brought to 
fulfillment with the preaching of Christ.  
 The Second Vatican Council demonstrated an openness to and appreciation of 
non-Christian religions. It affirmed the possibility of salvation for those outside of the 
Roman Catholic Church. However, Lumen Gentium still maintained that “this pilgrim 
church is required for salvation” and that “Christ alone is mediator and way of 
salvation.”445 Thus, the church, as “universal sacrament of salvation,”446 plays an active 
role in the salvation of non-Christians. The Constitution on Sacred Liturgy, 
Sacrosanctum Concilium, proclaimed that the Church’s role in the redemption of non-
Christians takes place in the liturgy, especially in the divine sacrifice of the Eucharist.447 
The prayers “Lord, may this sacrifice which has made our peace with you, advance the 
peace and salvation of all the world,” and “we offer you his body and blood, the 
acceptable sacrifice which brings salvation to the whole world” are seen to justify 
describing the church as an efficacious sign of the salvation of non-Christians even when 
it cannot play a more directly instrumental role by preaching the gospel to them.448 
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445 Lumen Gentium, 14.  
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447 Second Vatican Council, Sacrosanctum Concilium: The Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy, in Vatican 
Council II: Constitutions, Decrees, Declarations, ed. Austin Flannery, OP (Northport: NY: Costello, 1996), 
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448 Francis A. Sullivan, Salvation Outside the Church? Tracing the History of the Catholic Response (New 
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 Even as non-Christian religions, cultures, and philosophies are viewed as capable 
of “working against evil and serving life and everything that is good,”449 they are still 
regarded as deficient and in need of fulfillment by Christianity.  Shortly after Vatican II, 
in his 1975 Apostolic Exhortation Evangelii Nuntiandi, Pope Paul VI stated that other 
religions are “impregnated with innumerable seeds of the Word” that can constitute a 
“true preparation for the Gospel.” The church, he insisted, must keep her “missionary 
spirit” alive, as Christianity “establishes with God an authentic and living relationship 
which the other religions do not succeed in doing, even though they have, as it were, their 
arms outstretched toward heaven.”450 Fifteen years later, in his encyclical Redemptoris 
Missio: On the Permanent Validity of the Church’s Missionary Mandate, Pope John Paul 
II expressed the belief that “Christ endowed the Church, his body, with the fullness of the 
benefits and means of salvation.” John Paul II affirmed the presence of the Holy Spirit 
outside the church’s visible boundaries, even insisting that the Spirit affects not only 
individuals, but also “society and history, peoples, cultures and religions.”451 However, 
he reiterated the church has a “specific and necessary role” and a “special connection 
with the kingdom of God.”452 The possibility of salvation for all must be maintained, but 
salvation can only come through Jesus Christ, the “one, universal mediation” between 
God and humankind. Although, John Paul II insisted, “participated forms of mediation of 
                                                        
 
449  See John Paul II, Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation on the Ecclesia in Asia, 
http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_jp-
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different kinds and degrees are not excluded, they acquire meaning and value only from 
Christ’s own mediation, and they cannot be understood as parallel and complementary to 
his.”453 
 In 1991, the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue and the congregation 
for the Evangelization of Peoples released a reflection on interreligious dialogue entitled 
Dialogue and Proclamation. It insisted that 
concretely, it will be in the sincere practice of what is good in their own religious 
traditions and by following the dictates of their conscience that members of other 
religious traditions respond positively to God’s invitation and receive salvation in 
Christ, even while they do not recognize or acknowledge him as their savior.454 
 
Yet, this 1991 document was not a sign of an increasingly positive attitude tone and 
attitude toward other religions. The 2000 declaration Dominus Iesus: On the Unicity and 
Salvific Universality of Jesus Christ and the Church (hereafter referred to as DI), 
mentioned in Chapter One, was not received as well as previous documents that 
addressed the Church’s relationship to other religions. It sought to respond to what are 
described as “relativistic theories which seek to justify religious pluralism, not only de 
facto but also de iure (or in principle)” by reiterating “certain truths that are part of the 
Church’s faith.”455 The document’s main concern was upholding the “universal salvific 
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mediation of the church,” a truth which theologians such as Roger Haight and Paul 
Knitter have called into question.  
Dominus Iesus sought to emphasize the distinction between theological faith and 
belief. Theological faith, defined as the “the acceptance of grace in revealed truth,” which 
is a “gift of God” and “a supernatural virtue infused by him” belongs, according to DI, 
only to Christianity. Other religions are merely “religious experience still in search of 
absolute truth and still lacking assent to God who reveals himself.”456 Still, the document 
expressly denied that other religions, even Judaism and Islam, can be considered ways of 
salvation alongside the Church. While the prayers and rituals of other religions can be 
viewed positively as preparation for the Gospel, one cannot attribute to them a divine 
origin or an ex opere operato457 salvific efficacy, which is proper to the Christian 
sacraments alone.458 Thus, the followers of other religions are “in a gravely deficient 
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situation in comparison with those who, in the Church, have the fullness of the means of 
salvation.”459  
Strongly insisting upon the necessity of Jesus Christ for the salvation of all 
people, Dominus Iesus emphasized that the kingdom of God, although it is a concern of 
everyone, cannot be separated from Christ or the church. It condemned “kingdom 
centered” approaches which “stress the image of a Church which is not concerned about 
herself, but which is totally concerned with bearing witness to and serving the kingdom.” 
Such conceptions, it said, are silent about Christ and put great stress on the mystery of 
creation, while keeping silent about the mystery of redemption, thereby undervaluing the 
Church.460 Dominus Iesus affirmed that terms like “unicity”, “universality”, and 
“absoluteness” cannot be avoided when describing the significance and value of Jesus 
Christ in relation to other religions.461 Interreligious dialogue is mentioned toward the 
end of the document as part of the church’s “evangelizing mission.” Equality is upheld as 
a presupposition of interreligious dialogue, but this refers “to the equal personal dignity 
of the parties in dialogue, not to doctrinal content, not even less to the position of Jesus 
Christ- who is God himself made man- in relation to the founders of other religions.”462 
 From this review of official Catholic teaching, it may seem as though the 
Magisterium abandoned the dogma of extra ecclesiam nulla salus. However, that is not 
the case. Rather than dropping the phrase altogether, the Magisterium’s interpretation of 
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it has expanded so as to apply more aptly to a historical context in which people of 
different religions encounter one another on a daily basis. Cyprian’s main concern in 
third century was bringing those who had apostatized back into the community of the 
Church. Joseph Ratzinger, later Pope Benedict XVI, defended Cyprian’s formulation of 
extra ecclesiam nulla salus. Cyprian, speaking about apostates and schismatics, said not 
to “think they are still in the way of life and salvation, if they will not obey the bishops 
and priests…. They cannot have life out of [the Church] because the house of God is one, 
and there cannot be salvation for any, except in the Church.”463 Ratzinger saw the true 
meaning of Cyprian’s statement as “the positive assertion that the episcopal structure is 
absolutely essential to the Church, rather than the negative statement that the majority of 
mankind is lost.”464   
 Francis Sullivan further explains that one must take into account the historical 
conditions previous articulations of extra ecclesiam nulla salus were addressing. The 
limits of geographical location convinced the early Christians that “everyone had ample 
opportunity to hear and respond to the gospel.” Likewise, “the limits of their grasp of 
human psychology led them to the conviction that all those who had heard the message of 
the gospel and did not accept it must be guilty of sinning against the truth.”465 This 
enables Sullivan to affirm that the “substance” of the doctrine still endures, namely that 
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“God has assigned to the Church a necessary role in the divine economy of salvation.”466 
For even though the possibility of salvation for those outside of the Church is now 
affirmed, this salvation still comes to non-Christians through the Church as its mediator. 
According to Matthew Ramage, this contemporary enunciation of extra ecclesiam nulla 
salus (namely that there is no salvation outside the Church but non-Christians may be 
mysteriously oriented to the Church and therefore, be saved) would likely have met the 
approval of Cyprian and other early Christian figures, had they been given the knowledge 
we have today.467  
 While the affirmation of a shift from exclusvisim to inclusivism is clear in the 
documents, the question of whether or not the Second Vatican Council’s position on the 
status of other religions in the process of salvation was “optimistic” has been the subject 
of debate. Karl Rahner held “optimism concerning salvation” as “one of the most 
noteworthy results of the Second Vatican Council.”468 Following Rahner, Sullivan 
interprets the attitude of the Council as involving “a presumption of innocence” and an 
“absence of culpability” on the part of those who are outside of the church.469 This 
presumption of innocence coupled with God’s universal salvific will would mean that the 
salvation of those outside the church is a probability rather than a mere possibility; and 
the idea that all persons are indeed saved is a likely proposition. However, more 
conservative interpreters, such as Ralph Martin, believe that none of the Council sources 
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indicate such a “presumption of innocence” and thus, optimists are taking too huge of a 
leap in assuming that the possibility of salvation means that everyone will be saved.470 
Avery Cardinal Dulles also railed against “a kind of thoughtless optimism” that has 
prevailed since Vatican II. “Unable to grasp the rationale for eternal punishment, many 
Christians take it almost for granted that everyone, or practically everyone, must be 
saved.”471 According to Dulles, “the constant teaching of the Magisterium has been that 
unrepentant sinners are sent to eternal punishment.” However, Dulles also held that just 
because it is highly improbable that all will be saved does not mean we cannot and should 
not hope and pray that it will happen.472 
 Even after Vatican II, discourse surrounding salvation in mainline Catholic 
theology is often focused on the eschatological element. It sees salvation in terms of 
something that is given to certain people at the time of death, rather than something 
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present in their lifetime. Such discourse has a theoretical or mechanical understanding of 
salvation, seeking to provide theological explanations for how salvation can be given to 
certain people, in spite of various so-called “impediments,” such as not being an explicit 
Christian. According to Dulles, “more education is needed to convince people that they 
ought to fear God who, as Jesus taught, can punish soul and body together in hell.”473 
Here, Dulles is appealing to Matthew 10:28, “And do not fear those who kill the body but 
cannot kill the soul rather fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell.” Such a 
statement may perhaps encourage some Christians to be more cautious of avoiding sin so 
as to escape the terrifying thought of damnation. However, it is not likely to resonate with 
those who no longer find plausible the notion of a God who sends people to a purely 
supernatural realm called heaven or hell. 
 Contemporary liberationist and feminist theologians challenge mainline Catholic 
visions of salvation by highlighting that salvation is a this-worldly reality, not merely one 
to be realized in the future. Liberationist theologians assert that the good news of 
salvation in Christ must speak to the experience of the economically impoverished. In his 
book A Theology of Liberation, Gustavo Gutierrez insists that the Christian message of 
salvation must be one of liberation. Liberation includes three levels: 1) social and 
political liberation 2) psycho-social liberation, empowering people to assume conscious 
responsibility for their lives and destiny 3) liberation from sin, which is the ultimate root 
of oppression. All three levels, he states, entail “a single, complex process, which finds 
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its deepest sense in the saving work of Christ.”474 Salvation is not just about freeing 
people from bonds of oppression in the next life, but dealing with the causes and effects 
of oppression in this one. Thus, Gutierrez argues for the need to move from a 
“quantitative” view of salvation to a “qualitative” one. In other words, he proposes a shift 
away from theological speculation about the salvation of those outside of the church 
toward a consideration of what salvation in Christ means for this world and the next.475  
 Likewise, feminist theologians insist that the good news of salvation in Christ 
must speak to oppressed women. According to feminist theologians, androcentrism, or 
the attitude that men are inherently superior to women, has been prevalent throughout the 
development of the Christian tradition, leading to a dangerous silencing of women’s 
voices and concerns both in the church and society as a whole.  Rosemary Radford 
Ruether identifies the “critical principle of feminist theology” as “the promotion of the 
full humanity of women.” Therefore, “whatever denies, diminishes, or distorts the full 
humanity of women is, therefore, appraised as not redemptive.” On the positive side, 
“what does promote the full humanity of women is of the Holy, it does reflect true 
relation to the divine, it is the true nature of things, the authentic message of redemption 
and the mission of redemptive community.”476  Clearly, in a liberationist perspective, the 
definition of salvation has something to do with what is happening in this life, and it must 
speak to the most marginalized among us.  
                                                        
 
474 Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, trans. Caridad Inda and John Eagleson (Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis, 1973), 37, in Ryan, 137.  
475 Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, 150-152, in Ryan, 137.  
476 Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1983), 18-19.  
 
 150 
 In line with feminist and liberationist theologies, Schillebeeckx favors narrative 
over theory when dealing with the topic of salvation. Instead of attempting to construct a 
theory about the saving work of Christ and if, how, and in what circumstances, it reaches 
outside of the Church, he attempts to tell the life story of Jesus as the liberating story of 
God to demonstrate how salvation from God has and continues to reach human beings in 
their concrete situations. Salvation is not merely the result of Jesus’s death and 
resurrection, but rather salvation from God is present in the entire ministry of Jesus, the 
teachings, healings, exorcisms, and table fellowship with the outcast.  
 Rather than a theoretical and mechanical view of salvation, Schillebeeckx 
provides a more personal one, where salvation is a reality that touches the whole person 
in their embodied life. For Schillebeeckx, “there is no salvation outside the world.” This 
notion represents an optimistic standpoint with regard to salvation, but not one that is, as 
Dulles would accuse, “thoughtless optimism.” God’s offer of salvation is a gift freely 
given even beyond the visible bounds of the church, but it is still one that places demands 
on every human being. For Schillebeeckx, how salvation from God is present amidst the 
sufferings of the world is a more urgent question than who is saved in the afterlife and 
how.  
2. From Extra Ecclesiam Nulla Salus to Extra Mundum Nulla Salus  
Schillebeeckx first made the declaration “outside the world, there is no salvation” 
in a 1989 essay honoring Gustavo Gutierrez.477 However, this statement captured what 
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has been found in Schillebeeckx’s theology of creation from the beginning of his career. 
Indeed the nascent conception of “no salvation outside the world” can be found in one of 
Schillebeeckx’s earliest works, Christ The Sacrament of The Encounter with God: 
“God’s saving activity makes history by revealing itself, and it reveals itself by becoming 
history.”478 Schillebeeckx defined grace as “a personal encounter with God.” In doing so, 
he took issue with impersonal, mechanical approaches to grace that make human beings 
out to be merely passive recipients. Schillebeeckx insisted that while “it is only by grace, 
and not in virtue of our own merits” that we can truly serve God, grace still requires a 
human response.479 In other words, the only way we come to awareness of God’s salvific 
action is through our embodied selves, there is no salvation outside the world.480 
For Schillebeeckx, creation is the “foundation of all theology.”481 According to 
Martin Poulsom, Schillebeeckx’s theology expressed the need to “restore a balance 
between creation and redemption.”482 As mentioned earlier, the Catholic tradition has 
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tended to over-emphasize the supernatural and eschatological dimensions of salvation. 
Oftentimes, salvation is understood as something human beings only “need” due to some 
kind of lack or failure on their part, and this something, rather than being graciously 
gifted to humanity, is reserved for certain persons who fit certain categories, even if such 
categories have expanded since Vatican II to account for phenomena like “anonymous 
Christianity.” Such a view of salvation stems from a literal reading of Genesis 3 and a 
theological anthropology in which death or human finitude is seen as punishment for 
Adam and Eve’s disobedience to God. Thus, God’s work of redemption has historically 
been tied to the “fall of humanity.” In the third century, Athanasius asserted that the 
disobedience of humanity is the reason for the incarnation. A century later, Augustine 
claimed, “God foreknew that the first man would sin” and “He at the same time foresaw 
how a large multitude of godly persons would by His grace be translated to the 
fellowship of angels.”483 Certainly, most contemporary Christian theologians no longer 
read Genesis as a historical account of creation.484 However, Schillebeeckx believed that 
too strong of a connection between redemption and human sin still persists. For example, 
Schillebeeckx strove to distinguish his position from that of the Dutch Reformed 
theologian Louis Berkhof (1873-1957). Berkhof insisted that it is only possible to talk 
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about creation from the standpoint of redemption, since outside of the redemption human 
nature is corrupt.485  
Schillebeeckx reversed Berkhof’s argument and instead claimed that we can only 
speak of redemption from the standpoint of creation. According to Schillebeeckx, the 
beginning of the history of human liberation coincides with the beginning of creation. 
Schillebeeckx firmly rejected the notion of a “fall” of humanity and his preferred point of 
departure was “the fundamental goodness of creation.” This does not mean that 
Schillebeeckx denied the existence of human sin, but rather he wanted to emphasize that 
human goodness is not cancelled out by human transgression.486 Finitude, he believed, is 
not a punishment for human sin, but rather the logical outcome of creation. If God is 
Creator, God creates what is not divine, what is finite.487 Human finitude is what 
distinguishes humanity and God. Departing from Augustine, Schillebeeckx declared that 
it is mistaken to view finitude as a wound. Salvation from God is not a salvation from 
finitude but the reality that God “is concerned to be our God in our humanity and for our 
humanity, in and with our finitude.” Humanity is not an error or failure. Rather than 
lamenting our condition, we “recognize the divinity of God in the recognition and 
acceptance of our limits and those of nature and history.”488  
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 In declaring that there is “no salvation outside the world,” Schillebeeckx wanted 
to illustrate that it is in “the history of human beings and the life of human beings who 
hold on to one another or let one another go” that the cause of salvation or damnation is 
decided.”489 According to Schillebeeckx, the process of liberation in human history is the 
medium and material of divine revelation. Believers then interpret that element of human 
liberation in relation to God, which enables them to confess that “God has brought 
redemption in and through human beings.”490 Prior to considering whether or not there is 
salvation with or without the church, it must be affirmed that without the material of the 
created world through which God reveals God’s self to us, there can be no salvation.  
Since history is the material in which and through which God prepares our salvation, 
there can be no demarcation between sacred and secular. Secular history is the place 
where God is revealed. While believers see the face of God in this history and 
unbelievers do not, “at the level of human liberation (the material of God’s revelation) 
that process can be discussed by both believers and unbelievers in a common 
language.”491 Schillebeeckx maintained that God’s initiative in salvation is a constant 
reality, one that is independent of our human consciousness of it.492 Human existence is a 
promise of salvation, regardless of whether one accepts or denies it.493 
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Schillebeeckx’s understanding of creation rests on his absolute opposition to the 
dualism often assumed between “above” (what comes directly from God) and “below” 
(what arises from human choices).494 Creation is not a past action by God that has been 
passively received by humanity once and for all. Neither can creation be viewed as a 
divine blueprint for humanity, with pre-determined expectations and results. Rather, the 
relationship between God and humanity in the act of creation can be described as a 
partnership. Creation is still ongoing, and humans are called to participate in it. There is 
no rivalry here between God the Creator and human creativity, and thus creation 
presupposes contribution, freedom and initiative from both sides.  
Schillebeeckx referred to creation as “a blank cheque for which God himself and 
God alone stands surety. It is God’s vote of confidence in mankind.”495 By creating 
human beings with their own finite and free will, God voluntarily renounces power. In 
this sense, although God is always present to save us beyond the limits of our finitude, 
God is dependent on human beings and, to a certain degree, vulnerable. Schillebeeckx 
asserted that the historical future is not known, even to God.496 Created in the image of 
God, human beings are not conservers or discoverers of what is already given, but rather 
“the principle of their own human lives” who through their actions develop and realize 
the world and its future in contingent, chance, and specific situations. With free will, of 
course, humans are left with the opportunity to choose between many alternatives, 
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including between good and evil, a distinction which Schillebeeckx insisted “does not 
precede this freedom but which human beings, by their free choice, bring to light without 
being its source.”497  
Therefore, creation cannot be regarded as an explanation for the origins of the 
world. If God were to be considered an explanation of the way things are, any attempt to 
change the status quo would be rendered “blasphemous.”498 God’s act of creation is 
unconditional and absolutely free, it is pure gift 499 Nevertheless, it is also a 
responsibility. God cannot be a stop-gap expected to solve all of humanity’s problems or 
explain everything that happens as if it is God’s will. The transformation of the world lies 
in the hands of finite humanity. God can never be an excuse for our lack of action in the 
face of oppression and injustice, and building a better society. In the midst of suffering, 
humans often ask where God is. Schillebeeckx saw this as the wrong question. Rather, he 
insisted that it is God who asks human beings, “where are you? What have you done with 
your history?”500  
While Schillebeeckx held that we experience and feel God’s presence, we cannot 
make direct contact with God in either nature or in ordinary human history. This 
realization is not an argument in favor of atheism, but “in a certain respect an expression 
of reverence towards God; namely, a growing recognition of the fact that God transcends 
this world.”501 God is not the world and nothing we come into contact with in this world 
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can ever be God, though certain signs may help direct our attention toward God, whose 
superabundant reality is ultimately beyond all names and symbols. 
B. Salvation: Both This-Worldly and Reserved for the Future 
 
If creation is a continuous activity in which humans are called to participate, so is 
salvation. Salvation, for Schillebeeckx, cannot be regarded merely as “the salvation of 
souls,” a destiny put off until the afterlife. Rather, it must be the healing and making 
whole of the entire person in this world and therefore includes, though is not exhausted 
by, ecological, social, and political aspects. It requires not only inner renewal, but a 
renewal and improvement of social structures.502 This means that salvation, like creation, 
is never defined and determined once and for all, but rather takes shape as a response to 
ever-changing situations that arise in our finite and contingent world.  
In Christianity, the term salvation is associated with the “kingdom of God.” 
According to Schillebeeckx, the “kingdom of God” was the main content of Jesus’ 
preaching and ministry. Jesus enacted the kingdom in his person during his time on earth, 
yet also affirmed that the fulfillment of the kingdom lay in the future, beyond this world. 
The Our Father prayer that Jesus taught his disciples makes explicit that the kingdom of 
God is a reality that is both already here and still to come. 
Our Father, hallowed be they name. Thy kingdom come. Give us each day our 
daily bread; and forgive us our sins; for we ourselves forgive every one who is 
indebted to us; and lead us not into temptation (Luke 11:2-5, cf. Matthew 6:9-13). 
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The words “Thy kingdom come” and “Hallowed be thy name” are, what Schillebeeckx 
called, eschatological prayer formula, looking forward to the end time, or fulfillment. 
However, the words “give us this day” signal that the kingdom of God breaks through 
now. Schillebeeckx maintained, “[the kingdom of God] is already here and it is 
manifested in the fact that others forgive us our guilt and sin and that we forgive 
others.”503  
The kingdom of God is not simply good news that we can passively await, but 
something that we are supposed to work to bring about here. Therefore, echoing Gustavo 
Gutierrez, Schillebeeckx saw salvation from God as both a gift and a task.  To illustrate 
this, Schillebeeckx pointed to the New Testament understanding of grace. Grace is not 
dependent on the human will or human exertion, as if we bring it about ourselves. “So it 
depends not upon man’s will or exertion, but upon God’s mercy (Romans 9:16).” 
However, this grace must become fruitful for us in moral and religious action. “Likewise, 
my brethren, you have died to the law through the body of Christ, so that you may belong 
to another, to him who has been raised from the dead in order that we may bear fruit for 
God (Romans 7:4).” The apostle Paul urged the early Christian community not to “accept 
the grace of God in vain (2 Cor 6:1).” Paul, illustrating the cooperation between divine 
and human creativity, exclaimed, “By the grace of God I am what I am, and his grace 
toward me was not in vain. On the contrary, I worked harder than any of them, though it 
was not I, but the grace of God which is with me (1 Cor 15:10).”504 
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The kingdom of God, for Schillebeeckx, implies liberation. Yet, Schillebeeckx 
insisted that before it is possible to understand what Christians mean by liberation, it is 
necessary to have already experienced some form of it. He asked, “for what can love of 
God mean to anyone who has never been the object of a liberating love from a fellow 
man, who has never experienced human love?”505  During Jesus’ time, his personification 
of the kingdom of God came through healing diseases, exorcisms, table-fellowship with 
prostitutes and tax collectors, and opposition to government authority that oppressed the 
poor and marginalized. Schillebeeckx stressed that it is Jesus who redeems us, not the 
Christological titles applied to him.506 We cannot discover the meaning of Jesus’s career 
solely through these terms. The personal career of Jesus of Nazareth interprets what titles 
like Messiah, Son of God, and Lord mean.507 That salvation from God is found in Jesus, 
and Jesus confessed as Christ, is not an abstract idea but is grounded on Jesus’s concrete 
actions on behalf of the kingdom of God in response to the problems and anxieties of his 
socio-historical context.508 In other words, the belief that God’s salvation was brought 
about definitively in Jesus Christ only came about because of the earliest disciple’s 
experience of being touched and healed by Jesus. Hope and belief in eschatological 
                                                        
 
505 Schillebeeckx, Christ, 740.  
506 Edward Schillebeeckx,“The Religious and Human Ecumene,” in The Future of Liberation Theology: 
Essays in Honor of Gustavo Gutierrez, ed. Marc H. Ellis and Otto Maduro (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1989), 
185.  
507 Schillebeeckx, Church, 106. In the book Jesus: An Experiment in Christology, Schillebeeckx asserted 
that Jesus saw himself not in a messianic role, but as an eschatological prophet. See Jesus, 217. The 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith took issue with this presentation of Jesus by Schillebeeckx. See, 
“Questions on the book Jesus: An Experiment in Christology addressed to Reverend Edward  
Schillebeeckx, OP, in The Schillebeeckx Case, ed. Ted Schoof (New York: Paulist Press, 1980), 28-29.  
508 See Schillebeeckx, Church, 176.  
 
 160 
salvation are only possible if salvation is experienced in the real lives of human beings. 
This was true for the earliest Christians, and it is true for our own context here and now.    
Eschatological salvation still ultimately remains a mystery., but “a mystery is not 
an entirely unknown quality. Enough of it is revealed in a veiled manner for us to be able 
to live from it.” 509 Eschatological salvation must be more than the human mind can 
possibly conceive, but it also must bear some relation to what human beings experience 
to be salvific or healing in this world. Citing the Dutch Calvinist theologian Harry 
Kuitert, Schillebeeckx asserted that we must have a “lowest limit” of the Christian 
concept of salvation, “it must at least be earthly salvation.”510 
Thus, there is an interdependence and unbreakable connection between the partial 
experiences of salvation in this world and eschatological, or final salvation. 
Schillebeeckx averred, “eschatological or final salvation-let us call it heaven-takes shape 
from what [human beings] on earth achieve as salvation for their fellow [human 
beings].”511 For Schillebeeckx, there can be no question of a theory of salvation detached 
from any practice.512 Belief in eternal life is no longer taken for granted as it was in 
previous eras. So, eternal life needs to be based on earthly, temporal presuppositions and 
beginnings in order to be experienced as meaningful and capable of being discussed 
today in human terms. In contemporary society, “we cannot really trust God over our 
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hereafter if we cannot build on him here and now on earth for the immediate future.”513 
No longer is the foundation for eternal life the spiritual soul, but rather the theologal life, 
the life of communion with God.514  
In grounding salvation in creation, Schillebeeckx took his definition of what 
creation means from the second-century bishop St. Irenaeus of Lyons. Irenaeus declared, 
“The glory of God is the happiness of living humankind; but the happiness of humankind 
is the living of God.”515 Human beings are intended by God to have God as their ultimate 
end and happiness, but God desires human flourishing not just in the afterlife, but also in 
this one. Neglect of salvation as a this-worldly phenomenon not only turns eschatological 
hope into a delusion or mythical fantasy, but also dangerously absolves humanity of its 
responsibility to bring about healing and liberation where it is needed now. 
C.  Jesus Christ as the Assurance of Eschatological Salvation Even in a Pluralist 
World 
 If the this-worldly dimension of salvation is so crucial, one may wonder if belief 
in a final or eschatological salvation is even necessary or worthwhile. In other words, one 
may ask, could we not get along just as well, or even better, without it? Furthermore, in a 
religiously pluralist world, one may inquire if it is still possible to claim that Jesus Christ 
plays a definitive role in eschatological salvation without discriminating against non-
Christian religions. Can Jesus still be declared a universal Savior? 
                                                        
 
513 Schillebeeckx, God Among Us: The Gospel Proclaimed (New York: Crossroad, 1983), 139.  
514 Schillebeeckx, I Am A Happy Theologian, 63.  
515 Philip Kennedy, “God and Creation,” in Praxis of the Reign of God, ed. Hilkert and Schreiter (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 47. See Schillebeeckx, For the Sake of the Gospel (SCM Press, 
1989), 58.  
 
 162 
 Schillebeeckx’s position on the role of Jesus Christ and the Church in 
eschatological salvation shifted throughout his career in response to the increasing 
concerns of the modern situation of religious pluralism. However, it is important to note 
that Schillebeeckx, even in his earliest writings, was never an exclusivist. Schillebeeckx 
also never moved to a pluralist position that abandons belief in the universal and 
definitive role of Jesus Christ. That is to say, Schillebeeckx always remained 
representative of an inclusivist standpoint.  
 In his early work, Christ the Sacrament of Encounter with God, Schillebeeckx 
described Jesus as the “primordial sacrament.” As the personal visible realization of the 
divine grace of redemption, Jesus “is intended by the Father to be in his humanity the 
only way to the actuality of redemption.”516 Jesus, for Schillebeeckx, is the norm and 
source of every encounter with God. Jesus, he wrote, “is not only the offer of divine love 
to man made visible but, at the same time, as prototype (or primordial model) he is the 
supreme realization of the response to human love to this divine offer.” Religion, he 
concluded, “can only be understood in the context of the incarnation of God the Son.”517 
In this early work, there is little to no mention of what these statements might mean in 
relation to non-Christians and non-believers. As was mentioned in Chapter Two, 
Schillebeeckx’s work prior to the Second Vatican Council has been described as his 
“dogmatic period,” where he placed much more emphasis on the church and its 
teachings. He described the church as the visible realization of God’s saving reality in 
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history. He did affirm that “not only the hierarchal Church but also the community of the 
faithful belong to this grace-giving sign that is the Church,”518 but did not consider the 
church’s relationship to those who are not members. This began to change after the 
Second Vatican Council and during Schillebeeckx’s lecture tour in the United States in 
the late 1960s.  
 In his 1968 lecture, “Toward a Catholic Use of Hermeneutics,” given three years 
after the close of Vatican II, Schillebeeckx wanted to assert the need for a hermeneutics 
of history, in which the past is interpreted in light of the present. Each person must be 
conscious that he or she approaches biblical texts with a certain pre-understanding and 
that the possibility of understanding is accomplished in the possible correction of our pre-
understanding. Even here, Schillebeeckx still insisted that for a Christian, “the 
eschatological kerygma of Christ is a situation that is constant and cannot be 
superseded.”519 
In another lecture given that same year, Schillebeeckx explained that fundamental 
changes have taken place with regard to the church’s understanding of herself. Among 
these are the recognition that the idea of extra ecclesiam nulla salus has been superseded, 
the recognition of the ecclesial character of non-Catholic communities, the recognition of 
the authentic religious aspect of non-Christian religions, and the awareness of that God’s 
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saving presence is experienced in secular, political, and social events.520 The church’s 
existence as a sacrament is still maintained, but the church’s role as a sacrament is now 
expanded to include and reach those outside of the church. The church is the sacrament of 
dialogue, of communication between human beings. As such, the church may still assert 
that the fullness of God’s promise of salvation rests on her, but cannot claim that she is 
always right. The church needs to dialogue with the world and human society in order 
fulfill her role and present her unique message to the world.521  This dialogue must also 
be reciprocal, it cannot be the communication of a “teaching church” to a “learning 
world” but an interrelationship in which both listen to one another and make a mutual 
contribution.522  
In the first book of his Christological Trilogy, Jesus: An Experiment in 
Christology, Schillebeeckx asked the question, “what does salvation in Jesus mean for us 
now?” This question is prompted by the recognition that the notion that all true salvation 
comes from Jesus alone is problematic in the context of secularization and religious 
pluralism, since “apart from Jesus Christ, there are a number of factors in our lives which, 
as a matter of historical truth, do induce well-being and do indeed heal a person or make 
him whole.”523 Jesus cannot be the monopoly of Christian churches, and non-Christian 
interpretations of Jesus remind us that Jesus has and must have something to say at the 
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human level.524 Here, Schillebeeckx is not denying that the life, death, and resurrection of 
Jesus Christ have universal significance for the salvation of all humankind. However, he 
does articulate that our understanding of what constitutes the salvation Jesus brings is 
impossible without taking into account how it relates to us here and now. “The material 
content of what, ‘good news,’ salvation and gospel, is concretely for us will change 
according to our concrete experience of its opposite.”525  
In his sequel to the Jesus book, Christ: The Experience of Jesus as Lord, 
Schillebeeckx lamented that Jesus is too often explained to us as salvation in grace in 
terms which are no longer valid from our world of experience. Nevertheless, the 
Christian must hold on to the conviction that “in Jesus Christ is experienced decisive 
salvation from God.”526 This conviction does not come about simply because past 
authorities tell us so, but because people in their own particular situations still continue to 
experience God’s salvation in Jesus. Jesus’s eschatological significance, therefore, is not 
something the Christian can prove theoretically. It is an act of faith, whose “proof” is 
shown through Christian praxis that builds up the kingdom of God. Yet, this praxis does 
not come from Christians alone. It can and must be enhanced by those who belong to 
different traditions, as well as by politics, science, and the social sciences. Schillebeeckx 
insisted that, “believers begin to catch a glimpse of new dimensions to their own 
Christian tradition, precisely as a result of the introduction of new stimuli from outside, 
stimuli which in fact may have been alien to their tradition.”527 
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What can be witnessed in the evolution of Schillebeeckx’s theology thus far is the 
continuous movement toward what he refers to as a “negative ecclesiology, church 
theology in a minor key, in order to do away with the centuries-long ecclesiocentrism of 
the empirical phenomenon of the Christian religion.” Schillebeeckx explicitly stated this 
intent in his 1987 work On Christian Faith: The Spiritual, Ethical, and Political 
Dimensions, saying that the church as an institution never exists for itself.528 Salvation 
from God comes about in the worldly reality of history, not primarily in religions. Here, 
Schillebeeckx moves from calling the church the sacrament of salvation to referring to 
“religions and churches” as “the sacrament of salvation.” They are not salvation 
themselves, but churches and religions have an indispensable function. Churches, as well 
as synagogues, mosques, pagodas, all prevent the universal saving presence of God from 
being forgotten.529 Nevertheless, while acknowledging that encounters with God take 
place outside of Christianity, Schillebeeckx still affirmed that Jesus is the place where 
God has revealed himself in a decisive way as salvation of and for human beings. 
However, Jesus’s decisiveness does not make him absolute. Jesus, as fully human, is a 
particular and therefore, limited manifestation of God’s presence. Therefore, the 
incarnation alone does not capture the fullness of God’s riches. No historical 
particularity, including Jesus, can be called absolute. “The risen Jesus of Nazareth keeps 
pointing beyond himself to God.”530  
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In his later theology, we can see that Schillebeeckx concerned himself more and 
more with the question of how Christianity can maintain its own identity and uniqueness 
and at the same time ascribe a positive value to the diversity of religions in a non-
discriminating way.531 Schillebeeckx, however, did not view the plurality of religion as a 
problem that needed to be solved. For him, religious pluralism was not an evil that goes 
against the will of God, but rather “a fructifying richness to be welcomed by all.”532 This 
reality creates a tension between the church’s previous declarations of extra ecclesiam 
nulla salus and the tone of the Second Vatican Council, which affirms that those who, 
through no fault of their own, do not know the Gospel of Christ or the church, may 
achieve eternal salvation. While Schillebeeckx acknowledges that some theologians try 
reconcile these two positions, he maintains that they are “diametrically opposed.”533 This 
intimates that he believes the church can and does need to change and adapt in response 
to historical and cultural movements.  
In the final book of his Christological Trilogy, Church: The Human Story of God, 
Schillebeeckx’s main interest is the need for Christians to be able to explain why Jesus is 
the only way of life for them, even though God leaves other ways of salvation open for 
others.534 By the time of the publication of Church (the Dutch edition Mensen als 
Verhaal van God was released in 1989), Schillebeeckx seems to have been aware of the 
rise of postmodern thinking, asserting that in contemporary society, it is now impossible 
to live with “the unshaken certainty that one continues to possess the truth oneself while 
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others are mistaken.”535 In other words, “modern believers know that there is also truth 
about other convictions about life.”536 It is no longer culturally possible to adhere to extra 
ecclesiam nulla salus. For many Christians, especially the younger generation, the 
uniqueness of Jesus must be expressed in a way that does not discriminate against other 
religions.  
For Schillebeeckx, one’s faith, even if one believes wholeheartedly that one’s 
religion is the fullest expression of truth, can never be used as an imperialistic tool. Faith 
is not based on rational arguments meant to show the superiority of one religion to other 
solution. A responsible faith, wrote Schillebeeckx, “is not a matter of looking for rational 
proofs for faith, but of making understandable to fellow-believers and non-believers what 
is meant by talk about God.”537  
Earlier, I mentioned that Schillebeeckx referred to creation as God’s “vote of 
confidence in humankind.” For Christians, Jesus is the one in whom “God’s risky trust in 
human beings is not put to shame. Despite everything — despite even the execution of 
the eschatological prophet — God’s kingdom does come. Jesus’ person, his life, death 
and resurrection, are the kingdom’s inauguration.”538 Thus, for Christians, “Jesus has a 
normative or essential relationship to the universal kingdom of God for all men and 
women.”539 Nevertheless, making the Christian claim that Jesus is the universal redeemer 
endows Christians with the responsibility of bringing forth the fruits of the kingdom of 
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God.540 Christians are not supposed to merely preach “the good news,” but enact it. 
Salvation founded in Christ as a promise for all becomes universal not because of an 
abstract, universal idea, or a message from on high, but “by the power of its cognitive, 
critical and liberating character.”541 Therefore, the uniqueness of Jesus is a not a purely 
speculative or theoretical universality, but one which can be realized in fragments in our 
history.  
The church’s mission is not dependent on the conviction that Christianity is 
superior to other religions. The church, writes Schillebeeckx, is not salvation, but a sign 
of it. “The church is an actual minority which is there to serve a majority and is not 
concerned with winning as many as souls as possible for itself.”542 The purpose of the 
church is not to gain the most converts or to make everyone else come to the same 
convictions and beliefs, but to make salvation from God in Jesus Christ present to the 
whole world through service to humankind. According to Schillebeeckx, 
This means that Christianity with its message and own way of life is not a 
categorical imperative for men and women but an ‘offer,’ and in this way, in its 
distinctiveness, is also dialogue with and possible criticism and provocation of 
other religions, which in their turn put equally critical and provocative questions 
to Christianity in the dialogue.543 
 
Some of the statements made in Schillebeeckx’s later work, may, at first glance, 
appear to be shifting to a pluralist position.544 In 1994, Schillebeeckx wrote that 
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“salvation is not exclusively linked to Jesus himself, for the God he confessed was 
experienced by him as love of all people. God did not become that only with the coming 
of Jesus; that would have spelled the end of the value and meaning of all other world 
religions.”545 Yet, this does not mean that Christians would do just as well without Jesus, 
or that Jesus’s unique role in salvation history can be downplayed. Even as late as 1997, 
Schillebeeckx still upheld that eliminating the Christian claim to absolute truth cannot 
and should not mean denying the eschatological character of Jesus. “God’s final or 
eschatological form of salvation-bringing revelation is mediated through Jesus, the 
Christ.”546 Jesus of Nazareth is historically and culturally limited, and therefore, not the 
only way through which one can encounter God. Nevertheless, Jesus is the historically 
and culturally limited, situated expression of salvation for all people.547  
While Schillebeeckx became increasingly open to other religions throughout his 
career, he never abandoned his confession of Jesus’s unique role in eschatological 
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salvation. Schillebeeckx certainly wanted to affirm that human beings’ ability to perform 
acts of liberation is neither dependent on belief in God, nor based on belief in an 
eschatological fulfillment of world history. Indeed, the work done by atheists and 
agnostics for the betterment of humankind can be just as fruitful and sometimes, even 
more efficacious, than that of an avowed believer.548 But, this does not mean that belief in 
the eschatological dimension of salvation does not contain any truth or value for the 
contemporary world. Schillebeeckx’s response to the question raised at the beginning of 
this section would be that human beings are better off living with eschatological hope 
rather than without it. 
While we may experience glimpses of salvation in this world, it is crucial to 
remember that any and all forms of earthly salvation are and always will be only partial.  
Due to our finitude and contingency, all human actions inevitably fall short. Time and 
resources are limited, unforeseen events occur, and positive efforts sometimes meet with 
harsh, and even violent, resistance. Everyday life is filled with the unexpected, from the 
simple cancellation of outdoor plans due to a thunderstorm, to the more disturbing 
realities of sudden illness or the tragic loss of a loved one.  
Salvation, defined by Schillebeeckx, is “the conquest of all human, personal and 
social alienations.” It is human wholeness.  Yet, “alienation in human life cannot be 
completely overcome either personally or socially.” There is human hurt for which no 
social or political cure exists.549 Even with the best of plans and intentions, not all human 
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problems can be solved by human action alone. Ultimately, human finitude is 
inescapable. Social and political action may work to make people’s quality of life better 
and may event prevent premature death or illness, but it cannot take away the loneliness 
and anguish that all humans face at the prospect of their own mortality, nor can such 
action erase the traumatic scars of past suffering.  
Even Jesus, Schillebeeckx pointed out, had to cope with the bitter experience of 
failure.550 Jesus’s preaching and ministry met with opposition, so much so that he was 
publicly condemned and executed. However, according to Schillebeeckx, “Jesus was 
successful by virtue of his living communion with God, which is stronger than death.”551 
From God’s standpoint, there is no failure. “Religious communion with God robs purely 
human experience of its presumption to have the last word.” Entrusting one’s failures to 
God does not whitewash human pain and suffering, but rather affirms one’s faith that 
God is present in and greater than our human weaknesses. Human action is risky, and 
when plans do not go as we hoped or expected, it can easily lead to despair. Yet, “as that 
intrinsic consequence of the radicalism of its message and reconciling practice, the 
crucifixion of Jesus shows that any attempt at liberating redemption which is concerned 
with humanity is valid in and of itself and not subsequently as a result of any success 
which may follow.”552  
Redemption, in this sense, can still be seen, in the words of Gutierrez, as a task 
imposed upon us. Yet, it is a task that still remains “a reconciliation to be realized, which 
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will constantly be molded by failure, suffering and death in the refractoriness of our 
history- by a love which is impotent in this world but which will never give in.”553 That 
final salvation has not arrived, and is still yet to come, serves a reminder that no human 
person, group, institution, or program of action can be identified with the fulfillment of 
human history. If any socio-political liberation claims to be total, “it essentially becomes 
a new form of servitude and slavery.”554 Human projects are always subject to critique, 
and must be amended in order to better serve an ever-changing world. New ideas in 
response to new problems and insights are unavoidably essential. Although human effort 
is required for pushing humanity toward the kingdom of God and certainly plays a role in 
shaping the future for better or worse, the future is never completely the product of 
human planning and achievement. God alone, Schillebeeckx claimed, is the Lord of 
history.555 For him, “God is new each day” and “is a constant source of new 
possibilities.”556  
Although God’s saving presence is co-existent with creation and precedes the 
incarnation, this does not detract from the unique role of Jesus Christ as expressed by 
Christians. Logically, Schillebeeckx wrote, “should there be a definitive and decisive 
saving action of God in our history, then it will be achieved in experienceable, historical 
events, interpreted and enunciated in the language of faith.”557 In the human life of Jesus, 
a decisive sign of definitive salvation did appear in our history. Here, the ultimate point 
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of human existence has been disclosed in word and action. Of course, this is only 
revealed in “the interpretive act of faith” of those who understand and accept Jesus as 
definitive for their understanding of themselves and of reality.558 This explains why 
Christians may make claims about Jesus that are not shared by members of other 
traditions. God’s revelation in Jesus is neither a scientifically verifiable fact nor a 
supernatural truth forced upon humanity from on high, but one which comes to Christians 
in and through their own experience and requires a response in faith.  
In light of humanity’s inability to bring about total liberation, for Christians, Jesus 
becomes the “positive guarantor” of the kingdom of God in its final form, in which all 
forms of oppression, pain, and suffering shall be no more.559 Death is an inescapable and 
incomprehensible human reality, which shows that “men and women are beings who in 
the end cannot by themselves realize their own nature, promised and in the future.” In 
going before us, Jesus makes possible our confidence that “God’s living presence is 
stronger and penetrates further than the absurdity of death.”560 Schillebeeckx thus 
referred to Christology as “concentrated creation” or the “belief in creation as God wills 
it to be.” Only through Christ, wrote Schillebeeckx, “do we begin to realize that there is 
more to God than might otherwise have been expected. God, the creator, the one in whom 
we can trust, is liberating love for humanity, in a way that fulfills and transcends all 
human, personal, social, and political expectations.”561 Thus, even in the midst of 
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religious pluralism, the Christian should not give up the deepest conviction of his or her 
life, since it is precisely this that is the source of eschatological hope.  
When Schillebeeckx insisted that no human program or institution can be equated 
with eschatological salvation, he meant the Catholic Church, as well as all other churches 
and religions. However, even though salvation does not primarily come about through 
churches and religions, they still have an indispensable function, as sacraments or signs 
of salvation. Churches, in particular, are called to be “places where salvation from God is 
expressed, explicitly confessed, proclaimed prophetically and celebrated in liturgy, with 
the aim of also in fact realizing salvation for men and women in everyday life.”562 This 
communal celebration, which consists of an openness to eschatological liberation and 
salvation that entails more than individual and socio-political liberation, is a fragmentary 
and partial actualization of the kingdom.563  
According to Schillebeeckx, the universal and definitive significance of Jesus’ 
message and way of life demands the existence of the church. Jesus’s earthly mission had 
to be continued by his disciples beyond Jesus’ lifetime. Thus, the origin of the church 
may be seen by believers “as the work of God, who in Jesus through the Spirit is 
establishing his eschatological people.”564  Yet, this does not mean that particular forms 
of the church, as they have become structured and developed throughout history, go back 
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to Jesus. It does mean, however, that the church is constantly in need of renewal, and 
strict adherence to certain rules, structures, and practices may indeed be causing harm. 
This is especially the case when the church has, at times, failed to be a “sacrament of 
salvation.” Schillebeeckx observed that instead of bearing “prophetic witness to Jesus,” 
the church often “invests itself with royal power.” Seeking to increase its own authority, 
it often places emphasis on “the exalted Jesus who sits in power” rather than the Jesus 
who came to serve the poor and to serve sinners.565   
In spite of these failings, Christians need not lose all hope in the church nor leave 
it altogether.  According to Schillebeeckx, “God fulfills his promise of faithfulness to his 
church throughout the centuries in and through man’s imperfection.”566 God’s fidelity to 
the church is not dependent on human perfection, nor is it an empirical fact. Rather, it is 
an experience that requires the assent of faith. The church, as a sacrament of salvation, 
does not magically produce an experience of God from out of nothing. Rather, the liturgy 
of the church presupposes the existence of religious experiences within ordinary human 
life, for it is in these experiences that revelation comes to us. Schillebeeckx asserted, “We 
cannot suddenly experience God in the church’s liturgy if we never perceive God outside 
the church in our everyday experiences of our fellow human beings and the world.”567 In 
other words, the affirmation of “no salvation outside the world” is compatible with 
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Christian devotion to the unique role of Jesus Christ in the history of salvation, and the 
indispensable role of the church in carrying forth that belief in today’s world.  
D. If it is Truly Salvation, It Must Be Communal 
 
 Salvation, both in its this-worldly and eschatological dimensions, is not something 
to be sought selfishly for one’s own personal gain, but rather a communal reality, a vision 
of wholeness that encompasses all of creation.  Yet, just how communal salvation is 
meant to be accomplished presents a challenge to us in a world where our fellow human 
beings are the cause of so much pain and suffering. When salvation is spoken of 
eschatologically, it is typically associated with heaven, a happy destiny that some earn 
and others are denied based on their actions in this world. Schillebeeckx cited sociologist 
Peter Berger, who claimed that “there is so much evil crying out to heaven that there 
must be something like a hell.”568 It can seem unfathomable that those who have 
committed the most heinous acts in history are not somehow separated from their victims 
in the afterlife. Common notions of justice would lead one to conclude that the mass 
murderer is bound for a future life of pain and separation, while the devoted humanitarian 
deserves an eternity of peaceful bliss.  
While Schillebeeckx could sympathize with positions like Berger’s, he saw things 
differently. According to Schillebeeckx, heaven and hell are, in the first place, 
anthropological possibilities, or, decisions made by human beings themselves. Hell is not 
an actual place with fire and brimstone that God invented to punish wickedness. Not God, 
urged Schillebeeckx, but human beings “are the inventors of hell, precisely by the way 
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they behave.”569 Instead of a physical place, Schillebeeckx defined what the religious 
traditions call hell as “a failure that man cannot and will not any longer entrust to the 
living God; resolute insistence on success, which finds its strength only in tyranny and 
dishonoring fellow men, on a larger or smaller scale.” It is a “reluctance and inability to 
love” that is at the source of all definitive evil.570 Hell is the agony of frustration with our 
finitude, an inability to accept our limits that results in physical and emotional violence 
toward the self and others.    
However, Schillebeeckx warned that we cannot demythologize heaven in the 
same way we do hell, since we should not “look for heaven in the joy of virtue on earth 
without any perspective on eternal life.”571 To do so would be dangerous since there is no 
salvation on earth that is not somehow partial or anticipates a future completion. From an 
eschatological standpoint, Schillebeeckx argued, there is only heaven. However, hell is 
not simply erased as an eschatological possibility because it is unpleasant to ponder. 
Schillebeeckx was not, as Avery Dulles accused, “naively optimistic.” Schillebeeckx 
explained his reasoning on this matter quite cogently.  
Schillebeeckx’s theology displays a relational ontology. All human beings 
participate in the divine reality because all human beings participate in creation.572 
“There is no situation in which God is not near to us to save and in which we will not be 
able to find him.”573 The existence of a “hell” beyond this world, for Schillebeeckx, 
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would have to be defined as the state of having no theologal574 relationship with God. 
The theologal relationship with God, as mentioned earlier, is the foundation for eternal 
life. Schillebeeckx insisted that we simply do not know if there really are people who do 
evil in a definitive way, totally separating themselves from communion with God. If there 
were, however, they would be headed for the annihilation of their own being, rather than 
a realm of damnation separate from “the saved.” 575  
According to Schillebeeckx, “it is against the nature of the God, who is love, for 
human beings to be punished for all eternity.” Unlike human beings, God does not have 
feelings of revenge. Rather, God “leaves evil to its own, limited logic.”576 Evil, in 
contrast to good has no need of a transcendent factor. The internal logic of evil 
“terminates in the finite mortality of human beings, while the internal logic of the good 
culminates in the eternal love of God.”577 St. Augustine, when inquiring into the origins 
of evil, discovered that evil is not a substance. It is simply the privation of what is good. 
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No person has an evil nature.578 Centuries later, Thomas Aquinas insisted that wherever 
there was any question of negativity, the “first cause” lies with creatures, while the good 
finds its first cause in God.579 Based on these beliefs about evil versus good, and the 
nature of God, Schillebeeckx drew the conclusion that there is no “negative eschaton.” It 
only makes sense that “good, not evil, has the last word.”580 
Schillebeeckx claimed, “it is an unimaginable scenario for me as a Christian, 
familiar with the gospel, that while there is said to be joy among the heavenly ones, right 
next to heaven people are supposed to be lying forever, gasping for breath and suffering 
the pains of hell,” however one might imagine them.581 Heaven could not be the 
fulfillment of anyone’s salvation if it means separation and division, and watching others 
suffer endless torment.  
Salvation, for Schillebeeckx, means wholeness. It can never mean achieving 
happiness for some at the expense of others, nor can it ever encompass an attitude of 
indifference toward others, even to those whom are not amongst our family, friends, and 
neighbors. As a Western theologian, Schillebeeckx asked himself, “What can it mean that 
I, as a Westerner who believes in God, claim to find salvation in my belief in God when 
two-thirds of humankind is unfree, enslaved and starving to death?”582 The conviction 
that there is an eschatological fulfillment is not meant to simply provide a sense of 
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comfort to each individual who possesses faith, but should spur us on to want to discover 
and help ameliorate situations in which the opposite of salvation prevails. Situations of 
poverty and oppression rightly pose a scandal to any belief in God. Christians 
themselves, according to Schillebeeckx, must “also go in Jesus’ direction of life if that 
which we proclaim is to be worthy of belief for others.”583 As Matthew’s Gospel makes 
clear, the “relationship to the other” is decisive for the salvation of every person.584  
Of course, one may ask how we are to know if our praxis is liberating and 
salvific. According to Schillebeeckx, praxis must meet at least three criteria. It must 1) 
establish justice for the disadvantaged and exploited; 2) entail a viable reconciliation with 
society after the liberation struggle is ended; and 3) avoid creating hierarchies of 
oppression and exclusion.585 Salvific praxis is not just about lifting up particular 
individuals, but must include historical movements and events of structural emancipation. 
However, salvation for marginalized persons can never be equated with the destruction of 
any person or group, even those responsible for their marginalization. Jesus, during his 
lifetime, clearly refused any messianic ideology that “liberates the oppressed” but 
“mercilessly annihilates all of the oppressors.”586 Even upon the cross, he cried, “Father 
forgive them; for they know not what they do (Luke 23:34).” Indeed, the desire for 
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retaliation and segregation is a manifestation of salvation’s opposite. A salvation for 
some and not others is not salvation at all.  
E. No Salvation Apart From Religious Others: Non-Christians as Necessary for the 
Fulfillment of Christian Praxis 
 It is interesting to observe that in the three criteria mentioned above, the words 
Christianity and religion are absent. Strictly speaking, liberating movements and events 
are salvific when they strive to achieve those three goals, regardless of whether or not 
they are religiously interpreted.587 Christians, therefore, are not the sole originators of 
salvific praxis. This is especially true considering that throughout history, Christians were 
at times, and continue to be, counted among the oppressors. While the name of God has 
been praised and glorified in words throughout the centuries, it has also been abused to 
justify inhuman practices as divine will.  
In insisting that “there is no salvation outside the world,” Schillebeeckx does not 
mean the world as we wish it to be, or the way we think it should be, but the world just as 
it is. The world in which we live is and always will be a religiously and culturally 
pluralist one. Therefore, if, as Schillebeeckx says, salvation is concerned with human 
wholeness and integrity, salvific praxis cannot be seen as the sole property of Christians, 
nor is salvation something Christians can desire just for themselves. As Schillebeeckx 
stated, “the critical solidarity of Christians with the emancipation process of liberation 
must not be made dependent on the real chances of Christian proclamation and 
evangelization.  Even when the church itself has no use for it, it has the duty to espouse 
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the cause of [people] deprived of their rights, to press for a minimum of human well-
being.”588 Furthermore, given that no earthly community or movement of liberation is 
identical to eschatological salvation, the praxis of Christians and the works inspired by 
Christianity cannot be taken as inerrant and flawless, but rather can always be subject to 
challenges and improvements over the course of time.  Thus, the praxis of bringing about 
the reign of God cannot be undertaken apart from non-Christians and even non-believers. 
In fact, Schillebeeckx affirmed that “without being specifically Christian, an 
emancipatory process of liberation can still be essential for Christianity, i.e, it can be a 
specific and historically necessary form of Christian love, faith, and hope.”589 Jesus was a 
finite human being and as such, lived and spoke in a particular time and culture, which 
means he could not possibly have left specific instructions on how to deal with many of 
the circumstances that confront human beings today. Likewise, the apostles and later 
Christian communities were also finite human beings conditioned by time and space. 
Christian praxis, therefore, cannot expect to rely solely on what is explicitly Christian and 
still be considered true praxis for the kingdom of God.   
Jean-Louis Souletie applies Schillebeeckx’s soteriology to the need for 
interreligious dialogue. According to Souletie, salvation must be understood as “the 
dynamic of love which enables the meeting of those who do not understand each other.” 
Other religions, while they may contain similarities to Christianity, cannot simply be 
reduced to what is familiar. There is always a strangeness or newness in encountering the 
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religious other. Yet, Souletie insists that “even when the distance cannot be completely 
overcome and when misunderstandings cannot be entirely ruled out, other religions do 
nevertheless deepen and change the Christian self-understanding.”590 Dialogue with non-
Christians and non-believers is not simply a matter of Christians being nice, but rather the 
wisdom offered by non-Christian perspectives is regarded as truly imperative for 
Christian living in a pluralist world. If salvation is for all, all must have a voice in 
building it. As Schillebeeckx stated early on, “There is more religious truth in all the 
religions together than in one particular religion.”591  
However, affirming that other traditions are required for the fulfillment of 
Christian praxis does not amount to admitting that the salvation guaranteed to us in Jesus 
Christ is somehow incomplete or that Christianity is in need of fulfillment by other 
traditions. For Schillebeeckx, “the New Testament is the covering letter of salvation that 
has been definitively completed.”592 If salvation in Christ were not “a definitive reality 
that will never be surpassed,”593 Jesus could not function for Christians as the divine 
promise of an eschatological future, a divine promise that thoroughly motivates Christian 
praxis.  
The necessity of dialogue also does not mean that Christians must adhere to the 
pluralist position that all traditions are totally equal. Faith is not a choice in the manner of 
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how one chooses a favorite color or ice-cream flavor. It is not a simple matter of personal 
preference, in which any option will suffice. Faith has serious implications. It does not 
only matter in the context of prayer and liturgy, but permeates one’s whole existence.  
Furthermore, the inner act faith is not something we fashion ourselves (although we 
outwardly express our faith using our limited human language), but it is a response to the 
experience of God in our own history. Christians experience Jesus to be God Incarnate 
and the insurer of salvation. Therefore, Jesus cannot be simply placed by among other 
religious figures in history, and the choice to be Christian cannot merely be seen as 
accidental.594 Thus, it is understandable that a Christian may not be able to declare that 
other religions, who either do not know Jesus or do not understand him in the same way, 
are fully “equal” to Christianity. 
This belief, however, should be a constant source of humility, rather than pride. 
The special place accorded to Christianity is not due to a superior intelligence possessed 
by Christians. Given the history of atrocities committed by Christians and in the name of 
Christianity, we know that Christians are not “better people” than non-Christians. Rather, 
the pre-eminence of Christianity, for Christians, stems from the content of the faith, from 
the significance of Jesus’s life, death, and resurrection, which make Jesus like no other 
human being whom ever lived. Of course, people can and will always argue that 
Christians are mistaken about or have overestimated Jesus’s eschatological significance, 
since it has no compelling historical or rational proof.595 However, Christians, through 
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their actions, have the power to influence others about whether or not their belief appears 
to be credible and gives hope to the world. Schillebeeckx wrote 
The question whether Christian belief in the resurrection, through which death 
unmistakably takes on another meaning, opens up a real future for man, will have 
to be proved again and again, here and now, from corresponding behavior on the 
part of Christians, from their activities in this world. Without such consistency, 
what Christians assert is in fact incredible; it has no power of attraction, and 
above all gives no hope to the world.596 
 
In Jesus, Schillebeeckx averred, “we have an image of God that we have not 
produced; we are simply deciphering the image of God that is given to us.”597 Still, since 
God Incarnate is a reality that is given to us, rather than constructed by us, Christians 
cannot arrogantly presume that God only gives the gift of God’s self to Christians 
through the incarnation. Rather, Christians, while not denying the irreplaceable role their 
faith plays in their lives, must recognize that others may be responding to God’s gifts in 
their own lives and experiences, and expressing this in their own rituals and practices. 
According to Schillebeeckx, “the rise of a multiplicity of religions can be explained from 
the same source from which religion as such comes into being: the multiplicity of human 
experiences of human beings and the world within particular divergent human traditions 
of experience.”598 The plurality of religions is not a flaw of humanity that must be 
overcome, but a positive reality. Therefore, true reconciliation can never be viewed as 
uniformity, but must entail mutuality and cooperation.   
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The purpose of this chapter was to provide a more thorough overview of 
Schillebeeckx’s soteriology. In particular, I focused on four aspects of Schillebeeckx’s 
soteriology: 1) creation as the foundation of salvation 2) the relationship between this-
worldly and eschatological salvation 3) the place of Jesus in Christianity as the assurance 
of eschatological salvation, and 4) the communal nature of salvation. I argued that 
Schillebeeckx’s understanding of salvation is especially fruitful for navigating what it 
means to be a Christian in a religiously pluralist world. Religious pluralism, in 
Schillebeeckx’s theology, is an inevitable fact that is neither to be lamented nor used as a 
reason to reduce all religions to a least common denominator in an effort to erase their 
differences. No person, movement, or tradition, whether Christian or non-Christian, 
embodies the kingdom of God by itself. Therefore, religious pluralism is a reality that 
should be celebrated, since human wholeness cannot be achieved without the 
contributions of non-Christians and non-believers. Christians cannot be Christians in 
isolation, but need the world with its religious diversity to be true disciples of Jesus. If 
“there is no salvation outside the world,” salvation cannot take place apart from religious 
others. 
In the next chapter, I will continue to discuss the implications of Schillebeeckx’s 
soteriology for interreligious dialogue, using the relationship between Islam and 
Christianity as a primary example. Salvation, as a dynamic concept based on the negative 
contrast experience, must include healing the tensions between these two religions. For 
true healing to occur, however, it cannot be said that one tradition “saves” the other but 
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rather that fragments of salvation are found in both traditions. I hope to show that finding 
fragments of salvation through interaction with another religious tradition need not be 
dependent on adopting a pluralist position; in fact, it might even hinder the process of 










As was established in Chapters Two and Three, the meaning of term “salvation” must 
be relevant to contemporary experiences of suffering and anxiety. Chapter Three 
discussed four aspects of Schillebeeckx’s soteriology: 1) creation as the foundation of 
Schillebeeckx’s soteriology; 2) Schillebeeckx’s articulation of the relationship between 
this-worldly and eschatological salvation; 3) the role of Jesus in Schillebeeckx’s 
soteriology, in which the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus himself becomes the 
assurance of eschatological salvation; 4) the communal nature of salvation. It then 
explored how Schillebeeckx’s soteriology might aid interreligious dialogue. According to 
Schillebeeckx, “the material content of the ‘good news,’ salvation and gospel, is 
concretely for us will change according to our concrete experience of its opposite.”599 All 
ways of envisioning salvation therefore, are culturally conditioned. Salvation is also a 
communal reality, meaning that salvation only for Christians, or any other group, to the 
neglect of all others, is not truly salvation. Salvation involves reconciliation and care for 
the well-being of all, not just members of one’s own religious or cultural group. 
Therefore, reconciliation between Christianity and non-Christian religions, including 
non-believers, is a necessary component of what Christians call “salvation.” Working 
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toward such reconciliation will unavoidably entail interreligious dialogue so that persons 
can come to better understand one another and work alongside one another. 
 The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate that salvation, as a dynamic concept based 
on the negative contrast experience, must always be defined by our experience of its 
opposite. Given that we live in a pluralistic world, non-Christians and even non-believers 
must have a role in defining salvation. For example, if salvation includes mending 
tensions between, for example, Islam and Christianity, then in order for true healing to 
occur, it cannot be said that only one of these traditions “saves.” It also cannot be said 
that one tradition must try to conform its unique beliefs and practices to those of another.  
 The structure of this chapter will be that I will first, provide a brief discussion of 
the possible meanings of the term “dialogue.” Second, I will then propose that 
Schillebeeckx’s notion of the threatened humanum be used as the criterion for 
interreligious dialogue in order to avoid the dangers of a religious or cultural relativism 
that permits oppression or violence in the name of respecting differences. Third, I will 
present Schillebeeckx’s articulation of the relationship between religion and ethics in 
order to show his belief that Christians are not the sole possessors of ethical values. 
Ethical values can and do originate outside of Christianity, and even outside of religion as 
a whole. Fourth, in order to illustrate the relevance of Schillebeeckx’s work for a 
contemporary example of interreligious dialogue, I examine Schillebeeckx’s own brief 
treatment of Islam, a tradition that, like Christianity, makes absolute claims that conflict 
with beliefs held by persons outside of its adherents. Fifth and finally, by not requiring 
the adoption of the pluralist position, I argue that Schillebeeckx’s soteriology provides an 
inclusivist way of accepting the existence of salvation in other traditions. If salvation is a 
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dynamic concept that changes in response to our awareness of various types of suffering, 
one can and must find fragments of salvation through interaction with other faiths 
traditions, but can still maintain that his or her own tradition is the most full or 
complete.600  
A. What is Dialogue? More Than Just Talking 
 
 Dialogue is a rather vague term. An exhaustive analysis of the different types and 
purposes of interreligious dialogue is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Alan Race, 
the scholar who first proposed the threefold paradigm of exclusivism, inclusivism, and 
pluralism, points out that the word dialogue comes from the Greek dia (across) and logos 
(reasoning). Interreligious dialogue means “reasoning across worlds of religious 
difference.” It presumes that something is to be gained from dialogical encounter that is 
both “more than simply another context for self-assertion and more than simply 
observing differences.” According to Race, dialogue requires “both transcending the self- 
sufficiency of individual traditions and also refusing the fate of relativism or 
indifference.”601 In other words, dialogue does not mean abandoning one’s own religious 
tradition or changing what one believes in order to make the differences between 
traditions less apparent. However, dialogue does require a certain sense of vulnerability, 
in that one must surrender the position that he or she is always right, or that his or her 
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tradition, even if one believes it is the fullest approximation of the truth, has all of the 
answers.602 All parties to dialogue have a valuable contribution to make, even if they do 
not all agree with one another on matters of doctrine and religious practice. 
The 1991 Vatican document Dialogue and Proclamation identifies four types of 
interreligious dialogue that are informative for a Christian understanding of the term. The 
dialogue of life deals with day-to-day life, where people strive to share their joys and 
sorrows with one another as neighbors. The dialogue of action deals with collaboration 
between members of different religions on social justice issues. The dialogue of 
theological exchange is the type of dialogue done by university specialists, in which both 
parties strive to deepen their understanding of one another, and compare values and 
practices. The dialogue of religious experience is the sharing of personal spiritual 
experiences and practices, such as prayer and contemplation. These types of dialogue are 
not mutually exclusive and often overlap.603  
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While it may seem as though the type of dialogue that is most relevant to this 
dissertation is the dialogue of action, I believe that all four types are equally necessary 
and important. It is certainly true that Schillebeeckx’s concept of salvation shows the 
need for collaboration among members of different religions, including those who are not 
religious, for dealing with social justice concerns. However, I argue that the mutual and 
genuine engagement in any of these forms of dialogue between two or more parties 
ultimately contributes to the building up of salvation in this world. In a world where 
religious conflict is prevalent, the practice of taking time to learn about another tradition, 
whether more formally through the dialogue of interreligious exchange, or less formally 
through the dialogue of interreligious experience or the dialogue of day-to-day life, 
serves to work toward eliminating fears, biases, and negative stereotypes people may 
have of the religious other. It is also here where persons may find themselves in awe at 
the beauty and complexity of another tradition’s beliefs and rituals, and thereby discover 
that the other tradition has something to offer in addressing life’s most pressing 
questions.  
 At the time of his encounter with secularization in the late 1960s, Schillebeeckx 
began to refer to the Church as the “sacrament of dialogue,” insisting that “dialogue is the 
proper and distinctive mode of existence for the unique witness of the pilgrim Church.” 
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According to Schillebeeckx, the Church exists for the sake of giving Christ’s Good News 
of the kingdom of God which is to come, but in order to communicate this, “she must 
also receive from and listen to what comes to her from the world as foreign prophecy.” 
Both the Church and the world must make “a mutual contribution and listen sincerely to 
each other.”604  Dialogue, therefore, can never simply be “dialogue as method.” Nor do 
all interactions between members of different traditions count as true dialogue. 
 Dialogue cannot be self-serving. It is not the simple addition of non-Christians to 
one’s organization or group for the sake of boasting “diversity,” or the reading the texts 
of religious others solely for the purpose of becoming a more learned scholar. Dialogue 
must always encompass a basic openness to the other as “other.” It is not one-sided, but 
rather a reciprocal process of teaching and learning. Being conscious of pluralism, says 
Schillebeeckx, means implicitly transcending it, since “one does not regard one’s own 
frame of thought as exclusive.”605 Nevertheless, the avoidance of such exclusivity does 
not mean the adoption of an “anything goes” attitude for the sake of honoring differences. 
Some type of standards or criteria are needed, and these are provided by Schillebeeckx’s 
concept of the humanum.  
B. The Humanum as Criterion for Interreligious Dialogue 
 
  Humanum is a Latin term that Schillebeeckx uses to express the not-yet-seen 
fulfillment of all that it means to be human and the articulation of the promise of 
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humanity’s positive potential.606 Influenced by his encounter with secularization in the 
late 1960s, Schillebeeckx began to speak of his conviction that a global ethics cannot be 
based upon religious or confessional claims, including Christianity. In “Church, 
Magisterium, and Politics,” Schillebeeckx asserts that the Christian message does not 
directly provide us with a concrete program of action.607 This statement, he avers, was 
recognized by the Second Vatican Council in the Pastoral Constitution on the Church and 
the World, Gaudium et Spes with its declaration that, “in every age, the church carries the 
responsibility of reading the signs of the times and of interpreting them in the light of the 
Gospel.”608 As was mentioned in Chapter Three, Gaudium et Spes was considered 
revolutionary because it was addressed not just to Catholics, but to “the whole of 
humanity,” admitting that the Church by itself cannot respond to the problems of the 
modern world.609  In dealing with certain social and political issues, the Church cannot 
rely directly on revelation; human experience and “nontheological” factors play a very 
important role.610 In this essay, Schillebeeckx insisted that “there is only one source of 
ethical norms, namely, the historical reality of the value of the inviolable human person 
with all its bodily and social implications.”611 Ethical norms arise out of negative contrast 
experiences: “the absence of what ought to be is experienced initially, and this leads to a 
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perhaps vague, yet real, perception of what should be done here and now.”612 In other 
words, ethical norms must be related to and respond the sufferings actually experienced 
by human beings today. This means that our understanding of salvation will continuously 
shift and develop.  
 Schillebeeckx was not the first thinker to use the term humanum. According to 
Rosino Gibellini, Schillebeeckx’s soteriology is guided by two preoccupations: in the 
negative sense, by what the German Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch calls “ the 
threatened humanum” and the stories of the suffering and death of human beings; and in a 
positive sense, by what French philosopher Paul Ricoeur calls “the desirable humanum,” 
or the fullness and integrity of the humanum.613 The dynamic interplay between the 
positive and the negative was a theme of Schillebeeckx’s earliest philosophical theology, 
and it takes on a new expression after his encounter with critical theory and 
hermeneutics.614 Yet, the contents of the desirable humanum have only been articulated in 
plural, fragmentary, and mutually contradictory forms. Nevertheless, Schillebeeckx 
argues that these disparate visions all have something in common, the universal pre-
understanding of the experience of humanum as threatened. Citing Ernst Bloch, 
Schillebeeckx claims that in all positive views of humankind, humankind can be seen as 
seeking to address the threatened humanum. Here, “a sphere of meaning is revealed in the 
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negative experiences of contrast in our personal and social life.” This sphere of meaning, 
however, is only revealed in our opposition to what is inhuman in our situation.615 
Humans are not in possession of a definitively formulated conception of the humanum, 
but they develop some vague sense of it through their experience of and resistance to 
suffering. According to Schillebeeckx,  
human life includes particular experiences which are signs or glimpses of an 
ultimate total meaning of human life. All our negative experiences cannot brush 
aside the ‘nonetheless’ of trust which is revealed in man’s critical resistance and 
which prevents us from simply surrendering man, human society, and the world 
entirely to total meaninglessness. This trust in the ultimate meaning of human life 
seems to me to be the basic presupposition of man’s action in history.616 
 
Thus, he holds that among different world religions and even among those who do not 
believe in the existence of God, there exists a common trust in the meaning of human 
history, without which resistance against that which is unworthy of humankind would be 
impossible.  
In Christ: The Experience of Jesus as Lord, Schillebeeckx illustrates how ethical 
demands and imperatives arise not from a pre-existing order of laws, but from the 
humanum, threatened and already damaged. Therefore, “ethical invitation or demand is 
not an abstract norm but historically, an event which presents a challenge: our concrete 
history itself, man in need, mankind in need.”617  The humanum resists any uniform 
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definition, since one’s understanding of it shifts along with new contexts and experiences. 
What is ethical does not come to us as some timeless truth from on high, discovered by 
specialists in contemplative isolation, rather what is ethical only becomes apparent in 
human action toward healing what is inhuman.  In other words, there is no transhistorical 
ethics. 
This means that for Schillebeeckx, there is no pre-existing definition of humanity 
at our disposal, nor can one claim the existence of some sort of “universal human nature.” 
What we do have, he claims, is a set of seven anthropological constants which “point to 
permanent human impulses and orientations, values and spheres of value, but at the same 
time do not provide us with directly specific norms or ethical imperatives.”618 According 
to Schillebeeckx, these anthropological constants at least provide us with the conditions 
which must always be presupposed in any human action. When taking into account both 
the various socio-historical forms of a particular society and the spheres of values 
recognized as constant, Schillebeeckx argues that it is possible to establish specific norms 
for human action over time.619 In Christ, he names and describes these seven constants 
which I will briefly summarize below.  
The first anthropological constant is the relationship of the human being to his or 
her own corporeality, and by means of this corporeality, to the wider sphere of nature and 
the ecological environment. Christian salvation, therefore, is concerned not only with the 
individual person, but with all of nature, including non-human creatures.620 The second 
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anthropological constant is that human identity involves relationships with other people. 
The human face, as a part of one’s body that one does not see (unless looking in a 
mirror), indicates that the human being is directed toward and destined for others. 
According to Schillebeeckx, “this also implies that well-being and wholeness, complete 
and undamaged humanity, must be universal, must apply to each and every individual, 
not only a few privileged ones.”621 
The third anthropological constant is the relationship of the human person to 
social and institutional structures. Schillebeeckx explains that while human beings “bring 
these structures to life in the course of our history, they become independent and then 
develop into an objective form of society in which we live our particular lives and which 
again also deeply influence our inwardness, our personhood.” However, Schillebeeckx 
warns that even though these structures form a part of human identity, they are contingent 
and changeable. In fact, we have a duty to change them if they enslave and debase human 
beings rather than contributing to their well-being.622 The fourth anthropological constant 
is the conditioning of peoples and cultures by time and space. Therefore, while there are 
some forms of suffering that human beings can relieve by themselves, there are also 
forms of suffering and threats to life over which human beings can have no influence 
through technology or social intervention.623 This leads Schillebeeckx to describe 
humanity as a hermeneutical undertaking, in which concrete demands arise from one’s 
own particular historical and social context.  
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 The fifth anthropological constant is the mutual and essential relationship between 
theory and praxis. Human culture, as a hermeneutical undertaking, or an undertaking of 
changing meaning and improving the world, needs permanence.  This combination of 
theory and praxis, Schillebeeckx insists, “will be the only humanly responsible guarantee 
of a permanent culture which is increasingly worthy of man.”624  In order that history not 
devolve into the survival of the most powerful, the commitment to human justice requires 
both reflection and action.625 The sixth anthropological constant is what Schillebeeckx 
calls “the utopian element in human consciousness.” This utopian element manifests 
itself in “a variety of different conservative or progressive totalitarian conceptions which 
make it possible for man in society in some way to make sense of contingency or 
finitude, impermanence and the problems of suffering, fiasco, failure and death which it 
presents, or to overcome them.” In most of these utopias, humankind is seen as an active 
subject shaping the future, but also as a subject who is not totally in control of nor 
personally responsible for all of history. In other words, there is something bigger and 
greater than humanity at work. For some, this is fate, or evolution, or nature. For religious 
persons, this is “the living God, the Lord of history.” What all these different forms have 
in common, however, is that each represents a form of faith, a utopia which cannot ever 
be scientifically demonstrated or completely rationalized. Therefore, faith, the ground for 
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hope, is “a constant without which human life and action worthy of men and capable of 
realization becomes impossible.”626  
 Finally, the seventh anthropological constant is what Schillebeeckx calls “the 
irreducible synthesis of these six dimensions.” The reality which heals human beings, 
according to Schillebeeckx, lies in this synthesis.627 Although the full definition of the 
humanum eludes us, humanity is not completely left in the dark in its search for what is 
worthy of humankind. Thus, the anthropological constants serve as guideposts in our 
quest the humanum.  
1. The Independence but Interrelatedness of Religion and Ethics  
 As mentioned above, in the late 1960s, Schillebeeckx began to identify negative 
contrast experiences as the source of ethical norms. This means that ethical norms do not 
arise directly from revelation, or from Church doctrines and teachings, although, as will 
be discussed later, these are not irrelevant or unrelated. Thus, Schillebeeckx, in Jesus, 
describes ethics and religion as interrelated but not identical.628 In Christ, Schillebeeckx 
elaborates upon this relationship further by saying that ethics must be given priority over 
religion “for ethics has the character of a really pressing urgency which cannot wait until 
there is unanimity among men over the ultimate questions of life.”629 The reality of the 
threatened humanum demands that we respond to it now, even though human beings hold 
different and even, at times, conflicting religious views. Schillebeeckx also observes in 
the contemporary world, ethical concerns have become more globalized. Until recently, 
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he notes, ethical norms related only to the private and micro-sphere of human life, 
concerned only with the level of family, town, or country. Today, ethical norms are more 
attentive to what Schillebeeckx calls “the macro-sphere,” or the effects of our activity on 
the whole of humankind and the future of humankind. One example of this shift can be 
seen in our increasing awareness of the issue of climate change. The impetus for our 
present-day resistance to what threatens the natural environment is a concern not only 
with the present state of the world, but with what life will be like for future generations. 
Schillebeeckx writes,  
for the first time in human history, mankind as such sees itself confronted with the 
task of taking responsibility as a whole for the consequences of its action. The 
international solidarity, binding on all mankind, therefore calls for universally 
valid ethical norms or basic principles which apply to all men, if this situation is 
not to turn into a farce of world catastrophe. The need for this combined 
responsibility is, of course, matched by the demand for an ethic of world-wide 
responsibility.630 
 
Clearly, the demand for an ethic of world-wide responsibility requires the ability 
to speak to one another across religious boundaries. The reality of the humanum as 
threatened and already damaged does not allow us to wait for the conversion of others to 
our own religious or philosophical views, nor should this be a desired goal. Ethics must 
focus on the immediate healing on human beings as they are in response to current 
situations of suffering, not some abstract ideal that only makes sense for persons who 
hold certain beliefs.  
In the final book of his Christological trilogy, Church: The Human Story of God, 
Schillebeeckx explains that because both believers and non-believers have negative 
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contrast experiences and such experiences are the source of ethical norms, “we do not 
need God as the direct foundation of our ethical action.”631 Therefore, Schillebeeckx 
appreciates the value of atheistic secular humanism. Human history has shown that one’s 
ability to respond to the threatened humanum is not dependent upon belief in God, nor is 
belief in God a guarantee of right ethical action.  
Without adopting an atheistic worldview himself, but remaining fully committed 
to his Catholic faith, Schillebeeckx grants that an atheistic conception of humanity may 
very well yield fundamental insights for Christianity. Some forms of atheism, he writes, 
“are a justified criticism of traditional concepts of God.” As an example, he cites the 
atheist German philosopher Ludwig von Feuerbach who taught us that “a concept of God 
as the wholly Other is not only logically incoherent but in social and personal terms has 
no liberating, critical, and productive significance. The wholly Other can legitimate 
oppression and dictatorship as well as human liberation.” Therefore, to speak of God’s 
transcendence without ever talking about God’s immanence is, for Schillebeeckx, 
dangerous and absurd.632  
Furthermore, Schillebeeckx recognized that “believers from many religions have 
all too often misused the name of God” to the detriment of human wholeness and 
happiness. Too often, says Schillebeeckx, “the existence of God is denied because people 
hold completely wrong, humanly foolish ideas about precisely who God is.”633 Thus, he 
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concludes that “it is better today not to think that there is a God than to adhere to an 
inhuman God who enslaves men and women, and thus appeal to radicalism.”634  
Certainly, while ethics does have a certain independence from religion, religion 
still has an important role to play in ethical decision-making; thus, a believer can 
proclaim that religion is still needed. One can recognize the valuable contributions made 
by non-believers, but still remain unconvinced that ethics can be done just as well 
without religion, or, even more specifically, without his or her own particular religion. 
2. The Valuable and Vital Role of Religion in Ethics 
 Schillebeeckx insisted that while the concrete principles for ethically responding 
to evil and injustice in this world cannot be provided by revelation, the inspiration and 
moral spirit necessary for their construction can be.635 Faith and ethics are not same, but 
faith can and does manifest itself in ethics. Just as our ways of envisioning salvation are 
culturally conditioned, one cannot neatly separate one’s religious life from one’s ethical 
tasks, since responding to the threatened humanum is a demand of Christian discipleship. 
One easily may be able to publicly talk about ethical action without using explicitly 
religious terms, but one cannot simply forget or put aside their religion when reflecting 
upon the issues that face society and how to deal with them.636  
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Returning to the example of climate change and ecological concerns, it is science 
that has provided us with evidence that such change is occurring, and such evidence on 
its own can and has motivated human efforts toward building a more sustainable future. 
The Christian holds that the natural world and all that is in it is God’s creation. This does 
not mean that the Christian rejects the theory of evolution, or that the Christian remains 
unpersuaded by or uninterested in the findings of modern science. In fact, some scientists 
studying climate change are devoutly Christian!  However, the Christian may very likely 
see environmental activism as his or her responsibility toward God’s creatures, and that a 
Christian’s duty is to read and respond to the “signs of the times,” all the while, fully 
recognizing that this responsibility for the world and its future inhabitants has also been 
accepted by non-Christians and non-believers.  
 The valuable and indispensable role of religion, and, in particular, Christianity, is 
a consistent theme in Schillebeeckx’s considerations of the humanum. While he claims 
that the humanum resists any uniform definition, as a Christian, he insists that “the 
humanum which is sought, but always threatened, is proclaimed and promised in Jesus 
Christ.”637 He identifies the humanum with the kingdom of God, a reality that is both 
already, and not yet. It is conceivable for us and experienced in fragments here and now, 
but it awaits future fulfillment. According to Schillebeeckx, “the power to realize this 
humanum and to bring about an individual and collective peace is reserved for God, the 
power of love.” He refers to this as the “eschatological reservation.” Humanity has the 
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power and responsibility to shape the future, but lacks the ability to provide total and 
universal salvation for all beings in all contexts. Not only are humans unable to address 
every possible instance of suffering due to the limits of time and space, but human beings 
throughout history have, at times, caused great harm in their appeals to the threatened 
humanum. A striking example of this, Schillebeeckx writes, was Nazism in Germany, 
which claimed to protect the humanum but in fact, led to a greater degradation of 
humanity.638 Human beings are imperfect, and Schillebeeckx does not deny that they 
often get it wrong, sometimes tragically so.  
 According to Schillebeeckx, “evil has clearly been a datum of such great 
proportions in human history that neither man not society can offer us any guarantee at 
all that we shall ever be able to overcome it.”639 As was mentioned earlier, Schillebeeckx 
still maintains that “all our negative experiences cannot brush aside the ‘nonetheless’ of 
trust which is revealed in man’s critical resistance and which prevents us from 
surrendering man, human society, and the world entirely to total meaninglessness.”640 
Atheists can live a meaningful life and find plenty of strong reasons for investing in the 
betterment of society. However, a Christian cannot help but make the claim that God will 
ultimately have the last word and good will triumph over evil. Such a position, which 
stems from a faith conviction, has a stronger impetus, than the position that history may 
or may not be meaningful in the end. In a 1983 conversation with Huub Oosterhuis and 
Piet Hoogeveen, Schillebeeckx reiterated this conviction, 
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God does not want a history consisting of a confusion of sense and nonsense. He wants 
pure sense, pure meaning, to be ultimately achieved and by men. That knowledge, based 
on faith, is, I think, the ultimate and most powerful driving force enabling men to work 
for a better world.641 
 
 Furthermore, our human efforts to ameliorate suffering are brought about amidst 
conflict and friction. Every contribution to the building up of society risks new 
possibilities for discord. Movements for social change are rarely accepted without threats 
of violence and ridicule. Human beings often find themselves caught in the dilemma of 
whether to do what they believe is right or to do what is safe and does not endanger their 
security or reputation. Our human finitude also means that human beings cannot escape 
eventual death, even with advances in science that have helped us live longer, healthier 
lives. Even the greatest and strongest humanitarian people, programs, and organizations 
cannot reach everyone. People still die homeless and hungry on the street. Diseases, even 
those for which a cure or vaccination exists, kill people each day. Without God, the lives 
of the dead may have meaning in that they lived in order that future generations may be 
spared from the same fate. However, from this point of view, the dead themselves do not 
experience any liberation or redemption.642  For the Christian believer, this is not a cause 
for despair, but a push to keep working, because while the fullness of the humanum 
eludes us, its eventual fulfillment has been promised in Jesus Christ. Now promised in 
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there is no guarantee that evil will not have the last word on our existence. See also Poulsom, The 
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Christ, that reality is “made conceivable and assured for us in grace.”643  Christ’s promise 
is not only for the living, but also for the dead and forgotten.  
 Finitude, according to Schillebeeckx, can never be completely secularized, 
otherwise human beings would have already discovered a way to eradicate our own 
mortality. For the Christian, the futility of such a project points to a God who is greater 
than all our human endeavors. Within the Christian experience, the believer has the 
insight that “finitude is not left in solitude but is supported by the absolute presence of the 
creator God.”644 Instead of being an irremovable blemish on humanity, finitude has an 
extraordinary power and depth.645 Finitude, for believers, is the never-failing source of all 
religion.646  
 Schillebeeckx’s later work speaks to some of dangers of totally removing religion 
from ethics, and specifically expresses a deep suspicion toward “human rights” as a 
substitute for spirituality. In Christ, he presents some historical background as to the 
development of a purely ethical, non-religious, secular foundation for morality. This 
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644 Schillebeeckx, The Collected Works of Edward Schillebeeckx, Vol 8: Interim Report on the Books Jesus 
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occurred during the process of secularization, and also coincided with the rise of 
completely new issues that were not the concern of Christian morality in the past, 
namely, the problems caused by the industrialization and technological development of 
social life. Thus, with the emancipation of ethics from theology, “an autonomous ethics 
came to the fore in contrast to and in opposition to the earlier Christian morality, with its 
bias toward the sphere of the private individual.” While the older Christian morality 
could be described as a micro-ethics, human ethics is a macro-ethics. Ethical questions 
were now discussed outside the realm of Christian moral theology.647  
 Schillebeeckx does not view this emancipation of ethics from religion in an 
entirely negative light, even though he affirms that religion cannot be reduced to ethics. 
“Religion is something more, something different, though at the same time it is 
ethical.”648 In other words, we cannot define a religion simply based on its ethical claims 
or moral imperatives. Religion offers persons more than rules or guidelines for living a 
moral life; it provides believers with comfort, hope, a sense of a community or belonging, 
and specific prayers or practices for developing a relationship with the Transcendent.  
Schillebeeckx observes that the total detachment of ethics from religion began to 
turn into an emancipation of the human being from ethics itself, particularly in the form 
of the contemporary call for an ethics which is free of norms. He states that “we may 
certainly welcome a norm-free ethics if that is taken to mean that ethical norms may not 
have any alienating, external function, but must rather open up possibilities and 
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perspectives which enable us to be as far as possible true men in specific historical 
situations.”649 We must remain constantly vigilant of the need for ethics to take into 
account the specific concerns that arise from particular times and places; but ethics 
cannot merely be left to the whim of human minds without undermining the basic 
structure of the world. Schillebeeckx warns against a position that insists upon trying to 
discover human limits simply by experimentation. For him, such an attitude bears 
dangerous consequences such as the elevation of biological laws or ideals of capitalist 
society to unchangeable norms.  
 At the end of Interim Report on the Books Jesus and Christ, Schillebeeckx 
specifically states that no earthly ideology can rival Christianity, since the death of Jesus 
has universal significance for the living and the dead. In Jesus, God gives a future even to 
those whose lives have been forgotten, to those who know no more future, since 
Christianity affirms that “for God, no human being is a reject. What the modern age calls 
‘human rights’ is a weak, though authentic, secular residue of this Christian view.”650 In a 
later work, Schillebeeckx explained that without religion, ethics often becomes eager for 
revenge, rather than reconciliation.651 Fighting for a particular party, institution, or 
system, often takes prominence over human welfare. It is easy to only seek the well-being 
of those whom we feel “deserve” to be saved. Salvation is not about one group or idea 
winning an earthly battle over and against another, but, as a communal reality, it must be 
about ending such divisions. 
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 Schillebeeckx elaborated upon the weakness of “human rights” toward the end of 
his career, writing that “a human rights culture is a minimum and the beginnings of love, 
but it’s not enough.” People long for more than simply justice in terms of protection from 
discrimination or harm, and compensation for pain endured, but rather, they want to be 
accepted by others unconditionally for their own sake. Justice, Schillebeeckx insists, is 
cold and forbidding. “A human culture is a culture of love, and that cannot be pinned 
down in statutes and codified.”652 Justice and the law make necessary and positive 
contributions to human society, but the human person is in search of something more, 
which these things cannot provide. For Schillebeeckx, this explains why religious 
movements and religions remain dynamic forces in the world today, even though more 
and more people have begun to separate from religious institutions.653  
3. Why is the Humanum a Useful Concept for Interreligious Dialogue Today? 
 As Chapter One pointed out, there is a general consensus among most scholars 
that in Western society, a fundamental shift is occurring from the modern to the 
postmodern. The major marks of postmodernism are a consciousness of pluralism at 
every level of thinking about humanity, and skepticism toward arguments from authority 
and universal frameworks. While Schillebeeckx, as was mentioned in Chapter Two, has 
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often be categorized as a modern thinker, his articulation of the humanum takes seriously 
postmodern concerns, namely in its insistence that any uniform positive definition or 
identification of the humanum must be avoided. All human beings have negative contrast 
experiences, in which suffering tells us what “should not be” and provides impetus for 
our discovery of what should. Human history is a history of suffering, yet there is no past 
“golden age” to look to as a model or norm. Rather, people seek “the kind of society that 
has never yet been.” The meaning of history remains open, and still has to be created.654  
 No human being or religious community is in possession of the knowledge of 
what human wholeness fully entails now or in the future.  The theologian who wrestles 
with the questions plaguing humanity provides a valuable service, but he or she cannot 
also do the job of the scientist seeking a cure for harmful diseases. Meanwhile, the doctor 
administering urgent care to those physically afflicted may not be able to provide the 
mental and spiritual counseling of a minister or social worker. The person working in 
Africa or Latin America cannot at the same time be providing care for impoverished 
persons in American cities. Limited time, resources, and energy mean that, in order for 
society to progress further and further toward the humanum, we must rely on one another 
even across religious boundaries.  
For Schillebeeckx, the universal experience of the humanum as threatened and 
damaged provides a foundation and criterion for dialogue among persons who hold and 
even contradictory views. Whatever threatens and degrades humanity must be rejected. A 
religion or religious belief that humiliates other human beings is a mistaken way of 
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believing in God.655 The gospels portray Jesus himself as embodying a commitment to 
the humanum when he rejected the Pharisees’ strict observance of the Torah and 
welcomed tax collectors, prostitutes, and other “undesirables” to dine with him. When 
Jesus healed on the Sabbath, he put suffering humanity before the Law. “The Sabbath 
was made for mankind, and not humankind for the Sabbath.”656  
No religion, not even Christianity, is above the need for self-critique in response 
to the threatened humanum. Schillebeeckx reminds us that throughout history, Christians 
have not always recognized and responded to injustice. For example, Christians accepted 
slavery for centuries. Even St. Paul did not conclude that slavery was an evil. It was the 
human conscience, not Christians, which finally said no to slavery.657  
In one of his later essays on the relationship between religion and violence, 
Schillebeeckx discusses how the concept of religio was adopted by Christianity in the 
fourth century and then applied to the Christian relationship with God. Religio, in Roman 
law, was seen as the first, supreme patriotic or civic duty. Therefore, for centuries in the 
West, the Christian God became the upholder of the established socio-political order and 
all deviant ideas were considered punishable as heresy. Thus, Schillebeeckx states, 
“subsequently the church’s adoption of the ancient Roman concept of religio permitted 
the Crusades, in which Muslims were slaughtered, and the Inquisition, in which 
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dissidents from orthodoxy— the guarantee of political wellbeing— were handed over to 
the civil authorities as traitors and burned at the stake.”658 He concludes that no religion, 
even Christianity, can ever be considered the guarantor of human well-being. No religion 
has a special privilege with regard to the development of the humanum. The rejection of a 
direct link between Christian confession of God and a humanly established political order 
“allows Christians to engage in interreligious dialogue on equal footing with all dialogue 
partners in the face of real religious differences and rejection of the view that all religions 
are ‘equal’ (known as indifferentism).”659  
 The humanum also provides a way for Christians to see dialogue with non-
Christians and non-believers as something more than just “being nice” or “keeping the 
peace.” Here, in contrast to Karl Rahner, Schillebeeckx holds a positive view of religious 
pluralism. In his later work, he even regards religious pluralism as “not an evil which 
needs to be removed but rather a wealth which is to be welcomed and enjoyed by all.”660  
Therefore, Christians really need the wisdom provided by other traditions, including 
dialogue with what Schillebeeckx refers to as “the vast world of atheism” and “the 
exponents of that form of religiousness, so widespread today, whose outlook is purely of 
this world.” As early as 1959, Schillebeeckx affirmed that religious thought must include 
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secular thought in its reflections on the meaning of salvation.661 It must also incorporate 
insights from philosophical ethics, the natural sciences, and the social sciences.662 
 The humanum serves as a criterion for dialogue that does not patronize non-
Christians, but welcomes and relies on their contributions as religious others, not merely 
valuing what makes them similar to Christianity. Without erasing the uniqueness of 
different religious and philosophical views, it also insists that there is an experience that 
is common to all of us as human beings, namely, the experience of the humanum as 
threatened and damaged. Nevertheless, the recognition of this common universal 
experience does not mean people’s individual beliefs become irrelevant or must be 
disregarded. Schillebeeckx not only affirms that Christianity is still significant, but even 
continues to hold on to the belief that Jesus Christ provides the strongest impetus for 
investing in the humanum. In other words, there is room for one to still uphold his or her 
religion as “best.” While, at first glance, this may seem problematic, one must remember 
that this remains an option not just for Christians, but for all traditions. Therefore, the 
Muslim may say the strongest impetus is provided by the example of the Prophet 
Muhammad, and the atheist may claim that stronger impetus stems from belief in 
humanity or the world without a transcending figure. Conflicting beliefs may remain but 
this need not be an obstacle to fruitful dialogue and engagement. As was discussed in 
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Chapter One, advocating that Christians must adopt a pluralist position inevitably means 
that all other religions must also adopt such a position, and thereby turns dialogue into an 
imperialist endeavor that tells others how they must believe. Furthermore, the socially 
critical power of religious faith often stems from particular statements of faith, such as 
Jesus as the eschatological prophet, or the Quran as the literal Word of God. 
 In the following sections, I focus on the relationship between Christianity and 
Islam to illustrate the importance of interreligious dialogue in valuing the contributions of 
the other, but which does not make the other water down his or her beliefs to avoid points 
of disagreement. While this point could certainly be demonstrated via comparison with 
another world religion, I choose to concentrate on Islam for two main reasons. First, in 
today’s political climate, Muslims and Christians are often perceived to be in opposition 
to one another. Islam has often been labeled as an inherently violent and misogynistic 
religion by persons who have never studied the tradition in depth. Fear of Islam is 
rampant in the United States and Western Europe, and this has caused a great deal of 
suffering for individual Muslims and Muslim communities. Second, the solution to this 
issue cannot lie with the attempt to explain away all of the differences between Islam and 
Christianity in an effort to show that they are essentially the same. While Islam and 
Christianity share some significant similarities that it may be useful to emphasize, certain 
Muslim beliefs and Christian beliefs inevitably conflict with one another.  
C. Schillebeeckx’s Engagement with Islam 
 
 Before delving into Schillebeeckx’s engagement with Islam in his own work, it is 
important to point out that Schillebeeckx is not a scholar of Islam. Thus, the title of this 
section “Schillebeeckx’s engagement with Islam” is already a bit of a misnomer. 
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Schillebeeckx’s only real discussion of Islam appeared in the book Christ: The 
Experience of Jesus as Lord as part of a chapter called “Critical Remembrance of 
Suffering Humanity.”663 In what he called a “survey of human history,” Schillebeeckx 
attempted to show how various cultures, religions, and philosophical movements have 
dealt with the question of suffering in search of ways to overcome it.664 He did this to 
illustrate that the history of suffering in the world has been a constant theme of every 
account of life, whether religious or not. It also speaks to the fact that the problem of 
suffering is so immense that no person, religion, or movement has been able to solve it, 
or even speak adequately enough about it so as to have the final authoritative word. A 
roughly three and a half-page section on suffering in Islam is included as a part of this 
survey.  
The significance of discussing Schillebeeckx’s brief consideration of Islam is not 
so much for its informational value or even accuracy, but to get a sense of how 
Schillebeeckx perceives Islam in relation to Christianity and to venture how 
Schillebeeckx might approach current issues affecting the relationship between the two 
religions. It is also crucial to note that Schillebeeckx mostly talked about “Islam” as a 
whole, although he did once bring up the distinction between Sunni and Shi’a, and also 
makes mention of the development of Sufism in the eighth-century (though, of course, 
this distinction alone does not cover the diversity within the tradition).  
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 Schillebeeckx begins his discussion of Islam with the significance of Islam’s 
sacred text, the Quran. Even more so than for Jews and Christians, writes Schillebeeckx, 
Muslims see the Quran as “God’s word for man.” Stressing how Islam places a strong 
emphasis on God as “one,” he insist that for Muslims, there is but one revelation of God, 
which is found in the Quran. Although the Quran sees itself as a continuation of the 
tradition of Abraham and Jesus of Nazareth, Islam holds that Jews and Christians, with 
their different religious interpretations, have, in certain ways, corrupted the “one 
unfalsified revelation of God.” Here, Schillebeeckx seems to indicate that for Islam, like 
Judaism and Christianity, the universal is revealed in the particular. He describes the 
Quran as, “the Arab version of the one divine revelation; a timeless message, albeit 
bound with the specifically Arab character of the life of the prophet Muhammad.” Like 
the Bible, the Quran has a universal message relevant for all time periods, though it was 
revealed in a particular language, culture, and historical context. Nevertheless, 
Schillebeeckx asserts that, unlike the Bible, the Quran is concerned only with particular 
situations of suffering relevant to seventh century Arabia, and not suffering as a 
theoretical problem. Thus, he concludes, Muslims and Christians approach the question 
of suffering differently.  
For Muslims and Christians, as believers in God, suffering presents a problem that 
demands some sort of resolution. However, according to Schillebeeckx, Christians tend 
to focus more on suffering as a problem for God’s love, whereas Muslims tend to focus 
on God’s omnipotence. Citing various passages from the Quran that appear to establish 
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God’s omnipotence,665 Schillebeeckx states that, for Muslims, suffering must always be 
under God’s control and “therefore Moslems look for the many ways in which suffering 
can be fitted meaningfully into God’s purposes.” Islam gives two explanations for why 
suffering exists. Suffering is either a punishment for wrongdoing, or a test to determine 
whether one has true faith. In this context, Schillebeeckx insists, lamentations of despair 
and quests for human rights do not have a rightful place. The Islamic conception of God, 
writes Schillebeeckx, “leads to the only possible attitude, sabr, i.e., affirmative tolerance, 
the patience to bear it.” 
 However, Schillebeeckx does not say this to attack or condemn Islam. He points 
out that this attitude is not fatalism, but rather is representative of “a personalistic 
relationship of trust in God through which all things are possible to the believer.” Here, 
he makes a brief reference to the tension between Islam and the West.  
Such a belief in God does not seem to exercise any ‘criticism of society’ of the kind that 
would improve it. But why should one have to change a society in which one felt happy? 
Islam is critical of society in this sense; in other words, it is a criticism of the concern of 
others- Westerners- who, without being asked, want to Westernize Arab society, or, in 
Western eyes, make it better. For the orthodox Muslim, this means acceptance of the bad 
things from Western culture.666 
 
In contrast to Judaism and Christianity, Schillebeeckx states that Islam gives a 
“supernatural solution to the problem of suffering.” Because, according to the Quran, 
God produces exact eschatological rewards for good and punishments for evil, the 
hereafter is a forceful motivator for one’s deeds in this life. Yet, Schillebeeckx recognizes 
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that Islam too “knows both protest against suffering and the duty to alleviate human 
suffering as far as possible,” especially given Islam’s emphasis on God’s mercy. He also 
seems to sense that what he and other Christians may perceive as a lack of “criticism of 
society” in Islam is a Muslim repudiation of the particularly Western critiques of society. 
This does not mean Muslims do not desire social improvement, but that they do not want 
the West to dictate to them what progress should look like.  
 To further contrast Islam and Christianity, Schillebeeckx discusses the Islamic 
view of Jesus of Nazareth: “another characteristic of Islam is its assessment of the 
crucifixion of Jesus: it has no significance whatsoever.” This means Islam does not hold a 
notion of “redemptive suffering” as does Christianity in its interpretation of the meaning 
of the crucifixion. However, Jesus is still revered as a prophet in Islam. Schillebeeckx 
compares Jesus and Muhammad, saying that Jesus chose the cross, while Muhammad 
chose “the Hijrah, the way of success and power, the instrument of God in the fight 
against evil.”667 
 Schillebeeckx concludes this brief section by identifying the split between Sunni 
and Shi’a as the first great schism within Islam, caused by debates over the legitimate 
successors to the Prophet. This gave rise to the murder of Ali, and his sons Hasan and 
Hussein, who are revered as martyrs in the Shi’a tradition. Schillebeeckx regards these 
three murders as “the foundation of the theology of Shi’a Moslems.” This event shows 
“saving significance of innocent sufferings.” These martyrs have become a “universal 
mediator” and “the heavenly intercessor for all sinners.” This is a view which is foreign 
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to the understanding of Sunni Islam, and which Schillebeeckx calls “a kind of Arab 
apokatastasis.”668 
 In a 1983 conversation with Huub Oosterhuis and Piet Hoogeveen published as 
God is New Each Moment, Schillebeeckx articulates his understanding of some 
commonalities between Islam and Christianity in the context of a general distinction 
between Eastern and Western religions. In this context, Schillebeeckx categorizes 
Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism as Eastern religions, and classifies Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam as Western.  
 Eastern religions, he argues, are primarily “religions of the inner life.” The divine 
is a personal reality communing with human beings. Schillebeeckx interprets Eastern 
religions as holding the position that the commitment to work for a better world has only 
a relative value. He describes the prototype of these religions as “the yogi, sitting in the 
lotus position, silent, passive, turned inward on himself and away from the world and at 
one with the power that reconciles everything with itself.” The mysticism of Eastern 
religions, therefore, is one that has no connection to the socio-political order.669 
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 Western religions, of which Islam is one, are characterized by their “emphasis on 
a personal God who speaks to man, questions him, and challenges him.” The human 
being, created in God’s image, is responsible for history. Therefore, it can be said that all 
three Western religions- Judaism, Christianity, and Islam- are oriented toward ethical 
action and “all have the task of establishing the kingdom of God as a kingdom of justice 
among men.”  Yet, each of these religions is also mystical, deeply rooted in the personal 
experience of God. It is within this context that, Schillebeeckx speaks of a similarity 
between Jesus and the Prophet Muhammad. Muhammad had numerous encounters with 
Allah’s angels who communicated the Quran to him “directly from heaven.” Jesus, too, 
had a mystical experience of God as his Abba, or Father, which “was the source of the 
whole of his life in service to the poor and the enslaved people of this world.”670 
Schillebeeckx makes his comparison of Eastern and Western spiritualities in 
response to the situation where many people were no longer finding meaning in the 
Western traditions and have turned to the Eastern ones. Here, Schillebeeckx is very 
critical of the West. Although the West has a supposedly more ethical and this-worldly 
orientation, Western society’s consumerist tendencies have stunted its ability to 
experience the world. He states, “there are certain thing—things that are there to be 
seen—which we simply no longer see. We are just incapable of seeing then because we 
have learned to see only from the point of utility.”671 Oftentimes, when the West tries to 
be self-critical, it offers only “a criticism that leaves our society as it is and looks for 
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salvation in the inner life.” Schillebeeckx believes that this increasing Western turn 
toward Eastern spirituality is due to a growing despair over the possibility of changing 
prevailing social structures. People began to think of themselves as individuals and focus 
more on the renewal of the inner life through meditation. Certainly, one may dispute 
Schillebeeckx’s characterization of Eastern versus Western religions. However, what 
Schillebeeckx has successfully shown is that religious beliefs do have a profound effect 
on how the way one lives as a human being among other human beings in this world. 
When it comes to the addressing the misery that pervades this world, what at one 
believes, or does not believe, about God is not irrelevant.  
Schillebeeckx speaks of an additional noteworthy distinction between Islam and 
Christianity in his 1987 work, On Christian Faith. Discussing how a religious tradition 
can never be reduced to its ethics, Schillebeeckx remarked, “one can even say of the 
Christian tradition that the specific character of the ethics of Christians (as opposed to 
some other religion, e.g Islam) lies in the fact that it has no ethics of its own and is 
therefore open to the humanum that is sought by all men and women, here and now and 
ever anew.”672 In a 1993 interview, Schillebeeckx reaffirmed his view that “there is no 
such thing as a Christian ethic,” while “Islam is another matter, that has its ethics.” 
Schillebeeckx explained that for the Christian, neither revelation nor faith impose ethical 
norms, even if they may inspire their formation.673 This would then imply that for 
                                                        
 
672 For Schillebeeckx, this position is nothing new to Christianity. The position that morality is autonomous 
from religion was defended by Thomas Aquinas in Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 107, a. 4. Schillebeeckx, On 
Christian Faith: The Spiritual, Ethical, and Political Dimensions (New York: Crossroad, 1983), 50.   
673 Schillebeeckx, I Am A Happy Theologian, 70.  
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Muslims, faith and revelation do dictate certain ethical norms. It would also indicate that 
Muslims and Christians view the relationship between religion and ethics differently.  
D. Is there a Significant Difference Between Islam and Christianity on the 
Relationship Between Religion and Ethics?  
Although Schillebeeckx is not a scholar of Islam, it is important to evaluate his 
perception of the differences between Islam and Christianity. Particularly, I believe it is 
necessary to focus on three of Schillebeeckx’s claims.  First, Schillebeeckx’s comparison 
of the Bible and the Quran, including the assertion that unlike the Bible, the Quran only 
deals with instances of suffering particular to seventh-century Arabia, rather than the 
issue of suffering as a whole. Second, Schillebeeckx’s articulation of the differences 
between Islam and Christianity with regard to how they approach suffering, particularly 
the belief that in Islam, the only attitude one can take to suffering is submission, or the 
patience to bear it. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, is Schillebeeckx’s insistence 
that while Christianity does not have an ethics per se, but Islam does. I will take up each 
of these claims in the order they are listed. 
 Regarding the Bible and the Quran, Schillebeeckx is correct in emphasizing that 
these Scriptures are viewed differently by their respective traditions.  Both are considered 
the “Word of God,” but in distinct ways. The Bible is inspired by God, but it is not the 
literal word of God.674 It was composed by many different authors over a span of 
                                                        
 
674 Here, I am focusing in particular on the Catholic vision of the Bible. The majority of Christians, even 
non-Catholics, do not take the Bible to be the literal word of God and accept modern forms of biblical 
exegesis. However, there are Christians, in particular fundamentalist groups, who still uphold that the Bible 
is the literal word of God and therefore, for example, rejecting the theory of evolution in favor of the 
Genesis creation story which depicts God as creating the whole universe in seven days. See Second Vatican 
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thousands of years. Schillebeeckx insist that when Christians refer to the Bible as “God’s 
word,” it is a “metaphoric expression.” The Bible is a “human, historical, and, as such, 
contingent transmission.”675 On the other hand, Muslims believe that the Quran was 
revealed solely to the Prophet Muhammad by the Angel Gabriel over a period of 
approximately twenty-three years. Here, the teaching that the Prophet was illiterate is 
fundamental, since the Quran is not the words of the Prophet, but the words of God. As 
Seyyed Hossein Nasr explains, “before the Divine Message can be received, the human 
receptacle must be pure and clear.”676  
For many Sunni Muslims, the Quran is considered to be uncreated and therefore, 
co-eternal with God. This belief originated with the Hanbali school in the ninth century, 
which sought to emphasize the transcendent unity of God and God’s unlimited 
omnipotence. It upholds the priority of revelation over the use of reason, emphasizing the 
insufficiency of reason in the quest for religious truth. The belief in the eternal, uncreated 
Quran has led some scholars to posit that the Quran, in Islam, rather than the Prophet 
Muhammad, is what is parallel to Jesus in Christianity. This assertion is made in light of 
the profession made in the Nicene Creed, “begotten not made, consubstantial with the 
Father,” and the association of Jesus with the Word, or Logos, in the prologue of the 
Gospel of John.677   However, not all Muslims would subscribe to this view, and this is 
                                                        
 
Council, “Dei Verbum: Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation” in Vatican Council II: Constitutions, 
Decrees, Declarations, ed. Austin Flannery, OP (Northport: NY: Costello, 1996).  
675 Edward Schillebeeckx, “Theological Quests,” 121.  
676 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Muhammad: Man of God (Chicago: ABC International, 1995), 24. This is also in 
contrast to what Islam teaches about Jesus. In the Quran, Jesus is not illiterate, but learned and full of 
wisdom. Quran 3:48, “And God will teach Jesus the book, the wisdom, the Torah, and the Gospel.” See 
Zeki Saritoprak, Islam’s Jesus (University Press of Florida, 2014), 9.  




true in particular of Shi’a traditions. In the eighth century, the Mu’tazila emerged as an 
example of “theology from below.” In contrast to the later Hanbali school, Mu’tazila 
gave a central role to the gift of human reason as bestowed by God in order to aid the 
search for divine truth. They argued that the Quran was not the eternal, uncreated word of 
God, but created in time and therefore, subject to human interpretation and authority.  
However, those who uphold the view that the Quran is uncreated do not 
necessarily deny the importance of Quranic exegesis. While the doctrine of the Quran’s 
inviolability rules out the possibility that it is alterable, there are alternative ways of 
reading the text.678 Also, according to some scholars, there is no neat analogy between 
the Christian concept of Christ and the Islamic concept of the Quran. Muzammil Siddiqi 
points out that such an analogy is often proposed by Christian scholars, not Muslim 
scholars. The Quran, whether eternal or created, is still the Word of God, not God. 
Muslims do not worship the Quran, nor do they direct prayers to the sacred text in the 
same way that Christians pray to Jesus.679 As Amina Wadud explains, “The Quran is not 
God. Words are fallible.”680 For both Catholics and Muslims, God’s presence cannot be 
limited to their sacred texts.  
A second claim that Schillebeeckx makes is that the Quran, unlike the Bible, is 
concerned only with instances of suffering particular to seventh century Arabia, rather 
than suffering as a theoretical problem. However, such a statement is rather simplistic. It 
                                                        
 
678 Asma Barlas, Believing Women: Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of the Quran (Austin: 
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679 Muzammil H. Siddiqi, “God: A Muslim View,” in Three Faiths-One God: A Jewish, Christian, Muslim 
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680 Amina Wadud, Inside the Gender Jihad: Women’s Reform in Islam (Oxford: Oneworld, 2006), 208.  
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also appears to limit the Quran’s contemporary liberating potential. Schillebeeckx fails to 
explain how the Bible, composed of texts written in specific historical time periods, is 
any different. Schillebeeckx was correct, however, in asserting that in Islam, it is 
commonly held that Jews and Christians have corrupted divine revelation.681 The Quran 
is seen as the revelation that corrects and replaces the earlier revelations in the Hebrew 
Bible and the New Testament. However, just as Jesus the Jewish Nazarene did not intend 
to found a new religion, neither does Islam claim to be a new religion. According to the 
Quran, all of God’s prophets were Muslims, and preached only Islam, including Noah, 
Abraham, Joseph, and Jesus. In his treatment of Islam, Schillebeeckx also neglects to 
bring up a significant similarity between Islam and Christianity, which is that both regard 
their scripture as fulfilling earlier ones, although to a different degree. Muslims regard the 
prophets of Israel and Jesus as important, but the Old and New Testaments are not 
considered a part of their sacred scripture or used in Islamic prayers or rituals. For 
Christianity, the New Testament is said to fulfill Jewish revelation,682 but the Hebrew 
Bible remains an integral part of the Christian tradition and is used in Christian liturgy. 
                                                        
 
681 Mahmoud Ayoub adds, “it must be emphasized that Muslim thinkers do not reject the Gospels out of 
hand as complete distortions of the truth. They are regarded, on the contrary, as containing clear evidence 
of the essential truth of God’s Oneness and the humanity of Jesus.” See “Towards and Islamic Christology, 
II: The Death of Jesus, Reality or Delusion,” in The Muslim World LXX:2 (April 1980), 112.  
682 Some Christians who adopt a pluralist position reject the view of the New Testament as fulfillment of 
the Old Testament. For example, see Paul Knitter, Jesus and the Other Names: Christian Mission and 
Global Responsibility (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1996), 174, fn. 6. Schillebeeckx perspective on the Old 
Testament is indicative of an inclusivist position. He says, “the Old Testament has, as an expression of 
religious faith, a certain independent value of its own, but this Old Testament revelation must ultimately be 
seen principally as the prehistory of Christian revelation, as a growth towards the mystery of Christ, which 
is the center and the telos, the end and goal, of the whole of revelation.  The entire salvation history of the 
Old Testament was directed towards this final stage of revelation, and the first word of revelation can only 
be fully understood when it is considered in the perspective of this definitive revelation in Christ. See “The 
Bible and Theology,” in The Collected Works of Edward Schillebeeckx Vol 2: Revelation and Theology, 
Ed. Shoof, Sterkens, Borgman, Shreiter (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), 122, first published as “Exegese, 
Dogmatik und Dogmenentwicklung,” in Exegese und Dogmatik, ed. H. Vorgrimler (Mainz: 1962), 91-114.  
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 The fundamental nature of the Christian corruption of the Bible, according to 
Islam, was that the Prophet Jesus was turned into the Son of God and made to die on the 
cross. Thus, Schillebeeckx is right to point out that for Islam, the crucifixion of Jesus has 
no significance. This is because Islam denies that the crucifixion ever actually occurred. 
The Quran states, 
and for their saying: ‘We have surely killed the Christ, Jesus son of Mary, the messenger 
of God.’ They did not kill him, nor did they crucify him; rather it was made only to 
appear so to them. And those who have differed concerning him are in doubt regarding 
him; they have no knowledge of him, except the following of conjecture. They did not 
kill him with certainty. Rather, God took him up to Himself, for God is Mighty and 
Wise.683 
 
 Generally, this verse has been interpreted to mean that another was made to look 
like Jesus and died in his place. The crucifixion, from the Islamic point of view, would 
automatically rule out Jesus’ status as prophet, since God does not allow God’s prophets 
to be humiliated and tortured by their opponents.684 In one sense, it is completely logical 
for Schillebeeckx to conclude that Islam does not have a notion of “redemptive 
suffering.” Unlike Christianity, the concept of sin is not central in Islam. A comparison 
between Genesis 3 and Quran 2:35-39 reveals that the latter does not contain a story of 
the “fall” of humankind. In both Genesis and the Quran, the human being is tempted by 
the devil and eats fruit from a forbidden tree. Genesis 3 ends with a list of consequences 
of sin: enmity between the man and the woman, pain in childbirth, the woman’s desire 
for her husband who shall rule over her, the human need to toil for their daily bread. In 
the Quran, “Adam received from his Lord some words, and He accepted his repentance.” 
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In Islam, there is no concept of “original sin” as an explanation for human wrongdoing, 
although Islam certainly acknowledges that human error occurs. In contrast to the 
writings of St. Paul in the New Testament, in the Quran, sin has not corrupted or altered 
humanity in such a way that it is in need of a savior who is both human and divine.685  
However, the difference between Christianity and Islam is not as simple as 
claiming that Jesus is a savior figure for the former, and not a savior figure for the latter. 
Jesus as Savior cannot be central in Islam because Islam lacks a concept of sin analogous 
to the Christian view of fallen humanity and its need for redemption. Yet, Islam can and 
does say that Christ was a savior in that “he, by his message, helped save humanity from 
error and to guide its steps further on the path to God, to whom we all belong, and to 
whom we shall all return.”686 Jesus is a “messiah,” but not a divine messiah. In this 
regard, there is an alignment between Jews and Muslims in contradistinction to 
Christianity, in that neither consider their messiah to be divine. With regard to Jesus, 
Muslims consider themselves to be followers of the “middle way,” between one group of 
people who denied Jesus and another who exaggerated his status.687   
                                                        
 
685 Robert Simon, “Natural History of Sin: Remarks on the Origins of Sin in Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam,” in Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 56: 1 (2003), 24. See 1 Cor 2:6-8 “Yet 
among the mature we do impart wisdom, although it is not a wisdom of this age or of the rulers of this age 
who are doomed to pass away. But we impart a secret and hidden wisdom of God, which God decreed 
before the ages for our glorification. None of the rulers of this age understood this; for if they had, they 
would not have crucified the Lord of glory.” Romans 1:16,, “For I am not ashamed of the gospel: it is the 
power of God for salvation to everyone who has faith, to the Jew first and also the Greek;” and Romans 
3:22-24, “Since all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God, they are justified by his grace as a gift, 
through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus.” 
686 Mahmoud Ayoub, “Toward an Islamic Christology: An Image of Jesus in Early Shi’i Muslim 
Literature,” in The Muslim World LXVI:3 (July 1976), 167.  
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 It also crucial to mention that Jesus is not just simply tolerated or appreciated by 
Muslims, but rather belief in Jesus is an essential part of Muslim faith. The shahada, or 
the Muslim profession of faith, is the first of the five pillars of Islam.688  When 
proclaiming the shahada, a Muslim says the words, “I testify that there is no deity but 
Allah, and I testify that Muhammad is Allah’s Messenger.” However, it is often not 
acknowledged that the shahada includes the belief in Jesus and in all of the pre-Islamic 
prophets.689 For Muslims, the message of Jesus was nothing but the true religion of Islam. 
The real spirit of both the Torah and the Gospels is tawhid, the oneness of God.  
In the Quran, Jesus is presented as one of the signs of the Final Hour, or the Hour 
of Judgment. The Quran speaks to the role of the prophets as heralds of the path of God, 
although it is strictly God alone who can bestow eternal salvation. However, Jesus, 
Muhammad, and the other prophets can act as intercessors, pleading to God for the 
salvation of others on their behalf.690 In many ways, the Muslim view of Jesus is similar, 
though not identical to, the Catholic view of saintly intercession. 
Evaluating Schillebeeckx’s claim that Islam and Christianity approach suffering 
differently is a complicated task. Due to Islam’s focus on God’s omnipotence, 
Schillebeeckx insists that for Islam, everything must be under God’s control and 
therefore, suffering can be explained one of two ways: either as a punishment for some 
sort of wrongdoing or as a test of faith. Schillebeeckx’s contrasted this position with 
                                                        
 
688 The five pillars of Islam are 1) shahada 2) salat, performing ritual prayers five times a day 3) zakat, 
giving alms to the poor and needy 4) sawm, fasting during the month of Ramadan 5) hajj, making a 
pilgrimage to Mecca, if possible, at least once during one’s lifetime. 
689 Saritoprak,15.  
690 Saritoprak, 51. It is important to note that some Muslims completely reject any notion of intercession, as 
it gives too much power to human actions. Among these are the Mu’tazalites.  
 
 231 
Christianity, which, he claims, makes suffering a problem for God’s love, rather than 
God’s omnipotence. However, clearly, the theme of suffering as punishment for sin or 
suffering as a test of the strength of one’s devotion to God is repeatedly found in both the 
Bible and Christian theology, although some, but certainly not all, contemporary 
theologians have taken issue with such explanations for suffering. According to 
Schillebeeckx, there is too much suffering in the world to ever be able to make sense of 
it, and thus, there is no way to answer the theodicy question.691 
In Islam, human beings are regarded as the “vicegerents of God.” In Arabic, the 
word for worship, ibadah, also means service. Therefore, to worship God means to serve 
God, and this service to God entails care for humanity, especially the poor and 
marginalized.692 In general, the Sunni tradition of Islam encourages Muslims to make the 
world a more peaceful place, and thus, to prevent the Final Hour from arriving 
prematurely.”693 Furthermore, as will be discussed more thoroughly in the next chapter, 
the existence of feminism in Islam speaks to the fact that Islam does not passively accept 
suffering or the status quo. Schillebeeckx wisely points out that what may be interpreted 
as a lack of “critique of society” on the part of Islam may actually be a critique by Islam 
of the West. Western society often views itself as the harbinger of liberation for all, 
when, in reality, oppressions of all kinds remain, although we may not always be 
conscious of them. 
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Finally, Schillebeeckx remarks that Christianity does not really have an ethics, 
while Islam does. This statement does not mean that there is no such thing as “Christian 
ethics” whether as a branch of study, or a certain set of moral principles that Christians 
profess to live by. The Beatitudes found in Matthew and Luke’s Gospels, and The 
Parable of the Last Judgment in Matthew 25 both are both said to represent guidelines for 
Christian morality. However, there is an element of truth to Schillebeeckx’s comments, 
which stems from the differences in the origins of both traditions, and how their sacred 
texts are understood.   
In Robert Simon’s view, Christianity can be said to have two phases. It started 
with a prophetic movement of Jesus’s followers, resented by Judaism, that moved out 
into incorporating Gentiles. However, in the fourth century, as the Roman persecution of 
Christianity ended and Christianity became the official religion of the Empire, it became 
“sacramental, ritualized, and hierarchized,” shaped after the model of the imperial Roman 
Empire, imbued with this-worldly ambitions.694 Jesus had never assumed political 
leadership in this movement. He was not the head of a state or institutional organization. 
In the Gospels, we do not find a set of specific institutional guidelines laid out by Jesus 
himself for all of his followers.695 Rather, the communities worked out particular issues 
as they arose within the early Church. In fact, the most commonly quoted saying of Jesus 
with regard to politics is, “Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s; 
and unto God the things which are God’s.”696 This verse is often interpreted to mean that 
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church and state should be separate, but what exactly a separation of church and state 
means in still being worked out in contemporary American and European politics.  
Islam also emerged as a prophetic movement and was seen as a direct threat to the 
religious, social, political, and economic structure of the society in which it first 
appeared. Muhammad’s message was an affront to the polytheistic tribal leaders of 
Mecca who gained enormous economic benefit from regular religious practices and 
festivals, and a rigid, male-dominated social structure.697 However, unlike Jesus who 
eventually met his death right outside the walls of Jerusalem, Muhammad fled from his 
persecutors in Mecca. In 622, he established the first Islamic ummah, or community, in 
Medina. In Medina, Muhammad became the leader of a new religious-political 
government. He actually oversaw the functions of the state, appointing judges and 
military commanders, and negotiating treaties.698 The framework for this society was 
centered around the ummah, a community bound by the religious faith and commitment 
of Muslims. The authority for this new approach to religion and politics rested on the 
Quran and after Muhammad’s death in 632, both the Quran, and the sayings and actions 
                                                        
 
697 In particular, the Meccan leaders were threatened by radical monotheism, the declaration that all are 
equal before God, the prohibition of female infanticide, which was highly practiced in seventh century 
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of Muhammad. By contrast, the early Christian community began to form many years 
prior to the composition of the Gospels. These disciples, who worshipped together in 
house-churches and were faced with the threat of persecution, had nothing akin to a 
“Christian state” in the way that Medina can be called an “Islamic state.” St. Paul and his 
followers were religious leaders, not political ones.  
The Quran, in Islam, can be viewed not simply as the particular revelation of God 
to a particular people at a particular time, but “an unparalleled window into the moral 
tradition.”699 In Islam, a process that eventually became known as fiqh describes a 
movement from the roots of revelation to specific determinations or judgments of what 
actually constitutes divine law. The Quran is considered the first and most important 
basis of fiqh. As Islamic ethicist A. Kevin Reinhart explains, the Quran is a source of 
knowledge in the way the entire corpus of legal precedent is the for the common law 
tradition. The Quran, is “not so much an index of possible rulings as a quarry in which 
the astute inquirer can hope to find the building blocks for a morally valid, and therefore 
true, system of ethics.”700 By the fourth century, it was generally acknowledged that the 
Sunnah of the Prophet formed the second source of fiqh.701 The Sunnah is the verbally 
transmitted reports (hadith) of the Prophet’s words and actions. The Sunnah is generally 
considered to be the standard used to by Muslims to interpret the Quran. Given that only 
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 235 
God is absolute, fiqh knowledge is considered suppositional rather than certain. However, 
because fiqh knowledge is held to be guaranteed by sources which are of God, it has the 
same imperative status as a direct command from God above and can therefore be labeled 
as “truth.”702  
In summary, one can say that revelation in the Quran is interpreted through the 
medium of the Sunnah to mark the contents of shariah, or Islamic law.703 The term 
Shariah signifies “a highway along which to travel in order to lead the moral life.” The 
statutes and ordinances of Islamic law are the result of entry (shar’) by God into the 
world in order to provide a means (shariah) to Him.704 Judaism, therefore, is much closer 
to Islam than is Christianity in terms of laws and practices.705 The centrality of shariah as 
a path to God differs from St. Paul’s treatment of the law of Moses. Paul did not outright 
reject the Law, but held that it has been fulfilled by the arrival of Jesus. According to 
Paul, the Law and its keeping can lead only to a certain knowledge of sin, but it does not 
necessarily lead one to salvation.706 For Christians, there is no law that is considered a 
“path to God” in the same way the shariah functions for Muslims.  
Due to their different histories and ways of viewing their sacred texts, Christianity 
cannot be considered as having its own particular ethics in the same way Islam can. 
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Islamic ethics and Islam appear simultaneously, whereas for Christianity, what can be 
properly called “Christian ethics” did not arise with Jesus’ ministry, nor with the 
composition of the New Testament, but from the work of theologians inspired by these 
two sources. Nevertheless, the difference between Christianity and Islam, and their 
respective relationships to ethics are not as stark as one may at first perceive them to be.  
For example, it would be rash to declare that Christianity is inherently more 
flexible because it lacks a system like shariah. According to many Muslims, the shariah 
is not exempt from the need to be re-thought in ever changing circumstances and 
historical contexts. According to Abdullahi An-Naim, the shariah is “not the whole of 
Islam” but “an interpretation of its fundamental sources as understood in a particular 
context.”707 Thus, it may embody “medieval principles of reason and objects of public 
good [that] may no longer be valid today.”708 The Quran may be called divine speech, but 
there remains a distinction between the divine speech and its earthly realization.709  
Furthermore, Islam is not necessarily opposed to the notion that ethics and 
religion are independent to a certain degree, though most Muslims, along with 
Schillebeeckx, would not consent to the claim that ethics is done just as well without 
religion. According to Tariq Ramadan, the message of the Prophet Muhammad, or as 
Muslims would say, “the last message,” brings “nothing new to the affirmation of the 
principles of human dignity, justice, and equality: it merely recalls and confirms them.” 
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The Prophet did not conceive the content of his message as the expression of pure 
otherness in contrast to what other societies of his time were saying or what had been said 
in the past.710  
Prior to the revelation of the Quran, Muhammad participated in an alliance known 
as the Pact of the Virtuous, which was contracted at the home of Abdullah ibn Judan, 
chief of the Taym tribe. This alliance sought to place respect for the oppressed over 
considerations of kinship and political power in order to put an end to conflicts between 
the Meccan tribes. Yet, even after the period of revelation began, Muhammad 
remembered the pact, accepted it, and would not have hesitated to participate in it again, 
even as a Muslim.711 In this way, we can say the both the Jesus and Prophet Muhammad 
shared and responded to their experience of the humanum as threatened and damaged.  
Furthermore, while the Quran is the consummation of all previous revelation, the 
Quran is not considered to be the first or only instance of God’s communication with 
humankind. Revelation is not confined to any particular group or time period.712 Just as 
Schillebeeckx and the Roman Catholic tradition assert that revelation was occurring prior 
to the incarnation of Jesus in history, particularly, in the form of the Old Testament, Islam 
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the prophets, so they could be the teachers of humankind. Revelation in this specific and explicit sense was 




also affirms that revelation occurred prior to the Quran. The Quran says that there were 
never any people without a warner [prophet] living among them.713 For every people, 
God assigned a religious path to follow.714 The Islamic tradition, therefore, is no less 
capable than the Catholic tradition of recognizing cooperation with religious others as a 
not only a necessity for keeping the peace in the modern world, but as a religious duty.  
 Islam also lacks a centralizing authority figure akin to the papacy in Catholicism. 
Although one may argue that not all Catholics act in obedience to the Pope, and in fact, 
many flat out disagree with him on certain topics, the papacy at least has “symbolic 
spiritual authority.” Since all Catholics are technically under the authority of the pope, 
Catholic statements have an “official” character, which makes them more easily 
enforceable and generates “a remarkable global homogenization of Catholic culture.”715 
According to political scientist Michael Driessen, this can make negotiations with 
Catholic hierarchy easier. If a deal is reached with the pope, one can rest assured that the 
bishops and the faithful will rally around that decision, whereas the decentralization of 
authority in Islam “makes negotiations messier, involving more personalities and 
                                                        
 
713 Quran 35:24, “Indeed, we have sent you with the truth as a bringer of good tidings and a warner. And 
there is no nation but that there had passed within it a warner.” 
714 Quran 5:48, “And We have revealed to you, [O Muhammad], the Book in truth, confirming that which 
preceded it of the Scripture and as a criterion over it. So judge between them by what Allah has revealed 
and do not follow their inclinations away from what has come to you of the truth. To each of you We 
prescribed a law and a method. Had Allah willed, He would have made you one nation [united in religion], 
but [He intended] to test you in what He has given you; so race to [all that is] good. To Allah is your return 
all together, and He will [then] inform you concerning that over which you used to differ.” Quran 22:34, 
“And for all religion We have appointed a rite that they may make mention of what He has provided them 
of animals. For your go is one God, so to him submit. And, give good tidings to the humble.”  
 
715 Jose Casanova, “Catholic and Muslim Politics in Comparative Perspective,” in Taiwan Journal of 
Democracy 1:2 (2005), 98.  
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ideas.”716 This leaves more room for fear and skepticism, as one cannot exactly pinpoint 
“where Islam stands” or “what Islam says.” Nevertheless, this decentralization can also 
ease negotiations with political leaders as it makes it less difficult for Muslims to “adapt 
to new political environments” and “to support a greater pluralism of ideas and allow new 
ideas to ascend in importance more quickly.” The rigid centralization of authority in 
Catholicism, on the other hand, makes it easier for the pope to “remain personally 
obdurate to new political principles over greater lengths of time.”717 Individual Catholics 
can preach about their support for LGBT rights and women’s ordination, and make 
legitimate theological arguments for doing so, but they are always faced with the fact that 
“official” Catholic teaching says something different.  
` Finally, although Schillebeeckx spoke about the split between Sunni and Shi’a, 
his brief reflection does not even come close to expressing the amount of diversity that 
exists within in Islam, a diversity that is much greater than the internal differences among 
Catholics. No matter how much studying a person can do, it is impossible to know and 
understand a religious tradition completely, even one’s own tradition. Thus, for example, 
when Catholic and a Muslim engage one another, their engagement is with a particular 
Catholic and a particular Muslim, who may expand upon, confirm, or even contradict 
one’s original beliefs about that tradition. Furthermore, as I will explore in the next 
chapter, others markers of identity, such as race, gender, location, socioeconomic status, 
etc. often shape how one interprets and practices his or her religion.  
                                                        
 
716 Michael Driessen, Religious Democracy and Civilizational Politics: Comparing Political Islam and 
Political Catholicism (Washington DC: Center for International and Regional Studies Georgetown 
University, 2013), 26.  
717 Driessen, 26.  
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E. Dialogue with the Criterion of the Threatened Humanum: How two Religions 
Can Make Absolute Claims and Still Find Fragments of Salvation Through Their 
Interaction with One Another 
The existence of many similarities between two religions does not necessarily 
increase the likelihood of dialogue or peace between them. In fact, the more alike two 
religions are, the more threatening they may become to another, making them more prone 
to attack the other in an effort to accentuate the significance of their differences. This is 
not to say that mutual likenesses are always the cause of violence. On the contrary, they 
may also serve to foster compromise and understanding, as well as stimulate cooperation 
toward shared goals.  
Naturally, then, differences are not an automatic cause of strife. Obvious 
differences can actually make the religious other appear far less threatening, namely 
because such dissimilarities easily mark the other off as “other.” This may explain why 
Muslim-Christian relations are a much more controversial issue than, for instance, 
Christian-Buddhist relations. Muslims and Christians can easily say that one another has 
corrupted God’s true revelation, but Christianity and Buddhism have such disparate 
views of Ultimate Reality that such a claim would not begin to even make sense. When 
differences are not perceived as ominous, they may be more easily welcomed by both 
sides as a source of fascination and potential new knowledge. Of course, this is certainly 
not always the case. As many pluralist theologians have pointed out, the differences 
between religions have often led to a desire to rank them, and with this, a tendency to 
render one’s own tradition superior to such a degree that one need not listen to anyone 
else. However, given that both differences and similarities have the potential to lead to 
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both productivity and hostility, it does not make sense to offer the eradication of 
difference as a solution to religious animosity. Also, asking persons to not view their own 
personally held religious tradition as the best or most complete is impractical in many 
circumstances. In fact, such a solution, especially if applied to the relationship between 
Christianity and Islam, only exacerbates the problem. 
As can be gleaned from the information provided so far in this chapter, 
Christianity and Islam have many similarities. Both are monotheistic prophetic traditions 
that stress a personal relationship between God and humanity. Through further study of 
each tradition and through the experience of dialogue and theological exchange between 
members of both traditions, more areas of mutual agreement have been found than 
previously thought to exist. However, there is no denying both traditions make absolute 
claims. Certain beliefs, unless drastically altered, will always conflict with and even 
contradict one another.   
Christians believe that Jesus is God incarnate, fully human and fully divine. In 
Chapter One, I categorized Schillebeeckx as an inclusivist since Schillebeeckx affirmed 
the absolute uniqueness of Jesus Christ in the history of religions. Jesus, for 
Schillebeeckx, is not one mere incarnation among many, or just another intermediary 
between God and humanity. But, rather as “God’s unequivocal yes to humankind,” Jesus 
is “the one, the definitive eschatological revelation.”718  When speaking about Jesus, 
Schillebeeckx retained the three terms rejected by pluralist Paul Knitter: full, 
final/definitive, and unsurpassable.  
                                                        
 
718 Schillebeeckx, God is New Each Moment (New York: Continuum, 1983), 26-27. 
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Schillebeeckx’s vision of Jesus is one that clearly clashes with certain Islamic 
beliefs. For Islam, Muhammad is the Final Prophet, the revelation that surpasses and 
fulfills all others. In John’s Gospel, Jesus tells his disciples, “I will ask the Father, and he 
will give you another Advocate to be with you always.”719  Christians believe the 
Advocate refers to the Holy Spirit and points to the concept of a triune God.  Muslims 
believe that the Advocate refers to the Prophet Muhammad, and that Jesus was clearly 
foretelling the coming of Islam.720  The Christian ascription of divinity to Jesus is not a 
mere difference of opinion, but for Muslims, a violation of tawhid, God’s oneness and 
absolute sovereignty. The Quran, in rejection of a Trinitarian notion of God, states, 
“Indeed, Allah is but one God. Exalted is He above having a son.”721 Quran 5:116 
illustrates the following exchange in which Jesus himself denies the idea that divinity 
should be attributed to him: 
And [beware the Day] when Allah will say, "O Jesus, Son of Mary, did you say to the 
people, 'Take me and my mother as deities besides Allah ?'" He will say, "Exalted are 
You! It was not for me to say that to which I have no right. If I had said it, You would 
have known it. You know what is within myself, and I do not know what is within 
Yourself. Indeed, it is You who is Knower of the unseen.” 
 
If Jesus is not divine, Muslims cannot concur with Schillebeeckx that Jesus is the 
guarantor of eschatological salvation. For Islam, prophets like Jesus and Muhammad, 
convey the message of God’s salvation, but only God can truly give salvation. Islam does 
not merely deny the significance of Jesus’ crucifixion and resurrection, but explicitly 
claims that these events did not even happen. Yet, the resurrection of Jesus, regardless of 
                                                        
 
719 John 14:16 
720 Saritoprak, 4.  
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whether one affirms that Jesus’ appearances to the disciples after his death were bodily 
and literal, or spiritual and mystical, is central to Christian belief and practice.  
In Chapter One, I reviewed the positions of Christian theologians who tried to 
minimize disagreement by shifting their understanding of Jesus. Catholic Paul Knitter 
drops the terms full, final/definitive, and unsurpassable when speaking of Jesus. He 
insists that titles such as Son of God, Savior, and Word of God, are mere “love language” 
rather than conveyers of truth about the status of Jesus. Catholic theologian Roger Haight 
describes Jesus as the “symbol of God” who is the “mediation of God’s presence to 
Christianity,” but not the completion of other religions.722 Both theologians affirm that 
other religious figures, such as Muhammad or Buddha, can be considered to be on the 
same level as Jesus.723 This creates a multitude of problems for interreligious dialogue. 
First of all, many Christian theologians, including Schillebeeckx, are not able to 
assent to such pluralist claims. Second, such pluralist theologies would not necessarily be 
accepted or appreciated by Muslims. The problem that Islam has with Christian theology 
is not so much that it ranks Jesus higher than Muhammad, but that it considers Jesus to be 
divine, which, to Muslims, is a clear violation of tawhid, or the oneness of God. This is 
the reason many Muslims find it insulting to be referred to as “Mohammedans.” It 
implies that they worship and divinize the Prophet Muhammad in the same way 
Christians worship and praise Jesus Christ. Muslims reject any ascription of divinity to 
                                                        
 
722 Haight, Jesus Symbol of God (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1999), 338.  
723 See Haight, The Future of Christology  (New York: Continuum, 2005), 192-93 and Knitter, Without 
Buddha I Could Not Be A Christian (London: Oneworld, 2009), 125.  
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the Prophet, even if he is considered the most perfect of all human beings.724 This also 
explains why the Islam forbids statues, monuments, or icons of the Prophet, since these 
could easily lead to worship. Saying Muhammad is a saving figure “on the same level” as 
Jesus Christ is offensive to Muslim beliefs and distorts Islam’s true teachings.  
Christian philosopher and theologian John Hick goes further than Knitter and 
Haight in holding a pluralist position. According to Hick, Christians must leave the 
language of the Council of Nicea and the Council of Chalcedon behind.725 The 
incarnation, instead of the notion that God became flesh in Jesus Christ, takes on a 
metaphorical meaning in Hick’s theology. Jesus is Christianity’s supreme teacher and 
inspirer, but he is not divine. Divine incarnation is no longer defined solely by the birth of 
Christ, but is seen as “taking place wherever and whenever God’s will is done.” Thus, for 
Hick, Christian worship should be directed to God instead of Jesus.726  
                                                        
 
724 According to Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Muhammad was protected from error by God. Many Shi’a Muslims 
understand Muhammad’s inerrancy in the sense that his very substance of his being was immune from sin. 
See Nasr, Muhammad: Man of God, 71-72. Tariq Ramadan states that the Prophet “is a model for Muslims 
not only through the excellence of his behavior but also through the weaknesses of his humanity revealed 
and mentioned by the Quran.” In one passage of the Quran, the Prophet is actually chastised by God for his 
behavior. When trying to convey the message of Islam to a tribal chief named Walid, the Prophet was 
interrupted by a blind man and quickly became agitated as this blocked him from presenting his case to the 
chief. The following verses (Quran 80:1-12) were revealed: “In the name of God, Most Gracious, Most 
Merciful, He [the Prophet], frowned and turned away, because the blind man came t him. But could you tell 
but that perhaps he might grow in purity? Or that he might receive admonition, and the reminder might 
profit him? As to one who regards himself as self-sufficient, you attend to him, though it is no blame to you 
if he does not grow in purity. But as to he who came to you striving earnestly, with fear, of him you were 
unmindful. By no means [should it be so]! For it is indeed a message of remembrance. Therefore let who 
will, keep it in remembrance!” See Tariq Ramadan, In the Footsteps of the Prophet: Lessons from the Life 
of Muhammad (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 48-49.  
725 At the first Council of Nicaea in AD 325, Jesus was identified as God incarnate, the Second Person of 
Trinity, equal and consubstantial with the Father.  In 451, at the Council of Chalcedon, Jesus was 
confirmed as having two natures, human and divine. 
726 John Hick, A Christian Theology of Religions (Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 1995), 136.  
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Still, even Hick’s pluralist Christianity would not erase conflicts with Islam. Hick 
indicates that his vision of Jesus differs from the Quran on two major points. First, he 
rejects the virginal conception of Jesus by Mary, which is attested to in the Quran, as well 
as the Gospels of Matthew and Luke.727 Second, he affirms, against the Quran’s denial of 
the event, that the crucifixion of Jesus took place, although he still does not believe Jesus’ 
resurrection was a bodily event, nor that his death was necessary for the atonement of 
human sin. Here, Hick uses Christian standards in his rejection of the Quranic account of 
these events. With regard to the miraculous birth of Jesus, he accepts that by doubting its 
historicity, he is following the opinion of many New Testament scholars who 
acknowledge that the story has a meager basis in the New Testament and that many 
miraculous birth stories surround great figures in the ancient world. With regard to the 
crucifixion, Hick refers to historical evidence both in the New Testament and in 
references by the Jewish historian Josephus and the Roman historian Tacitus.728 While 
Hick gives an accurate assessment of current trends in New Testament scholarship, he 
nonetheless shows how one cannot so easily give up their own religious tradition as a 
frame of reference when considering certain claims. If even Hick cannot seem to place 
biblical criticism on the same level as Quranic exegesis, it shows that a pluralism that 
radically declares all religions to be entirely equal is neither a realistic nor a desirable 
goal if one wishes the maintain the integrity of individual religious beliefs.  
                                                        
 
727 Quran 21:91 says of Mary, “And [mention], the one who guarded her chastity, so We blew into her 
[garment] through our angel Gabriel, and we made her and her son a sign for the worlds.” The virginal 
conception of Jesus is found in the New Testament in Matthew 1:18 and Luke 1:25.  
728 John Hick, Islam and Christianity (lecture to Iranian Institute of Philosophy, Tehran, 2005), 14-15.   
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The rationale behind the call for religious pluralism is a desire to end appeals to 
religious others to convert to one’s own tradition. Certainly, ending proselytizing 
attempts that are coercive or violent is a noble and necessary objective in order to foster 
peaceful co-existence between religions. However, pluralism still insists that religious 
others undergo a conversion, a conversion to the pluralist position. Hick states, “I believe 
in time mainstream Christianity will come to see itself, not as the one and only true faith, 
but as one among a plurality of true faiths…. And I venture to hope that an equivalent 
long-term development is also taking place in Islam.”729  In an earlier work, Hick 
expressed his desire that 
the Muslim world will eventually find its own Quranic way of combining modern 
knowledge with its faith in the Transcendent and its commitment to a morality of human 
community. And we may further hope that this development will also include an 
increased recognition of the ecumenical point of view that has been so powerfully 
expressed within the Sufi strand of Islam.730 
 
 Muslim philosopher Hajj Muhammad Legenhausen731 states that Hick’s remarks 
are not only patronizing toward Muslims, but they also grossly misrepresent Sufism.732 
Legenhausen points out the Hick is fond of citing the words of Sufi mystic and poet Jalal 
al-Din Rumi, “The lamps are different but the Light is the same.” It is true that for many 
Sufis, religious differences are considered exterior differences, while the interior core of 
                                                        
 
729 Hick, Islam and Christianity, 17.  
730 John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent, Second Edition (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 378.  
731 Legenhausen was raised Catholic and converted to Islam in his adult life. He is currently a professor of 
Philosophy at the Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute in Qom, Iran.  
732 Sufism, briefly defined, is not so much an Islamic sect as a mystical way of approaching the Islamic 
faith. It is commonly described as “mystical Islamic belief and practice in which Muslims seek to find the 
truth of divine love and knowledge through direct personal experience of God.” See Shamim Akhter, Faith 
& Philosophy of Islam (Delhi: Kalpaz Publications, 2009).  
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all religions is the same. This, however, does not mean Rumi was the religious pluralist 
Hick claims him to have been.  
The Sufi way of life is called a tariqah or “path,” with the goal of the path being 
fana, or the total annihilation of the self in recognition that God is one. According to 
Legenhausen, the vast majority of Sufis have affirmed that there is no tariqah without 
shariah. In other words, “there is no way to the interior except through the exterior and 
the exterior required in the current age is that of Islam.”733 All religions have divine 
light,734 but this does not mean that which religion we choose to follow today is of little 
consequence, or that one’s choice of religion is merely a matter of personal taste or 
preference. Even the twelfth century Sufi mystic and philosopher, Ibn Arabi, who 
expressed that God’s truth can find expression in different religions and who spoke 
eloquently of Jesus735 and his mother Mary as prophetic figures, also stressed that it is 
incumbent upon people in the present age to follow the shariah brought by Muhammad. 
He stated: 
All the revealed religions are lights. Among these religions, the revealed 
religion of Muhammad is like the light of the sun among the lights of the stars. 
When the sun appears, the lights of the stars are hidden, and their lights are 
                                                        
 
733 Hajj Legenhausen, “A Muslim’s Proposal: Non-Reductive Religious Pluralism,” in Originalbeitrag für 
den Leseraum (January 1, 2006), 15-16.  
734 The Quran attests to the divine light found in the three prophetic religions. Quran 5:44-5:48- “Indeed, 
we sent down the Torah, in which was guidance and light… And We sent, following in their footsteps, 
Jesus, the son of Mary, confirming that which came before him in the Torah, and gave him the Gospel, in 
which was guidance and light and confirming that which preceded it in the Torah as guidance and 
instruction for the righteous….And We revealed to you, O Muhammad, the Book in truth, confirming that 
which preceded it of the Scripture and as a criterion over it.  
735 In the Ibn Arabi’s al-Futuhat al-Makkiyan (Meccan Revelations), his first encounter with the Unseen 
World takes place at the hands of Jesus. See Meccan Revelations, ed. Michel Chodkiewicx, trans. William 
Chittick and James Morris (New York: Pir Press, 2002), 169-80. In his other major work, Fusus al-Hikam 
(Wisdom of the Prophets), Ibn Arabi entitles a chapter “From the Wisdom of the Prophecy in the Word of 
Jesus.” See The Wisdom of the Prophets, trans by Titus Burckhardt and Angela Culme-Seymour (Beshara 
Publications, 1975), 68-82. 
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included in the light of the sun. Their being hidden is like the abrogation of the 
other revealed religions: that takes place through Muhammad’s revealed religion. 
Nevertheless, they do in fact exist, just as the existence of the light of the stars is 
actualized. This explains why we have been required in our all-inclusive religion 
to have faith in the truth of all messengers and all the revealed religions. They are 
not rendered null by abrogation- that is the opinion of the ignorant.”736 
 
Just as most Christians affirm the revelation of God in Jesus Christ to be full, 
definitive, and unsurpassable, Islam, likewise, states that all previous religions are 
brought to fulfillment with the revelation of the Quran. Whatever is necessary from the 
other traditions has been incorporated into God’s final revelation in the Quran. However, 
this does not mean other religions are worthless, since Islam can and does still learn from 
and cooperate with other traditions. 
If religions are to regard one another’s adherents as intellectual equals and equals 
in human dignity, room must be made for disagreement and for the possibility that one 
may view his or her religion as the best, or most true. Engagement with disparate 
religious beliefs leads to the acknowledgment that one’s own religious perspective, even 
if one regards it to be the most unique or most complete is, nonetheless, not the only 
possible or rational point of view. Religious pluralism prompts us to recall, with 
Schillebeeckx, that “human insight never exhausts the truth and always leaves a remnant 
of strangeness and obscurity.”737  The absolute claims made by one tradition, instead of a 
source of violence, can serve as a productive challenge for religious others. Islam’s 
                                                        
 
736 Futuhat, III, 153. 12, translated in William Chittick, Imaginal Worlds: Ibn al-Arabi and the Problem of 
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rejection of Jesus’ divinity may serve as a powerful reminder to Christians, who all too 
often neglect the study of the historical Jesus in favor of focusing on the Christ of faith, 
of Jesus’ full humanity. The Christian devotion to Jesus and a Trinitarian God can remind 
Muslims of the immanence and intimacy of God. The Christian does not have to deny 
Jesus’ divinity nor does the Muslim have to deny the finality of God’s revelation, but 
they can both come to understand and appreciate why the other believes differently, while 
still preferring their own perspective. 
 Encountering conflicting religious beliefs can also encourage powerful reflection 
upon why we believe the way we do. A Christian in dialogue with Islam may be 
motivated to explore why he or she holds a Trinitarian conception of God, or considers 
Jesus to be the savior of all humankind. A Muslim, likewise, may be driven to a personal 
meditation on why Muhammad is God’s final prophet, or why he or she chooses to 
follow the shariah of Islam is his or her everyday life. Such ruminations show individual 
believers how fragments of salvation can be found through the engagement with other 
traditions, while still maintaining that one’s own tradition is the best or most complete 
path to eschatological salvation. Appreciation for religious others, furthermore, reinforces 
how salvation is a dynamic concept. The humanum is the concept of human wholeness, 
which includes all of humanity, not simply one religion or culture. Our definition of 
human wholeness, therefore, must encompass the well- being of those who believe 
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differently than we do, and include the ability of religious others to meaningfully practice 
their tradition and share its wisdom with others.738   
F. Conclusion 
 
 Interreligious dialogue, need not, as many may fear, lead to an acceptance of 
everything in the name of toleration. Rather, dialogue must always be done with a sense 
of responsibility, namely to the threatened humanum. Schillebeeckx’s concept of the 
humanum, as a term that can never be fully defined at any one period, provides a 
common starting point for the formation of ethical values and norms. However, a shared 
commitment to the humanum is not incompatible with belief in and devotion to particular 
religious traditions that, at times, may conflict with one another. Using the example of 
Islam and Christianity, I attempted in this chapter to show how absolute claims need not 
lead to violence, while pluralist efforts to eradicate such claims do often become violent 
and exclusive. In fact, dealing with and learning from religious differences and even 
disagreements can be fruitful for both traditions, prompting self-reflection that enables 
Muslims and Christians to ultimately become better followers of their respective 
traditions in today’s world. Religion and ethics, although independent, are interrelated 
and religious faith is not irrelevant for one’s ethical practice. Therefore, one must be able 
to maintain, as Schillebeeckx does with respect to Christianity, and many Muslims do 
with regard to Islam, that one’s own tradition is the best path toward eschatological 
                                                        
 
738 This would, of course, exclude religious talk or practice that explicitly causes physical or emotional 
harm to others. According to Schillebeeckx, all religions must be held to the criterion of the threatened 
humanum. That which harms human wholeness or integrity cannot be considered a valid religious 
interpretation. For example, a religion “that sends the eldest son to death is certainly not of the same value 
as a religion that expressly forbids it.”738 See Schillebeeckx, “The Religious and the Human Ecumene,” 
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salvation. Schillebeeckx’s inclusivist soteriology lets religions keep what serves as the 
vital source of their hope, while enabling Christians to see fragments of salvation in 
practices and teachings that are found in other religions, and are not specifically 
Christian.   
In the next chapter, I will focus on how forcing dialogue partners to give up the 
absolute claims made by their respective traditions may have negative implications in the 
area of social justice. I will concentrate more specifically on the implications of 
Schillebeeckx’s soteriology and his inclusivist position for dialogue between Muslim and 







PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS: SCHILLLEBEECKX’S SOTERIOLOGY AND 
 
 DIALOGUE BETWEEN MUSLIM AND CATHOLIC WOMEN 
 
Chapter Four traced Schillebeeckx’s development of the concept of the humanum 
throughout his theological career. Influenced by Ernst Bloch and Paul Ricoeur, the 
humanum is a term used to express the not-yet-seen fulfillment of all that it means to be 
human and the articulation of the promise of humanity’s positive potential.739 There is no 
universal agreement about what exactly constitutes the humanum, but in Schillebeeckx’s 
estimation, all cultures and religions share the universal experience of the humanum as 
being threatened and damaged. This concept, I argued, has the potential to serve as the 
motivation and criterion for interreligious dialogue because it allows for an understanding 
of human wholeness that is not static, but one that is constantly developing in response to 
new experiences. It also does not require that different religions explain away doctrinal 
disagreements in order to engage with one another. In the last half of the chapter, I 
referred to Muslim-Christian dialogue as an example of one area where Schillebeeckx’s 
concept of the humanum may be particularly helpful. Because Islam and Christianity both 
make absolute claims that conflict with beliefs held by persons outside of their adherents, 
an inclusivist position that insists upon the necessity of dialogue and learning across 
religious boundaries without simultaneously trying to explain away their differences is 
essential in seeking the humanum.   
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In this chapter, I focus on a more specific example of the threatened humanum in 
order to illustrate the suitability of Schillebeeckx’s soteriology as a resource for 
contemporary interreligious dialogue: the experience of Muslim women and Catholic 
women, two groups who experience marginalization both within their respective religious 
communities and in society as a whole. The implications of women’s subordination, in 
which women are subjected to discrimination, violence, and labeling, due to negative 
stereotypes based on gender identity and expression, is a particularly egregious example 
of how the humanum is currently threatened and damaged. Since in Schillebeeckx’s 
soteriology, salvation is a dynamic concept defined by its opposite, a contemporary 
understanding of salvation must include a response to gender oppression here and now. 
If, as was emphasized in Chapter Three, there is no salvation outside the world, and the 
world is religiously pluralist, responding to suffering in a way that brings about partial 
and fragmentary experiences of salvation in this world requires mutual learning and 
dialogue between persons of various religious beliefs. I contend that this is particularly 
important for Muslim and Catholic women who live under patriarchy. 
In this chapter, I will discuss how feminist theologies have arisen as a response to 
the threatened humanum of women, yet these theologies often repeat many of the same 
exclusive dynamics that have kept women’s experiences from being included in 
theological reflection. Here, I will demonstrate that Christianity alone cannot be 
considered the only valuable resource in responding to the threatened humanum.  I begin 
by examining the ways in which patriarchy has been manifest in both Islam and 
Christianity with regard to four main points: body image, rigid notions of gender roles, 
leadership and authority, and purity standards. Next, I provide five major reasons why 
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dialogue between Muslim women and Catholic women is necessary for responding to the 
myriad ways the humanum of women is threatened in today’s world. In particular, I focus 
on how dialogue with Islam can contribute to a Catholic understanding of the humanum. 
Finally, I reiterate that the adoption of a pluralist position is unnecessary for such 
dialogue to be fruitful.  
A. Feminist Theology As a Response to the Threatened Humanum 
  
 The need for feminist theology, which takes the experience of women as its 
starting point, arises from the fact that women’s experiences have been neglected in 
religious and theological reflection. According to Catholic feminist theologian Rosemary 
Radford Ruether, classical Christian theology, including its codified traditions, are 
androcentric.740 Androcentrism, of course, is not unique to the Christian tradition. 
Buddhist feminist Rita Gross describes religion in general as a “boys-only club,” in 
which women’s presence has often been absent. This is also true, according to Gross, 
with respect to interreligious dialogue.741 Even in so-called secular spaces, women do not 
enjoy many of the same rights and privileges as their male counterparts.    
 As was discussed in Chapter Four, there is no universal vision of the humanum. 
The multiplicity of human experience means there are multiple perspectives on what the 
humanum entails. However, one can make the case that in most visions of the humanum 
articulated throughout history, male experience has been taken to be normative. This is 
seen especially in the use of exclusive language. Even Schillebeeckx, throughout his 
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writings, uses generic terms like “man” and “mankind.” God is often automatically given 
the pronoun He or Him, not only in prayer, worship, and academic writing, but even in 
everyday references to God by those who do not claim to believe in any deity.742  
However, the concept of the humanum, if it is means human flourishing, cannot be 
neglect the experiences of women whose voices have been marginalized throughout 
history. 
 Rosemary Radford Ruether’s articulation of the critical principle of feminist 
theology is similar to Schillebeeckx’s articulation of the humanum. She defines the 
criterion of feminist theology to be “the promotion of the full humanity of women.” This 
means that “whatever denies, diminishes, or distorts the full humanity of women is, 
therefore, appraised as not redemptive.” However, this negative principle implies a 
positive principle; namely, that “what does promote the full humanity of women is of the 
Holy, it does reflect true relation to the divine, it is the true nature of things, the authentic 
message of redemption and the mission of redemptive community.”743 Unfortunately, the 
meaning of this positive principle is not fully known and has not yet existed in our 
history, although partial glimpses of it have been witnessed to, in the protests of women 
concerning what has diminished them and their proposals for a better alternative.  
 The fact that this positive principle remains unrealized also means that even 
among women, there exist many different and even contradictory ideas about what 
women’s flourishing entails. Also, women’s responses to female suffering and 
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subordination have been limited and have, at times, repeated the same dynamics as 
androcentricism. According to Ruether, “any principle of religion or society that 
marginalizes one group of persons as less than fully human diminishes us all.” Thus, 
women cannot affirm their humanity in a way that denigrates the male population. 
Rather, in rejecting androcentrism, women must criticize all forms of chauvinism. No 
group or community can become the norm of humanity.744 The implication is that for 
redemption to take place, the focus cannot only be on the experience of white, 
heterosexual, Western Christian women as if their experiences speak for all women. 
Women’s identities are not shaped solely by gender, but also by other categories, such as 
race, religion, sexual orientation, and socioeconomic status. These identities are not 
easily separable as if women can just switch back and forth between “speaking as a 
woman” and “speaking as a Christian or Muslim” and speaking as an African American, 
or Latin American, or Caucasian.” Rather, these identities intersect. For example, how 
one lives her life as a devout Muslim is likely shaped by one’s experience of being 
female, African American, and heterosexual.  How another woman lives her life as a 
devout Catholic is influenced by her experience as being a lesbian, white, and middle-
class.  
 While I use the framework of Catholic feminist theology to begin this chapter, it 
is clear from Ruether’s articulation that she recognizes that Christian feminist theology’s 
vision of the humanum is neither complete nor the only one that matters.  Feminist 
liberation theology, Ruether avers, “opens up as a human project, not an exclusively 
                                                        
 
744 Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, 20. \ 
 
 257 
Christian project. Re-envisioned Christian symbols can be one cultural resource among 
others in a struggle for liberation that can meet and converge around the world only by 
being authentically rooted in many local contexts.”745 
 Buddhist feminist scholar Rita Gross, whom I discussed in Chapter One, 
criticized feminist theology for its tendency to equate the term “religion” with 
Christianity.746 For Gross, inclusivist perspectives are to blame for this situation, since, 
she claims, inclusivism turns difference into hierarchy and therefore, always implies 
competition and leads to mutual hostility. According to Gross, feminist theology can only 
be done from a pluralist perspective.747 While Gross does make a legitimate claim that 
feminist theology has not adequately recognized the voices of non-Christian religions, I 
argue that adopting a pluralist position does not solve this problem. Using the example of 
Muslim and Catholic women, I intend to show that interreligious dialogue is necessary, 
but dialogue from an inclusivist position, like that of Edward Schillebeeckx, is not only 
more practical, but provides the possibility of a more fruitful and mutual exchange—one 
that respects the difference and uniqueness of the other’s beliefs. I focus on Muslim and 
Catholic women in particular because women in both traditions encounter patriarchal 
beliefs and practices that inhibit their full flourishing. In addition, for many Muslim and 
Catholic women, giving up their faith is not an option and in fact, they often find 
resources within their traditions that promote the humanum of women. While both 
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traditions make absolute claims that come into conflict with one another, I propose that 
this need not prohibit reciprocal learning and appreciation.  
B. The Myth of Christian Exceptionalism: Patriarchy in Islam and Christianity 
 
 As Jacques Dupuis warned, Christians cannot compare what is best in their own 
tradition to what is worst in others.748 Such a double standard is dangerous not only 
because it inhibits the positive appreciation of other religions, but because, as in the case 
of Islam and Christianity, it leads to the acceptance of one form of patriarchy over 
another, rather than the total eradication of patriarchy. In this section, I reflect on the way 
patriarchy is manifest in both Islam and one particular branch of Christianity, Roman 
Catholicism.749 I will concentrate on four main points: 1) body image; 2) rigid notion of 
gender roles/gender complementarity; 3) lack of religious leadership roles for women and 
4) purity standards/male control over women’s bodies. All of these points, I will 
demonstrate, demand attention because they have caused women to suffer and inhibit 
women’s full flourishing. Thus, they illustrate how the humanum is threatened and 
damaged.  
1. Body Image 
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 A quick “Google Images” search reveals some disturbing trends. If one types in 
the words “Muslim woman,” one will find a substantial number of pictures of women in 
full burqas or niqabs.750 The general impression given by the overall results is that 
Muslim women are submissive and supportive of violence both against themselves and 
against the West. This is  evidenced by the presence of weapons in some of the women’s 
hands and the pictures of faces hidden behind cages. Such an impression is repeated in 
related searches for “burqa,” “hijab,” “clothing,” and “abuse.” So also, if one types in the 
words “American woman,” one will find an array of pictures of scantily-clad women in 
sexually provocative poses. Searches for “flag” result in images of women holding the 
American flag while in various sexually suggestive poses, and pictures containing 
statistics comparing the size of a typical woman versus Barbie dolls and models. Most of 
these women are clad in bikinis or tank tops. These results paint a picture of the 
American woman as a sex object who is entirely occupied with the quest for attaining a 
so-called “perfect body.” Clearly, the vast majority of Muslim women and American 
Christian women looking at these photos would say, “These results do not capture me, 
nor most of the woman I know!”  
 Yet, sadly, these pictures do capture certain cultural expectations and stereotypes 
of these women. In some countries in the Muslim world, the practice of veiling is strictly 
enforced.751 Shortly after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, women were required to 
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wear the chador. Failing to do so could result in arrest for inappropriate clothing. 
Mandatory veiling was enforced under the Taliban Regime in Afghanistan in the 1990s 
and early 2000s. Refusal to wear a burqa could result in beatings or imprisonment for 
immodesty.752 In Saudi Arabia, women are required to cover their bodies and don the 
hijab and abaya.753 Often, women feel social pressure to veil, since unveiling can be 
interpreted as a rebellious and indecent act. The veil can be perceived as a way for 
women to ensure they are taken seriously, and that they do not suffer harassment or 
ridicule in public.  
While some women in the Middle East may be at risk for choosing not to veil, 
ironically, in the West, Muslim women experience the opposite problem. The day of the 
Boston Marathon bombing, a friend of mine at Harvard Divinity School was told that she 
should not be out on the street in a hijab in order to protect her safety. Another Muslim 
friend begs her younger sister not to veil because she worries it will provoke violence 
against her. Discrimination and mockery are persistent realities for women who choose to 
veil. As Amina Wadud explains, while the number of tenured Muslim women in U.S. 
academia is already low, it is nearly impossible to find tenured Muslim women in 
hijab.754 A Catholic woman in the West may feel she has more freedom than her Muslim 
sisters, given that in most places, she is no longer required to cover her head in church.755 
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Fatima Mernissi, however, in her article “Size Six: The Western Woman’s Harem,” 
points out that women in the West are not necessarily more free with regard to their 
choice of attire.  
 Mernissi recalls her experience walking into an upscale New York clothing 
boutique and being made to feel ashamed for wearing a size larger than a six. “Deviant 
sizes,” she is told, must be purchased elsewhere. Walking around New York, feeling for 
the first time ever that her hips are a “deformity,” she comes to the conclusion that the 
Western objectification of women’s bodies is much more effective at keeping women 
subservient than “the methods of the Ayatollahs in the East.” In the U.S., Mernissi states, 
“women enter the power game with so much of their energy deflected toward physical 
appearance that one hesitates to say the playing field is level.”756 Interestingly, the United 
States, which has one of the largest numbers of woman in previously male-dominated 
spheres, also has the highest presence of anorexia.757 Approximately 90-95% of those 
diagnosed with anorexia are female.758 
 Unveiled women are often perceived as women who have a “choice” in what they 
wear and how they carry themselves. Yet, these women are, more often than not, 
affected, albeit sometimes unconsciously, by cultural beauty standards which support not 
only the fashion industry, but also the multi-billion-dollar diet industry and pornography 
industry. Scientific studies have shown that body dissatisfaction is correlated with 
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decreases in academic performance, motor skills used in athletics, and ability to take on 
leadership roles, as well as diminished ability to experience sexual pleasure.759  
2. Narrow Roles Pre-Ordained by God: Gender Complementarity 
 A common theme in both Catholic and Muslim thought is “gender 
complementarity,” or the belief in natural, God-given distinctions between males and 
females that prescribe for them certain roles, behaviors, and characteristics. Many who 
adhere to a complementary view of gender do so out of belief that this upholds the 
dignity of both men and women who are “equal but different.” The Egyptian Islamic 
theologian Yusuf al-Qaradawi believes that the different tasks assigned to the two sexes 
are not due to preference by Allah, but to differences in “natural disposition.”760 In his 
view, the Quran assigns guardianship to men by virtue of Surah 4:34, “Men are the 
protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah has made the one of them to excel 
the other because they spend [to support them] from their means.” This verse is 
interpreted to affirm that Allah has delegated the man to be the family provider. A man is 
required to provide his wife with food, clothing, a place to live, and medical treatment. 
Islamic philosopher Seyyed Hossein Nasr adds that this is man’s duty even if his wife is 
economically wealthy.761 In exchange for what he provides for her, “a wife is obliged to 
obey her husband in everything except disobeying Allah.”762 She also bears the 
responsibility of providing a home for her family and bringing up her children properly. 
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“In the home,” writes Nasr, “woman rules as queen and a Muslim man is in a sense the 
guest of his wife at home.”763  At the Istanbul Women’s Conference held November 
2014, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan764 stated that “you cannot place a mother 
breastfeeding her baby on an equal footing with men,” while calling on all women to 
have at least three, but preferably five, children.765  
Pope John Paul II and Pope Benedict XVI were major defenders of gender 
complementarity in the Catholic Church.  In Catholicism, women are often defined by 
their relationships with men. In his 1988 Apostolic Letter, Mulieris Dignitatem (“On the 
Vocation of Women”) John Paul II defined women in terms of motherhood, and named 
virginity and motherhood as “the two dimensions of the female vocation.”766 Women 
who renounce marriage and physical motherhood can practice what he calls “spiritual 
motherhood,” which takes on many different forms, such as “concern for people, 
especially the most needy: the sick, the handicapped, the abandoned, orphans, the elderly, 
children, young people, the imprisoned, and, in general, people on the edges of 
society.”767 Such a narrow understanding of women is disheartening. Some women 
cannot bear children, and do not have the means to adopt. Not all women who are 
childless feel called to join a religious order, or necessarily want to be defined in as 
“spiritual mothers.” In his 1995 Letter to Women, published shortly before the UN’s 
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Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing, John Paul II called for “universal 
recognition of the dignity of women.”768 However, he still considered women to be better 
suited for domestic work and the rearing of children, asserting that “society should create 
and develop conditions favoring work in the home.”769  
The view that women are, by nature, more nurturing and therefore, suited for 
domestic care-taking roles, is found in both Islam and Christianity. Adjectives like 
“nurturing,” “loving,” and “caring” are certainly not negative attributes. However, when 
they are posited as essential characteristics belonging to all women in a greater capacity 
than they belong to men, they can serve to undermine the importance of women’s 
economic independence. In turn, when women are not economically independent, they 
are often less likely to leave an abusive relationship. Furthermore, homes headed by 
women today are more likely to be impoverished than those headed by men. Women 
constitute 70% of the world’s 1.3 billion poorest and own less than one percent of the 
world’s property.770  
3. The Consequence of Complementarity: Lack of Leadership  
 Given the rigidity of “God-given gender roles,” it is no wonder that many Muslim 
women and Catholic women find themselves barred from exercising important public 
leadership positions in their communities. Traditionally, Muslim women are not allowed 
to act as an imam, or public prayer leader, unless the congregation is all female.  
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 While cases vary depending on the mosque and the country, gender segregation 
is a prevalent reality in Muslim prayer services. Some mosques do not even permit 
women to enter. Others have women pray behind a partition that is located either on the 
side of or behind the men, making the women invisible to them. Such a separation, insists 
self-identified Muslim feminist Amina Wadud, also reflects gender disparities through 
which women have limited access to or participation in mosque activities, especially 
decision-making.771 A common justification for gender segregation is summed up by 
Yusuf Al-Qaradawi. Because prayer requires intense concentration, he says, “it does not 
befit a woman, whose structure of physique naturally arouses instincts in men, to lead 
men in prayer and stand in front of them, for this may divert the men’s attention from 
concentrating in the prayer and the spiritual atmosphere required.”772 Women are often 
associated with fitna, or trial/strife. A frequently cited hadith773 quotes the Prophet 
Muhammad as having said, “I have not left to you any fitna greater than women.”774 
According to Wadud, “while some gender discretion in prayer may have been the 
intention, hierarchy is what is exemplified when women pray in the rear or in a place 
invisible to the leader of the prayer.”775 Some mosques have attempted to address the 
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issue by having men and women pray in separate sections, but side by side. Nevertheless, 
these solutions do nothing to challenge the dangerous idea that women are a distraction or 
an impediment to one’s communication with God.  
 In Catholicism, women cannot be ordained. If you walk into a Catholic Church, 
you will never see a woman presiding at Mass. This also means that the Magisterium, the 
official teaching authority of the Catholic Church, which consists of the pope and the 
bishops, is composed entirely of men. Although many Catholic teachings deal directly 
with women (i.e, the Church’s position on divorce and remarriage, artificial 
contraception, and abortion), women have no role in the formulation of Catholic 
teaching.776 While women can now be consultants to a Synod,777 they never have a vote. 
Decision-making power in the Catholic Church belongs solely to the ordained.  
 During the 1960s and 1970s, with the women’s rights movement in full swing, 
calls for admitting women to the priesthood were prominent, and on the eve of the 
Second Vatican Council, a petition was submitted calling for women’s ordination.778 
However, the petition did not get very far. In 1963, Pope John XXIII, who inaugurated 
the Council, died and was succeeded by Paul VI, who was unwilling to expand women’s 
roles. In 1976 the document Inter Insignores, was released by the Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith (CDF) and sought to explain why the Church was not authorized to 
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admit women to priestly ordination in spite of the increasing demand for it. The 
document appealed to the example of Jesus, whom it claimed only chose male Apostles 
and was not influenced by the patriarchal social conditions of his time when doing so. 
The Church, the CDF argued, is not comparable to other kinds of government, since its 
authority is not granted by people’s choice, but by the Holy Spirit. Thus, the admission of 
women to the priesthood cannot be based on appeals to the equality of rights of the 
human person. Furthermore, the priesthood is neither a right nor a goal of social 
advancement. Any woman who does feel called to the priesthood, the document asserts, 
is not experiencing a “genuine attraction.”779 Women who believe they are called to 
Catholic priesthood are automatically dismissed as frivolous and self-seeking, without 
any investigation or discernment of their personal spiritual journey.780 
 Since Catholicism and Islam place such a heavy emphasis on “natural” gender 
roles, deviation from gender norms is often considered to be morally wrong. In 
Catholicism, homosexual inclinations are morally neutral, but acting upon them is 
considered to be sinful. A person experiencing same- sex attraction is therefore counseled 
to live a celibate lifestyle. Similarly, according to Muslim ethicist Kecia Ali, Muslim 
                                                        
 
779 Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration Inter Insigniores on the Question of 
Admission of Women to the Ministerial Priesthood (October 15, 1976), found at 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19761015_inter-
insigniores_en.html,  6. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to address all of the issues surrounding 
women’s ordination, but debate on this topic has continued long after the release of Inter Insigniores. In 
1994, John Paul II released the encyclical Ordinatio Sacerdotalis to reiterate the CDF’s 1976 position and 




thinkers have, for the most part, taken for granted that same-sex relationships are neither 
licit nor possible to legitimize.781  
4. Unequal Standards of Purity and Men’s Control over Women’s Bodies 
 In both Islam and Catholicism, concerns surrounding women’s purity are 
prominent. As a normative position across Muslim schools of legal thought, the 
menstruating female is excluded from three of the five pillars of Islam782: salat, or the 
ritual prayer that is to be performed five times a day; fasting; and circumambulation of 
the Kaaba, the holiest shrine in Islam, during pilgrimage to Mecca.783 There is 
considerable disagreement regarding when a woman is eligible to regain a state of ritual 
purity, and it is not uncommon for contemporary hygiene manuals to supply extensive 
charts to aid in determining whether a vaginal discharge, based on color and texture, is 
“defiling or not.”784 According to Celene Ayat Lizzio, “often the material filth of the 
excreted material is emphasized in the case of post-partum bleeding and menstruation, 
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whereas the defiling property of semen is often seen as immaterial, non-physical.”785 
Some jurists go so far as to say that ritual prayer performed during menstruation is 
disobedient to God and therefore, nullified. In Lizzio’s words, “these male jurists reserve 
for themselves the authority to declare an act invalid regardless of personal intent.”786 
 Prior to the Second Vatican Council, the rite of “churching,” or the 
purification/blessing of women after childbirth, was a regular occurrence. The practice is 
thought to derive from Leviticus 12:2-5, which prescribes 40 days or ritual impurity to a 
new mother after the birth of a male, and 80 days after the birth of a female. In medieval 
literature, the practice was linked to notions that childbirth rendered a woman unclean. It 
was later renamed the Blessing of Women after Childbirth, and thus, became more 
associated with blessing and thanksgiving rather than re-gaining purity. Since the Second 
Vatican Council, the practice has been largely discontinued.787 However, the teachings of 
the Magisterium still place limits on women’s bodily autonomy. The 1968 encyclical 
Humanae Vitae reaffirmed the church’s consistent teaching that marriage and conjugal 
love “are by their nature ordained toward the procreation of children.”788 Much to the 
disappointment of many Catholics, it continued to assert that the human being, through 
his or her own initiative cannot break the procreative significance inherent in the 
marriage act, and therefore, should not use any means of artificial birth control. The 
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document does state that couples wishing to regulate the number of children they have 
can use natural family planning, or the rhythm method. However, the rhythm method has 
an average failure rate of 13-20%, which is much higher than those of the contraceptives 
banned by the Vatican.789 In addition, many women have irregular menstrual cycles that 
do not allow them practice this method with accuracy, a reality that could not possibly be 
in the purview of an all-male celibate hierarchy. Furthermore, use of the rhythm method 
places the blame on the woman and her body if an unintended pregnancy occurs.  
In Islam, the majority position in eight out of nine legal schools permits 
contraception. However, the reasons behind such support do not always reflect a concern 
for women’s freedom and dignity. Among the reasons given by the twelfth century 
mystic Al-Ghazali for allowing contraception, was “the need for the wife to preserve her 
beauty and attractiveness for the enjoyment of the marriage.”790  
 Positions on abortion also vary in Islam, but many who oppose it are at least in 
favor of certain exemptions. The Grand Ayatollah Yusuf Saanei of Iran, for example, 
issued a fatwa791 that permits abortion in the first trimester, and not only for reasons of 
mother’s health or fetal abnormalities. In a 2000 interview, Saanei stated that Islam is a 
religion of compassion and therefore, in the event of serious problems, abortion is 
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permitted.792 The Grand Shaykh of Al-Azhar, Sayed Tantawi similarly issued a fatwa 
indicating that abortion is permissible in the case of rape.793 
In Catholicism, however, abortion is forbidden in all circumstances, even in cases 
of rape or when the mother’s life is in danger. In 2009, Archbishop Jose Cardoso 
Sobrinho of Brazil declared a local woman to be excommunicated for obtaining an 
abortion for her nine-year old daughter, who conceived twins after being raped by her 
stepfather. The doctors who performed the procedure were excommunicated as well.794  
In 2010, Sr. Rosemary McBride, RSM, was excommunicated by the bishop of Tucson for 
approving the decision of the ethics committee at a Tucson Catholic hospital to permit a 
woman undergo an abortion. The woman was pregnant with her fifth child and doctors 
claimed the abortion was necessary to save her life.795 In this latter case, the 
excommunication was eventually lifted, but the church’s stance is still that the correct 
solution would have been to let the mother die. With regard to abortion, there is a strong 
moral tradition that adheres to the doctrine of “double effect.” An action that causes 
serious harm is permissible as a side effect of some good end. However, one cannot use 
that same action as a means to an end. For example, a doctor may choose to perform a 
hysterectomy in order to save the life of a pregnant woman with cancer, even though the 
death of the fetus is a consequence of the primary means, the hysterectomy. Performing 
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an abortion, on the other hand, is unjustifiable, as it would involve direct intention to kill 
the fetus as a means of saving the mother. 
 Furthermore, as Catholic theologian Rosemary Radford Ruether observes, the 
Church’s teachings on birth control and abortion are “an extraordinary example of moral 
absolutism” that go beyond official church judgments against “sins” that are far worse 
than these.796 Killing a fetus is considered “intrinsically evil,” but not killing in all cases, 
since mitigating circumstances such as self-defense are taken into account.797 Ruether 
points out that “the official church uses very different kinds of moral reasoning when it 
comes to questions of war than when it deals with abortion.”798 When speaking of 
abortion, the Church uses an absolutist natural law ethic, allowing no debate, applying 
coercive sanctions and excommunication, and demanding criminalization. Yet, when 
discussing war, it allows for a variety of opinions and perspectives, and ultimately 
“leaves matters in the hands of individual conscience.” No bishop has ever said that 
soldiers who directly massacre noncombatant civilians should be excommunicated.799 
 Catholic and Muslim women have also been subjected to judgment for venturing 
outside certain standards of purity. Nineteenth century Hanafi scholar Abd al-Hayy al-
Laknawi reasoned that abortion was permissible in the case of pregnancy out of wedlock, 
given that the future prospects of an unwed mother would be radically reduced in his 
society.800 Unwed mothers are not treated much better today. Amina Wadud recounts 
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how the Muslim community in Philadelphia made specific judgments about the virtue of 
her womanhood after her first divorce.801 Asra Nomani recalls the following line from a 
sermon at her mosque in Morgantown, VA, “A woman’s honor lies in her chastity and 
modesty. When she loses this, she is worthless.” An unwed mother herself, when Nomani 
challenged him a few weeks later, the preacher told her to leave the mosque, since she 
was not respected by anyone.802 It is not difficult to find news stories of Catholic schools 
firing female teachers for having children out of wedlock, even though these same 
women would have been condemned more strongly if they had chosen to abort, and the 
fathers of these children never seem to meet a similar punishment. In 2010, a single 
woman in Cincinnati, Ohio lost her job teaching at a Catholic elementary school because 
she chose to get pregnant through artificial insemination. In 2005, St. Rose of Lima 
School in Queens, New York fired a pregnant teacher because she was unmarried, yet 
still chose to keep her baby. Also, many Catholic schools discourage pregnant women 
from attending class out of fear that it will undermine efforts to teach Catholic marriage 
and sexuality.803 
 The above comparisons are not meant to imply that Catholicism is better or worse 
than Islam, or that Islam is better or worse than Catholicism when it comes to the 
treatment of women. In fact, it is meant to demonstrate that such an evaluation cannot be 
made. Women from both traditions experience discrimination with regard to these four 
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main points: standards of dress and body image, fixed definitions of womanhood found in 
gender complementarity, lack of access to leadership and decision-making, and unequal 
expectations of purity.804  
5. Why Patriarchal Attitudes and Practices in Islam and Catholicism Are a Threat to the 
Humanum 
Especially when thinking about middle and upper-class women in the United 
States and Western Europe, one may be skeptical as to whether or not the issues 
discussed in the previous section are truly a threat to the humanum. Indeed, it may very 
well be a stretch to categorize women’s desires to be ordained, or to act as an imam, as 
negative contrast experiences.805 One cannot deny that there are more pressing issues to 
be addressed, such as poverty, illness, and ecological degradation, to name only a few. 
For many women, constant concerns about having enough food to eat, clean drinking 
water, and a safe place to live mean that the question of women’s religious leadership is 
not even able to pondered. It is also true that, at least in the West, some Catholic and 
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Muslim women can choose to disobey the teachings of their traditions. For example, 
although they may experience pressure from families or religious communities to do 
otherwise, many Catholic women in the West have access to and use birth control. While 
it may frustrate some women that ordination is not something they can consider, I would 
not maintain that it is a constant source of pain and anguish for highly educated women 
with plenty of food to eat and clothes to wear.  
However, the presence of patriarchal attitudes and practices in religious 
communities do cause suffering, oppression, discrimination, and isolation, and these are 
contemporary examples of negative contrast experiences: the female victim of abuse who 
is unable to go confession to a male minister,806 the lesbian and the unwed mother fired 
from their jobs or shunned from their communities, the woman with a life-threatening 
pregnancy. One must also keep in mind that the negative impact of certain religious 
teachings may be felt more severely depending on one’s culture and context. Joanna 
Manning, for example, describes the horrible effect the ban on artificial contraception has 
on women in Africa, who do not enjoy the same economic and legal rights as women in 
the United States. Many of these women have had more children than they could clothe, 
educate, and feed. Use of the rhythm method poses a problem for many African women, 
who are threatened either physically or with divorce if they tell their husbands they must 
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avoid intercourse on certain days of the month.807 Furthermore, not all women have 
access to theological education, and therefore, have not had the opportunity to read and 
discuss the statements made by religious authorities. I personally, as a Catholic 
theologian, have been exposed to persuasive counter positions to the Magisterium’s 
teaching on women’s ordination, contraception and abortion, and the dimensions of the 
female vocation. However, not all women live in a context where they can safely and 
publicly question religious teachings. 
 Even when religious authorities do not explicitly condone violence against 
women and non-gender conforming individuals, their patriarchal beliefs and practices 
may indirectly encourage it. Rigid gender roles give way to rigid gender expectations. 
Those who defy such expectations—whether through dress/mannerisms, their choice of 
romantic partner, their disobedience toward male authority—are often the targets of 
violence and harassment, or are ostracized from certain communities. Even women who 
have not been on the receiving end of extreme violence or discrimination are aware of 
such cases. For example, most women know that rape is a more common occurrence than 
it should be. Women who have never been raped still have to contend with fears such as 
walking unaccompanied after dark, being taken advantage of when drinking alcohol, or 
being blamed for wearing clothing that encourages unwanted sexual advances. In other 
words, women know that they are “not safe,” that constant threats to their well-being 
exist, and that it is their gender that makes them more vulnerable. These experiences of 
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contrast are also often endured in silence, since many women fear reporting rape or 
sexual violence due to the potential for negative repercussions.  
 As I discussed in Chapter Four, Schillebeeckx states, while conceptions of the 
humanum vary greatly, every human being experiences the humanum, however they 
define it, as threatened and damaged. This is especially true for women who encounter 
patriarchal practices and attitudes in their religious communities. Yet, not all women 
agree upon what human wholeness entails. This can be seen by the fact that some women 
choose to leave Islam or Catholicism altogether, while others remain devoted to their 
religion and dedicate themselves to pushing for reform. Still others believe in the 
importance of adhering to traditional teachings. Despite these different visions on what 
reform should look like, or whether or not religious reform is even necessary, women are 
responding to their experience of subordination on the basis of gender and sharing their 
visions of a more egalitarian future. Since, as Schillebeeckx asserts, the humanum can 
never be given an absolute, final definition, a multitude of visions and perspectives must 
be taken into account when addressing the threatened humanum. This means that neither 
Catholic nor Muslim women can regard the resources from their own religions as 
providing all that is necessary for the healing and liberation of women. This is why, in 
my estimation, women from both traditions must be open to listening to and learning 
from one another.  
C. Women’s Liberation and the Need for Dialogue with Religious Others as 
“Others” 
 The comparison made above is not meant to imply that Catholicism is better or 
worse than Islam, or that Islam is better or worse than Catholicism when it comes to the 
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treatment of women. In fact, it is meant to demonstrate that such an evaluation cannot be 
made. One cannot claim, therefore, that the response to the experience of the threatened 
humanum in one tradition is to convert to or copy from the other. No person or religious 
tradition contains a complete vision of what human wholeness entails, or has a ready 
answer to every instance of suffering that befalls humanity. Therefore, each person must 
regard his or her own vision of the humanum with a sense of humility, knowing that each 
one’s vision has room to expand in dialogue with other visions. Christians do not need to 
accept everything that comes to them from another tradition, but one needs to realize that 
the resources of their own tradition are not enough. In what follows, I propose five major 
reasons why I believe that dialogue between Catholic women and Muslim women is 
necessary for the realization of women’s flourishing today. 
1. Disproving the Myth of Christian Exceptionalism & The Need to Engage in Self-
Critique  
 First, the presence of patriarchy in Islam and Christianity disproves the myth of a 
Christian exceptionalism, or the notion that Christianity contains all that is necessary for 
human flourishing and Islam has nothing new to offer, or all that it has to offer stems 
from what it shares in common with Christianity. In other words, Christianity, although it 
contains many positive resources that may serve as an inspiration for non-Christians, 
cannot be seen as the “liberator” of Muslim women.  
Accepting this is true, one might inquire what benefit there might be for Catholic 
and Muslim women to hear or read about one another’s particular experiences of 
marginalization. I see the advantages as twofold. First, sharing such experiences can 
dispel the myth that Islam and Christianity are inherently opposed to one another. In 
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learning about the experiences of Muslim women, Catholic women are almost always 
likely to find something to which they can relate and empathize. As was mentioned 
earlier, religious identity is shaped by one’s social location and experience, and these 
identities are entangled in such a way that they cannot be neatly separated. A person is 
not simply Christian or Muslim, but each individual is a particular Christian and a 
particular Muslim. For example, an openly lesbian Catholic woman may find more in 
common with a Muslim woman in a same-sex relationship than with a heterosexual 
Catholic man who staunchly holds that homosexuality is a sin. Similarly, a Muslim 
woman who works in an impoverished city school district might relate more to an urban 
Catholic woman from a similar city, than to a wealthy, tenured Muslim professor at an 
Ivy League university. Bonds of solidarity can be fostered beyond religious and cultural 
boundaries, emphasizing our common quest for the humanum.  
In addition, exposing the myth of Christian exceptionalism makes room for 
Catholic women to realize the need to critique all that threatens the humanum and assists 
them in the practice of self-critique. It cannot be denied that many Catholic women 
theologians, Ruether being one of them, engage in such critique and call for reforms that 
will more fully acknowledge the humanity of women. Due to limitations of time and 
space (Schillebeeckx’s fourth anthropological constant), it is possible to be out of touch 
with other people’s experiences and sufferings, even though they may belong to the same 
religion. Thus, for some Catholics, an all-male priesthood may be regarded as just “the 
way things are” without recognition of the reasons behind it and its implications. A 
Catholic woman may not lament the limitations placed on women’s roles because she 
was never taught to think about the priesthood as an option in the first place. 
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Furthermore, some may be unaware of the struggles faced by the most marginalized 
persons in their traditions. A wealthy woman with flexible working hours and in good 
health may not fully recognize the difficulties of the teachings of Humanae Vitae for a 
woman with three children who is struggling financially and has been told by doctors that 
her body cannot withstand another pregnancy.  
 Since another tradition comes to us as strange and new, it can often be easier to 
pinpoint problems found in that tradition. For example, as Fatima Mernissi points out, 
many Western women automatically assume that just because they do not to cover their 
heads, they have more freedom. Western women may have so internalized Western 
standards of beauty that favor bodies of a certain shape and size that they do not notice 
that such standards represent a threat to the humanum. Mernissi, who grew up in 
Morocco, expresses how she never felt self-conscious of her body size until her 
experience shopping for clothing in New York City. She had never considered that 
wearing a size large than six might be a cause of shame or embarrassment. Muslim 
women like Mernissi have important insights to impart to Catholic Western women who 
need to respond to this situation. 
2. No Person or Community Possesses a Complete, Totalizing Vision of the Humanum  
 The second reason dialogue is necessary is that while women’s commitment to 
the threatened humanum may be universal, their positive conception of it is not. No 
woman, no matter how committed she may be to feminist theology, can possibly possess 
a complete vision of what the humanum is, nor what bringing it about should entail. Thus, 
dialogue with Islam can provide a key element in expanding the Catholic conception of 
the humanum and for avoiding distorted visions that emphasize the well-being of one 
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group to the neglect of another. The veil is a poignant example here. In some Muslim 
countries, there are laws that force women to veil against their will.  The realities that 
contribute to the veil’s necessity for some women, such as sexual harassment and the 
objectification of female bodies, are also examples of the threatened humanum. 
 However, without consulting Muslim women themselves, it is easy to jump to the 
conclusion that the veil is nothing but a symbol of women’s oppression and therefore, 
must be completely eradicated. Laws or policies that prohibit women from wearing 
religious attire exist in many countries today, especially throughout Europe.808 While 
such bans on veiling may be enacted in the name of granting women freedom, in many 
respects the effect has been just the opposite.  
In Turkey, the ban on the headscarf in universities and hospitals, enacted in 1998, 
has greatly restricted women’s access to education and health care.809 Sadly, in the 2004 
case of Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights upheld the Turkish 
ban on the headscarf, claiming that it was “legitimate and necessary in a democratic 
society” and that it was “a necessary protection for other students, specifically those who 
do not wear a headscarf.”810  
 In 2014, The European Court of Human Rights also upheld the validity of 
France’s 2010 ban on the veil in public places declaring that the ban was a way of 
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encouraging citizens to “live together.”811 Yet, such laws have made Muslim women the 
targets of abuse, from being spat on to having their veils pulled off as they walk along the 
streets.812 According to the National Observatory Against Islamophobia, eighty percent of 
anti-Muslim acts in France that occurred between 2013-2014 were directed against veiled 
women.813 
 As scholar and expert in Quranic hermeneutics Asma Barlas states, it is entirely 
too simplistic to assume a correlation between a covered body and slavery. In fact, 
historically, female slaves were denied the right to cover themselves. This is recognized 
in the Quran when it defines the function of the jilbab (cloak) to distinguish between free 
women and slaves.814 During the British occupation of Egypt in the late nineteenth to 
early twentieth century, many women adopted the hijab as a symbol of their resistance to 
colonial definitions.815 During the 1979 Iranian Revolution, many middle class Iranian 
women chose to wear the hijab as a symbol of their resistance to the Shah and Western 
cultural encroachment. Prior to Iran’s post-revolutionary enforcement of the hijab, many 
educated and professional woman “deliberately donned the veil as an assertion of their 
identity which reflects a synthesis of modernity and tradition.”816   
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 Without a willingness to dialogue with Islam, Muslim women tend to be treated 
as objects of research instead of individual subjects in their own right. As Sa’diyya 
Shaikh explains, the hijab, for Muslim women, has come to represent a variety of 
meanings within multivalent realities. Some women see it as a religious requirement. 
Others state specifically feminist and anti-capitalist reasons for deciding to veil. Some 
claim that veiling detracts from patriarchal prioritization of women’s physical and sexual 
attractiveness, and resists Western consumerism in which women spend a lot of their time 
and energy keeping up with changing fashions.817 For other Muslim women, the veil is a 
way of outwardly expressing their religious identity, and serves as a visible reminder of 
their relationship with God. In many ways, it is similar to the reasons a Catholic may 
choose to wear a cross around his or her neck, or the medallion of a favorite saint. During 
a visit to the Islamic Center of Boston in Wayland, MA one woman explained to me her 
decision to veil in spite of opposition, saying, “I veil. It is what I choose to do to feel 
close to God. If someone does not like me for my choice, they are not a friend.”  
Interestingly, the veil for many Muslim women represents such a personal choice 
that it is common to meet two sisters or a mother and daughter, one in hijab and one with 
her head uncovered. While many believe that Muslim women are pressured into wearing 
the hijab, the opposite is actually quite common. Given the harsh reactions the veil often 
provokes, some Muslim women are actually encouraged by Muslim relatives and friends 
to uncover their heads for their own safety and protection. Women’s lack of autonomy is 
certainly a sign of the threatened humanum, but this cannot be remedied without careful 
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consideration of the actual experience of Muslim women, who should have a choice as to 
whether or not to adopt more Western styles of dress. Without taking into account the 
feelings and concerns of Muslim women, Western Christians may all too easily assume 
that their first reaction to the threatened humanum of women, namely the demonization of 
the veil as oppressive, is what is best for all women regardless of their cultural or 
religious background.  Furthermore, Muslim women who freely choose to veil may offer 
important insights to Catholic women who seek to outwardly express both their feminism 
and their religious devotion in the contemporary world.  
3. Muslim and Catholic Women May Expand One Another’s Conceptions of the 
Humanum 
Third, in engaging the particularities of both traditions, Muslim women and 
Catholic women can find inspiration from one another’s beliefs and practices, even if 
they may not be able to offer full assent to everything the other religion believes. As was 
discussed in Chapter Four, both Catholics and Muslims make absolute claims and 
therefore, doctrinal disagreements will persist. Catholics believe that Jesus was God 
incarnate, both human and divine. Jesus plays a crucial role in the salvation of all 
humanity, as God’s full, definitive and unsurpassable revelation. Islam, on the other 
hand, states that all previous religions are brought to fulfillment with God’s final 
revelation in the Quran. Muhammad, rather than Jesus, is God’s final prophet, although 
Muhammad is not divine, since, in Islam, the incarnation is seen as a violation of tawhid, 
or the oneness of God.   
 
 285 
 The Second Vatican Council acknowledged that the Church does not always have 
at hand the solution to particular problems.818 Schillebeeckx defined Christian 
discipleship, not as an exact imitation of Jesus, but as the effort to follow Jesus’s example 
by “allowing an intense experience of God to have an influence on our own situation.”819 
Jesus was a finite human being and as such, lived and spoke in a particular time and 
culture, which means he did not leave specific instructions on how to deal with many of 
the circumstances that confront human beings today. Jesus was a Middle Eastern Jewish 
man living under the oppression of the Roman Empire. The main focus of his ministry 
was the kingdom of God and he taught in the form of parables. He did not have a spouse 
or children, and was put to death by the Roman Empire at the age of thirty-three.  
 Muhammad lived in a very different context than Jesus. A seventh century Arab 
man, he was considered both a religious and political leader. He had wives and children, 
who also are considered to be important figures in Islam. Catholics look to the example 
of Jesus, and Muslims look to the example of the Prophet Muhammad, for guidance on 
how to live their lives and be faithful to God. However, it is impossible to fully replicate 
their actions in today’s world. Therefore, Catholics and Muslims must ponder how to 
follow their examples in modern situations, many of which were unthinkable centuries 
ago.  
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 Both Jesus and Muhammad were countercultural in their treatment of women. 
Jesus ate with women and taught them alongside men, behaviors that were scandalous at 
the time. According to the Gospels, women were the first witnesses to his resurrection. 
With the Prophet Muhammad, we get a different example of countercultural treatment 
toward women. Unlike Jesus, Muhammad had wives and children. His first wife, 
Khadija, was a wealthy businesswoman. She not only provided for Muhammad 
financially, but she was the one to console him when he received his first revelation of 
the Quran in 610.820  In other words, Muhammad loved a powerful woman, and his 
marriage provides an example of a situation that is still considered rare in many parts of 
the world today; namely, a female acting as the major breadwinner of a family. 
Indonesian religious studies scholar Syafa Almirzanah states, “Our Prophet cooked and 
even sewed his own clothes himself. There is nothing to be ashamed of in that.”821 
According to Almirzanah, “the Prophet didn’t teach that women should just stay at home. 
These rules were introduced by the Prophet’s companions after his death. The Quran 
gives women the right to pursue an education and be involved in worldly matters.”822 The 
Prophet often consulted with wives.  After negotiating the Covenant of al-Hudaybiyyah, 
which established peaceful relations between Muslims and the Quraysh tribe, his 
Companions refused to sacrifice their camels. He went to his wife Um Salamah and it 
was she who suggested the solution to his problem.823 
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The Prophet’s role as a father was also countercultural. According to Tariq 
Ramadan, the Prophet had six children with Khadija. Their two sons died in infancy and 
only their four daughters survived. Among seventh century Arabs, the birth of a daughter 
was considered shameful, yet Muhammad and Khadija “surrounded their daughters with 
deep love and constant care that they never hesitated to express in public.”824 The Prophet 
is said to have loved children. If his ritual prayer was disturbed by a crying child, the 
Prophet would say that the child was praying to God by invoking his or her mother, and 
would then shorten his prayer as if to respond to the prayer of the child.825 The Prophet 
learned from children to look at his surroundings with a sense of awe and wonder.  
Muhammad, as a non-celibate political and religious leader, dealt with many 
situations that Jesus did not; therefore, Catholics may find some of the stories and 
examples of the Prophet’s life, such as those mentioned above, to be not only 
educational, but spiritually and morally enriching. This does not mean that a Catholic 
should abandon Jesus as the criterion for her ethical behavior. However, hearing the 
accounts of the Prophet as a father and husband can broaden her knowledge of the 
religious resources that counter the notion that a patriarchal society is God’s will. She 
may regard what she learns from Islamic sources as necessary for responding to the 
threatened humanum of women today and therefore, part of being a disciple of Jesus. 
  Both Catholic and Muslim women find many examples of strong, admirable 
female figures in their tradition who defy gender stereotypes of women as passive and 
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obedient. Women exercised important leadership roles in the early Christian community. 
For example, the Church at Philippi was founded by a prosperous woman named Lydia. 
Many women shared in the task of evangelization along with Paul and helped provide for 
him financially. In Romans 16:1, a woman named Phoebe is referred to as a “deacon.” 
She was responsible for overseeing the assembly of Christians at Cenchreae and 
informing Paul of its progress. In Romans 16:7 Paul also bestows the term “apostle” on a 
woman named Junia.826  
 Early Muslim women took on different types of leadership roles in a different 
context than that found in the Gospels. The Prophet’s wife Aisha was a leading 
theologian, as well as political/military personality.827 She defended the integrity of the 
Prophet by calling into question misogynistic hadith reports, stressing the importance of 
“narrating hadith in their entirety, highlighting the context in which they were uttered.”828 
Hadith are accounts of the sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad.829 Women had 
an active role in the initial preservation of the Quran as well as in the transmission of 
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hadith. An eyewitness encounter with Muhammad was the only prerequisite for narrating 
reports on his life, and thus, the narrations of women were considered no less reliable 
than those of men.830  One of the first people to memorize the Quran was the Prophet’s 
wife, Hafsa bint Umar.831 She also played a vital role in looking after the holy scrolls and 
relics on which the Quran was inscribed during the Prophet’s lifetime. The final editing 
of the Quran by the Third Caliph was also placed in her care and became the standard 
copy of the Holy Script.832  
Becoming aware of the major female figures in both Muslim and Catholic history 
expands women’s knowledge of what women can and have accomplished, providing 
more examples and therefore, more role models than can be offered by one tradition 
alone. Such examples also provide encouragement for women who wish to maintain that 
being religious (or even religious scholars) is compatible with a commitment to the 
flourishing of women.  
 While the Quran may not have the same level of authority as the Bible for a 
Catholic (and vice versa for a Muslim), that does not mean that the Quran cannot deepen 
our understanding of the humanum, particularly in its vision of how human beings should 
approach the situation of religious pluralism. The Quran Surah 5:48 speaks beautifully to 
the need for interreligious dialogue: “For each [people] We have appointed a Divine Law 
and a way. Had God willed, He could have made you one community. But that He may 
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try you by that which He hath given you. So vie with one another in good works.”833 The 
Quran presents us with a positive appreciation of the existence of multiple religions, 
stating that is the will of God rather than an unfortunate circumstances. Rather than 
bemoan the fact that humanity does not share one religion, the Quran encourages human 
being to vie with one another in their efforts to better the world. This also implies that all 
human beings, not just Muslims, have the ability to perform “good works.” In witnessing 
the good works enacted by religious others, human beings should raise their own 
standards and continuously strive to better themselves.  
 The account of the Prophet Muhammad’s encounter with the Najran Christians 
can be read as conveying the value of interreligious dialogue from an inclusivist 
perspective. A delegation of fourteen religious leaders from Najran (present day Yemen) 
visited Muhammad to inquire about the new religion of Islam and what its perspective 
was on Jesus. The Prophet happily answered their questions and pointed out the link 
between the two traditions. He viewed Islam as being the continuation of Jesus’s 
message, but he rejected the dogma of the Trinity. The Prophet invited the Najran 
Christians to convert to Islam but they refused. Nevertheless, the Prophet, to the dismay 
of some of his Companions, still allowed the Christians to pray inside the mosque. They 
left Medina unharmed and still devoted to their Christian beliefs. Here, we see an 
example of both groups being unwilling to give up their deeply held beliefs, but still able 
to converse peacefully. 834  
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Specifically dealing with women, Catholics and Muslims share some foremothers 
in common, in particular, Eve and Mary, the mother of Jesus. Muslim perspectives on 
Eve and Mary can prove nourishing for Catholic women’s spirituality. In the Catholic 
tradition, many women have lamented that the Virgin Mary, as an “ideal woman,” has 
been upheld as a model of obedience, rather than independence and strength. Mary is 
held in high esteem in the Quran. As does Catholicism, the Quran affirms that Jesus was 
created in the womb of Mary by a special decree to which she freely assents and not by 
normal biology. The position of St. Ambrose, which was eventually adopted by the 
Church, insists upon the utter intactness of Mary’s body throughout the birthing process, 
never penetrated or torn, a birth without pain or blood.835 In Genesis 3:16, after her 
disobedience, God says to Eve, “I will sharpen the pain of your pregnancy, and in pain 
you will give birth.” The Church Fathers reasoned that Mary, as the receptacle of the 
Savior, must have been conceived without sin. Being sinless, she could not be subject to 
birth pangs, since they are the mark of original sin. This depiction of Mary removes her 
from the experience of ordinary women, and also posits a strong association between the 
female body and sin.   
In the Quran, however, Mary’s birthing process is described like that of every 
other woman who bears a child. “Would that I had died before this time and been long 
forgotten (rather than feel such pains)?”836 The Quran also demonstrates God’s sympathy 
for Mary at this time, telling her to “Grieve not!”837 and asking her to eat, drink, and be 
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comforted.838 The Quran classifies Mary as one of the qanitin, or one devout before 
Allah. Interestingly, the Quran uses the masculine plural form of this word, rather than 
the feminine, to emphasize the significance of Mary as an example for all who believe 
and showing that “her virtue was not confined by gender.”839 These are aspects of Mary’s 
experience that have been covered up throughout Church history which many women 
today want to recall. Catholic feminist theologian Elizabeth Johnson writes, “real blood 
was shed at this delivery, by a poor woman of peasant society far from home, laboring in 
childbirth for the first time. And it was holy.” The human Mary who gives birth naturally 
shows that “womb and breasts, flesh and bleeding” are not “outside the sphere of the 
sacred.”840  A Catholic may not regard the Quran as God’s final revelation, but Quranic 
passages about Mary may help her in a thinking and speaking about Mary in fresh new 
ways and may increase her appreciation of and ability to relate to Mary as the Mother of 
God.   
 For a Catholic, the admission that the wisdom of the Quran and the example of 
the Prophet Muhammad make valuable contributions toward expanding our conception of 
the humanum does not amount to putting Muhammad over Jesus, or even declaring that 
Muhammad and Jesus are on the same level. It also does not mean that Catholics must 
adopt or accept all of the Prophet’s teachings.841 However, as was stated earlier, even 
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while Catholics hold that Jesus is God incarnate, they must recognize that Jesus, during 
his time on Earth, was limited by the constraints of time and space. Thus, the Gospels do 
not provide us with examples of how to deal with every possible issue that arises in 
modern day society. Catholics, therefore, do not learn what the humanum entails directly 
from Jesus but constantly rely upon additional sources for moral guidance: saints, priests 
and ministers, scholars and theologians, parents, and other influential figures in their 
lives. They also rely on these sources knowing that they are human and therefore, subject 
to error. Therefore, there is nothing preventing Catholics from learning from and drawing 
upon the resources of Islam, even when not holding the same beliefs as Muslims do 
regarding the status of the Quran and the Prophet. Recognizing that Islam has something 
new and unique to offer to the development of the humanum that is not found or 
emphasized in Christianity does not amount to saying that Islam is necessarily a better 
religion, or even that it holds the same importance in the life of the devout Catholic.   
4. Deepening Appreciation of One’s Own Tradition and the Tradition of the “Other”  
 Fourth, dialogue is necessary especially for a Catholic who might be devout but 
repeats their creedal affirmation or responses to the consecration of the Eucharist by rote. 
Likewise, a Muslim who stops to pray five times a day has developed a habit of doing so 
and may rarely stop to think about why she does it.  
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Mara Brecht explains that dialogue across disagreement provides an opportunity 
for members of different religions to listen to one another with deeper appreciation. This 
was particularly important after September 11th when many media outlets portrayed Islam 
and Christianity as inherently opposed, with the former religion being intrinsically violent 
and something to be feared. Brecht conducted research on the Philadelphia Area 
Women’s Interreligious Dialogue Group, which has been in existence for a little over a 
decade. This group of Muslim and Catholic women practiced the art of negotiating 
difference through dialogue. For many months, they devoted each dialogue session to the 
spiritual autobiographies of two women, each of whom would exchange the role of 
storyteller and story hearer at various times. These narratives helped women build 
empathy across religious boundaries, and cultivate feelings of care and appreciation.  
 In one such example, Brecht relates how a Christian woman hears a Muslim 
woman describe her pilgrimage to Mecca, one of the five pillars of Islam. From the 
Muslim woman’s pilgrimage description, the Christian woman began to envision the Hajj 
as something walking around the Kaaba and be awestruck. While, as a non-Muslim, she 
cannot technically participate in the Hajj, her imagining herself into the pilgrimage 
instills in her the profundity of the ways Muslims express their faith in walking and 
reminds her of the embodied nature of religious experience.842 In other words, the 
encounter with the unfamiliar is an example of how one can re-ignite one’s faith by 
inspiring a sense of awe and wonder at the Divine and the created world.  
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5. Feminism is Not and Cannot Be a Solely Western Christian Phenomenon  
 The fifth and final reason why dialogue is beneficial is that the term “feminism” 
has come to have negative connotations, especially in pre-dominantly Muslim countries. 
Islamic philosopher Seyyed Hossein Nasr identifies feminism as “a thirsting for all things 
Western.”843 If, Nasr says, Westerners really wanted to be “friends and fellow human 
beings,” they should not seek to impose their views on Muslims but should ask Muslims 
what they considered to be the rights that were most missing in their lives.844  Contrary to 
widespread belief, the majority of women in Muslim countries believe that women 
deserve the same legal status as men, the right to vote without influence from family 
members, and to work at any job they are qualified for, and even to serve in the highest 
levels of government.845 However, while many Muslim women admire much about the 
West, the majority do not yearn to become more like their Western counterparts. Many 
are wary of the “West’s perceived promiscuity, pornography, and indecent dress- 
perceptions that can be traced to Hollywood images exported daily to the Muslim world... 
images of scantily clad young women may leave Muslim women believing that despite 
Western women’s equal legal status, their cultural status is lacking.”846 Some may also 
perceive a lack of respect for motherhood in the West. Thus, while many Muslim women 
favor gender parity, they want it on their own terms and within their own cultural 
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context.847 Interreligious dialogue, therefore, is necessary to keep feminism from being 
perceived as an imperialistic Western Christian phenomenon. A feminism that refuses to 
listen to non-Christian perspectives is not truly feminism since it neglects the humanum 
of women from other cultural and religious contexts.  
 In summary, I have provided five reasons why dialogue between Catholic and 
Muslim women is necessary in responding to the threatened humanum. First, dialogue 
can dispel the myth of Christian exceptionalism and reminds both traditions of the need 
to not simply look for the issues found in the beliefs and practices of the other, but to also 
engage in self-critique. Second, no one person, culture, or tradition possesses a universal 
vision of what the humanum should entail. There is always more that can be learned in 
responding to a particular situation. The veiling of women is a poignant example here. 
Without listening to perspectives outside her own culture and religion, the Western 
Christian woman can easily come to the dangerous conclusion that veiling is oppressive 
and should be prohibited in all circumstances. Third, every human being is limited by the 
constraints of time and space. Islam, having arisen and developed in a different context 
than Christianity, has wisdom to offer Christianity that has not been thematized in the 
Christian tradition, yet still may prove necessary for responding to the threatened 
humanum in today’s world, and vice versa. Fourth, dialogue with another tradition can 
foster better appreciation of one’s home tradition, reminding her of what she believes and 
why. Fifth and finally, dialogue between Catholicism and Islam serves as a powerful 
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reminder that feminism cannot and should not be solely defined by the experience of 
Western Christian women.  
D. Conclusion: Pluralism is Not the Answer 
 
I have maintained throughout this chapter that patriarchy is manifest in both Islam 
and Catholicism. In both traditions, women’s ability to change this situation is inhibited 
by the fact that they are excluded from major roles of religious leadership. To put it 
succinctly, women are told by male authorities how they should think and behave as 
“holy women.” For this reason, I do not accept Rita Gross’s assertion, that the pluralist 
paradigm is the only suitable choice for any feminist theology of religions.848 Insisting 
that women can only collaborate with one another if they subscribe to a pluralist position 
reinforces certain patriarchal patterns. Instead of male humanity, pluralism is held up as 
the norm. Whatever beliefs and practices fail to meet the standards of a pluralist theology 
of religions are rejected as wrong, inherently violent, and incompatible with fruitful 
interreligious dialogue. Basically, if Gross’ assertion is to be upheld, women are told by 
persons outside of their religious traditions what beliefs and practices they can and cannot 
accept.  
Given the similarities between Jesus and Muhammad discussed in the section 
above, one may wonder why Catholics and Muslims cannot simply declare them to be on 
an equal level to avoid disagreement and potential conflict. However, according to 
Schillebeeckx, the belief that God’s salvation was brought about definitively in Jesus 
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Christ came about because of the earliest disciples’ experience of being touched and 
healed by Jesus. Jesus’s divinity and Jesus’s role in eschatological salvation are not 
simply personal preferences that can be given up when one pleases, but faith convictions 
that stem from personal experience.849 For Muslims, the finality of the Prophet 
Muhammad stems from the experience of the Quran as the Word of God and as a central 
part of one’s life. The absolute claims made about Jesus, and about the Quran and the 
Prophet Muhammad, are not made simply for the sake of proving one’s religion to be 
better than others, but, as statements of faith, as personal responses to the divine in one’s 
life. Certainly, such claims have been misused to justify violence toward religious others 
and may have at times instilled a sense of religious superiority.  Also, not every person 
who publicly declares faith in Jesus or the Quran is an authentic believer (one’s inner 
beliefs are not something we can know with exact certainty). We cannot ask people to 
simply change their religious beliefs the way we may try to convince them to change 
their preference for political candidates or policy positions. Certainly, genuine religious 
conversions can and do happen, but they must be in response to one’s personal 
experience, not a theory that seeks to eradicate religious disagreement for the sake of 
making the beliefs of religious others more palatable.  
 In Chapter Four, I discussed how the reality of the threatened humanum demands 
that we respond to it now, even though human beings hold different and sometimes 
contradictory views. Therefore, for Schillebeeckx, ethics must always be given priority 
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over religion because ethics has the character of a “pressing urgency” which cannot wait 
until there is unanimity among humankind over the ultimate questions of life.850 This 
applies to the contemporary situation, in which the humanum of women is threatened by 
patriarchal attitudes and practices that perpetuate gender-based suffering and oppression. 
Women today are realizing that this situation “should not be!”  Thus, interreligious 
cooperation cannot wait until mutual agreement upon religious doctrines is found; nor is 
such unanimity even necessarily desirable. As Schillbeeckx also states, “God is too rich 
and too super-substantial to be exhausted in fullness by one distinct and thus limited 
tradition or experience.”851 In other words, the praxis of Muslim and Catholic women on 
behalf of the humanum is richer when informed by dialogue between both religions, 
rather than based on the experience of one tradition alone. Even if one believes her 
tradition to be the most complete, she can still acknowledge that the religious other has 
something new and profound to offer.  
In this chapter, I have sought to demonstrate how Schillebeeckx’s claim that 
“there is no salvation outside the world” must translate into “no salvation apart from 
religious others” using the example of Muslim women and Catholic women. First, 
utilizing the work of Catholic feminist theologian Rosemary Radford Ruether, I discussed 
how the humanum of women has been and is continuously is threatened. Feminist 
theology has sought to respond to this situation, but has often failed to take into account 
the experiences of non-Christian, non-Western women. Second, I sought to uncover the 
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myth of a Christian exceptionalism by discussing how patriarchy is present both 
Catholicism and Islam with regard to four main points: body image, rigid gender roles, 
lack of leadership roles, and purity standards. Third, I argued that the presence of 
patriarchy in both traditions shows that no one religion contains a full vision of what the 
humanum entails. Therefore, interreligious dialogue is necessary for glimpses of salvation 
to be felt and seen. When one fails to see religious others as cooperators in building the 
humanum, one often neglects to practice the self-critique necessary for responding to 
threats to the humanum found in her own tradition.  A concept of what the humanum 
should be cannot neglect the hopes and desires of women outside of another woman’s 
own religious or social location. Finally, given that both Muslims and Christians make 
absolute religious claims that conflict with one another, I have attempted to show that it is 
not only possible, but in fact, desirable, to engage in fruitful dialogue from an inclusivist 






THE IMPLICATIONS OF “NO SALVATION APART FROM RELIGIOUS OTHERS”  
 
FOR CHRISTIAN DISCIPLESHIP 
 
The motivation behind this dissertation was to acknowledge the situation of 
religious pluralism as a “sign of the times.” Today, Christians are not simply aware that 
other religions exist, but rather, religious others are prevalent in our classrooms, 
workplaces, and even in our families. Even at a Catholic institution, Christianity is not 
the only religion represented on campus. It can no longer be assumed that a married 
couple will share the same religion, or that children share the same religion of their 
parents. Although not all Christians engage in the scholarly study of world religions, they 
still are often exposed to some of the beliefs, practices, and concerns of other religions 
through their everyday interactions and through social media.  
A. Was Schillebeeckx Really an Inclusivist? And Why Is this Significant? 
 
In both the Introduction and Chapter One, I presented the three paradigms of the 
theology of religions that seek to deal with the question of the salvation of non-
Christians: exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism. Although Schillebeeckx never 
explicitly identified himself as such, I argued that throughout his theological career, he 
remained a representative of the inclusivist paradigm. He did not hold that all religions 
are equal or the same. Nor was he willing to relinquish his belief in Jesus as God’s 
universal, definitive, and unsurpassable revelation.  
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In the words of Lieven Boeve, throughout Schillebeeckx’s entire theological 
career, “in the end the Christian truth claims is the criterion for all other truth claims.”852 
Schillebeeckx maintained a vision of Jesus as normative for all of humankind. In Jesus, 
Schillebeeckx insists, we witness “an unveiling of the true face of God and a disclosure 
of the true being of man.” Jesus’s humanity thus becomes the measure by which we 
ought to judge ourselves.853 This, however, does not mean that those who follow Jesus 
have a monopoly on the definition of what it means to be human, a definition which no 
human person or institution can fully possess. As Schillebeeckx attested, “turning to 
Jesus to find salvation in him means approaching him in a state of not knowing, or rather 
of ‘open knowledge’ of the true meaning of humanity and divinity alike, maybe to learn 
from him the true nature of their interrelationship as manifested in Jesus.”854 In Jesus, 
Christians do not have an instruction manual on how to handle every situation that could 
ever possibly arise in this world, but they do believe they have an image of the invisible 
God, God incarnate. Jesus, and only Jesus, then, is the “positive guarantor” of the final 
salvation that Christians believe is yet to come, in which all forms of suffering will cease. 
Jesus is the testament to the statement that “God is among us” and that the 
meaninglessness and suffering found in the world will not have the last word. Therefore, 
Jesus’s life, death, and resurrection are of all universal significance for all of humankind. 
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Given Schillebeeckx’s understanding of salvation, discussed in Chapter Three, denying 
this would not make sense. Salvation from God is a communal reality, not simply good 
news for certain individuals. Jesus cannot be the redeemer of Christians if he is not the 
redeemer of all humankind including those who do not believe him to be such. The 
purpose of the Christian declaration that God’s salvation was brought about definitively 
in Jesus Christ is not one-upmanship in comparison to other religions, but reflects the 
Christian response to their experience of Jesus as the foundation for their eschatological 
hope.  
Just as Schillebeeckx did not explicitly refer to himself as an inclusivist, it is 
important to acknowledge that most Christians, including many Christian theologians, do 
not categorize their views in terms of the paradigms, even if they are aware of them. Most 
people do not base the way they treat non-Christians during the course of their everyday 
lives on a well-established theory. Nevertheless, Schillebeeckx’s fifth anthropological 
constant (discussed in Chapter Four) concerns the mutual and essential relationship 
between theory and praxis. Any commitment to the humanum requires both reflection 
and action. As was stated in the introduction, it is widely accepted that, whether 
consciously or unconsciously, Christians come to any encounter with another tradition 
with an understanding that corresponds to one of three paradigms: exclusivism, 
inclusivism, and pluralism. Certainly, not all Christians need to do an in-depth study of 
the theology of religions, but it is important for all Christians to reflect about their own 
personal understanding of the relationship between Christianity and non-Christian 
traditions, since such an understanding, albeit unconsciously, impacts their ability to 
dialogue with and learn from religious others in their everyday lives. The paradigms are 
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not the only way to do this, but they do provide a helpful guidepost when one is 
attempting to articulate his or her perspective.  
This dissertation attempted to dispel the belief that one must hold a pluralist 
position, and thereby uphold that all religions have equal validity, relinquishing any 
absolute claims, in order to dialogue with religious others effectively. As this dissertation 
has shown, it is not necessary to dismiss pluralists as if they cannot also be contributors 
to fruitful interreligious dialogue. For example, Paul Knitter does not apply the terms 
“full, definitive, and unsurpassable” to Jesus Christ. He also maintains that he is fully a 
Buddhist-Christian, without giving primacy to either identity. In this way, neither identity 
is considered better or more important than the other. Thus, the intention of this 
dissertation was not to prove that Paul Knitter cannot or should not make such claims. He 
is free to do so, especially if these are the beliefs that truly correspond to his own 
experience. Rather, my critique of Knitter in this dissertation was his belief that all 
Christians must adopt his perspective.  
Certainly, pluralists like Knitter are not wrong in pointing out that in the past, 
Christian beliefs have been used to justify violence. The Crusades and the Inquisition are 
just two examples that testify to the dangers of religious violence. Nevertheless, 
preventing religious violence cannot consist of forcing persons to water down their 
religious beliefs so as not to conflict with the beliefs of others. In today’s religiously 
pluralist world, one must be able to discern the difference between a dangerous sense of 
superiority and authentic devotion to one’s tradition. The latter need not always lead to 
the former. To use Christianity and Islam as an example, a Christian may claim that Jesus 
is God’s definitive revelation and the guarantor of final salvation from God, while a 
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Muslim may claim that the Quran is the Word of God and Muhammad is God’s final 
prophet. The Christian and the Muslim need not abandon these claims. However, they 
can and should reflect on why they make these claims, and the way these claims 
influence their actions in the world. If these are statements of faith made in response to 
the experience of the Divine in their lives, or what a person, in his or heart, believes to be 
true, then one cannot expect that they can easily be dropped.  However, if these 
statements are made for the sake of giving one comfort that his or her beliefs are “right,” 
while others are “wrong,” they become problematic and a threat to one’s ability to engage 
in dialogue. For the Christian, the belief in Jesus as God’s definitive revelation should not 
be a source of satisfaction as if one has “chosen the best religion,” but a constant 
challenge to make this belief in final salvation from God credible in today’s world.  
 As we have seen, Schillebeeckx’s soteriology is founded on the notion that there 
is “no salvation outside the world.” The world through which God reveals Godself is not 
a society with perfect agreement among all individuals and communities.  In its current 
state, the world we live in is one in which not all persons profess the same religion or any 
religion at all.  Rather, persons hold unique, different, and sometimes even contradictory 
beliefs. Therefore, the human history which serves as the material of divine revelation 
cannot be understood as a history built solely by Christians. It must include the 
participation of non-Christians and non-believers. Since God reveals God’s self to the 
world independently from a human person’s decision to confess belief in God or Jesus 
Christ, it is conceivable that Christians have not come to know everything there is to 
know about experiencing the Divine.  Nor are Christians the only ones who possess the 
wisdom necessary for responding to the threatened humanum. As I have insisted in this 
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dissertation, “no salvation outside the world” means no salvation outside a world that is 
religiously pluralist. The Church, although a part of the world, is not the whole world.  
The implication therefore is that partial and fragmentary experiences of salvation in this 
world that Schillebeeckx speaks about are seen and experienced in relationships with 
religious others, even if these others do not label their experiences as fragments of 
salvation. “No salvation apart from religious others,” thus becomes the logical conclusion 
of Schillebeeckx’s soteriology in today’s world.  
 The notion of “no salvation apart from religious others,” as a consequence of “no 
salvation outside the world” does not view interreligious dialogue as simply something 
nice to do for the sake of minimizing discord. Neither does my claim take a patronizing 
attitude toward non-Christian religions, in which everything of value found in the 
religious other must somehow derive from Christianity. Rather, the view of the religious 
other adopted in this dissertation has been that religious others truly have something 
unique to offer a Christian understanding of the humanum. Even though Christianity and 
other religions have different beliefs that sometimes come in conflict with one another, 
such differences need not be erased, but can be the basis of fruitful dialogue. The topic of 
religion need not be constantly shunned in diverse groups for fear of maintaining so-
called “political correctness.” Even if the Christian does not share all of another religious 
adherent’s beliefs, one can and must see the religious other as a source of wisdom simply 
because—as Schillebeeck has persuasively argued—the Christian cannot find everything 





B. A Controversial Claim? Avoiding Misconceptions  
 
“No salvation apart from religious others,” I recognize, is a potentially 
controversial claim. Therefore, it is important to avoid certain possible misconceptions. 
First of all, “no salvation apart from religious others,” does not mean that everything 
found in non-Christian traditions contributes to the humanum. While not imposing a 
static definition of the human being, the humanum serves to help prevent interreligious 
dialogue from becoming relativistic and accepting all beliefs and practices in the name of 
diversity. The criterion of the humanum holds that anything that serves to diminish or 
oppress others cannot be embraced. This means that one may reject or even criticize what 
may come about from an interreligious encounter. However, in keeping with the criterion 
of the humanum, one’s critique of a particular situation, action or attitude must not turn 
into a blanket condemnation of an entire religion or culture, labeling it as wicked or 
backward. Nor should one harbor an attitude of fear or hatred toward anyone who 
identifies with a particular culture or religion. Although one may denounce particular acts 
of violence committed in the name of Allah or in the name of Jesus, such judgments 
cannot lead to the labeling of all Muslims or Christians as evil.  As this dissertation has 
argued, “no salvation apart from religious others” means that no religious tradition has all 
of the answers; therefore, it is necessary to cooperate with and learn from religious 
others. However, cooperation and dialogue does not entail a blind obedience to whatever 
comes to us from another tradition. Dialogue partners must practice discernment, 
remaining open to what might at first sound strange, or new, but which may prove useful 
and even necessary in responding to the suffering that surrounds us. 
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As I have shown, some pluralists, like Rita Gross, have rightly pointed out that 
non-Christians have been excluded by certain movements, communities, and institutions. 
This is an issue that demands attention, and it is a key reason why I proposed in Chapter 
Five, that dialogue between Muslim and Catholic women is both beneficial and 
necessary. However, a person or community’s treatment of religious others may not 
devolve into the sole litmus test for whether or not that community is sufficiently 
responding to the threatened humanum. In Chapter One, I referred to the statement of 
Paul Knitter, who said: “I do not have major problems with the controversial ethical or 
practical teachings of my church dealing with matters such as birth control, divorce, the 
role of women, homosexuality, clerical celibacy, episcopal leadership, and 
transparency.”855 Rather, Knitter went on to explain that he struggles with what he calls 
the big stuff— that which applies to all Christians, not just the Roman Catholic 
community. Here, he was referring to the “basic ingredients of the Creed, the beliefs that 
many Christians proclaim together every Sunday and that are supposed to define who 
they are in a world of many other religious beliefs and philosophies.”856  My critique of 
Knitter argued that for some people, ethical and practical teachings are “big stuff.” A 
community may adopt a more open and inclusive attitude toward non-Christian 
traditions, but this alone is not necessarily going to help the gay couple fired from their 
jobs at Catholic institutions solely for marrying one another, or the Muslim woman who 
feels excluded from the mosque for having a child out of wedlock. Religious 
                                                        
 
855 Knitter, Without Buddha, x.  
856 Knitter, Without Buddha, x. 
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communities must not neglect internal relationships in their efforts to dialogue and learn 
from religious others.  
In Chapter Five, I argued that dialogue between Muslim and Catholic women, in 
which both come to appreciate the beliefs and practices of the other is certainly valuable, 
especially in a world where these groups often hold negative stereotypes about the other. 
However, this does not mean that every encounter between a Muslim and a Catholic 
automatically contributes to the humanum. Dialogue between Muslim and Catholic men 
might actually lead to discovering common ground on how to continue exclusionary 
practices toward women. Dialogue between Muslim and Catholic women could also end 
in an exchange of feelings of disgust toward LGBTQI persons. My point here is that 
simply talking to and learning from religious others cannot be our sole concern; rather we 
must always undertake dialogue with attention to the sufferings of those who are 
marginalized both within and outside of our religious communities. 
Nevertheless, the potential for dialogue to have harmful consequences does not 
lessen the need for interreligious cooperation. The patriarchal beliefs and practices that 
threaten and damage the humanum of women which were presented in Chapter Five, 
illustrated but one contemporary example of a situation where interreligious dialogue and 
cooperation can contribute to furthering experiences of fragments of salvation and 
healing needed in this world. Both Islam and Christianity, even if their adherents believe 
them to have universal significance, are historically particular religions that arose in a 
particular time, place, and culture. While both traditions have spread beyond their places 
of origin, Muslims and Christians are and have always been limited by the constraints of 
time and space. Moreover, no religious institution can claim the ability to know or teach 
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everything that is necessary for the building of the humanum in this world. There are 
always more resources to be tapped and points of view to consider. By focusing on the 
benefits of dialogue among Muslim and Catholic women, this dissertation has argued that 
both groups’ perspectives on what freedom and wholeness for women entails may prompt 
them to critically examine situations that previously were never regarded were 
oppressive. In other words, there is wisdom to be found in the Quran and examples from 
the life of the Prophet Muhammad that have not been thematized in Christianity. Again, 
this does not mean that Islam is better than Christianity, nor that Christianity is better 
than Islam. It does, however, mean that there is more wisdom contained in the exchange 
between two religions than in one religion alone.  
 In discussing the importance of “no salvation apart from religious others,” it 
becomes crucial to always to keep in mind that the term salvation, in the context of 
Schillebeeckx’s usage, always refers to the this-worldly experience of salvation, which is 
always only partial and fragmentary, not the final salvation given by God and reserved 
for the afterlife. In Chapter Three, I explained how the Catholic Church has shifted away 
from an exclusivist position, which maintained that there is no salvation outside of 
Christianity. The affirmation, at the Second Vatican Council, that non-Christians and 
non-believers may experience salvation in Jesus Christ (the inclusivist position), came 
about through pondering religious pluralism as a major “sign of the times.”   In much the 
same way the Catholic Church no longer claims that an explicit confession of faith in 
Jesus is necessary for final salvation, neither am I claiming that participation in 
interreligious dialogue is necessary for final salvation, as if those who are unwilling to 
engage in such dialogue are destined for damnation. The aim of interreligious dialogue is 
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not to create another category of persons excluded from “salvation.” Here, my argument 
has followed Schillebeeckx’s claim that fragments of salvation may be glimpsed in 
human actions, but the fulfillment of salvation and total elimination of suffering is 
reserved for God. The person who refuses to engage with persons outside of his or her 
own tradition may be perpetuating a form of suffering in this world and missing out on 
opportunities to experience healing and inspiration, but it is not up to human beings to 
make the judgment that this precludes someone from final salvation.  
 It is also important to reiterate what was said in Chapter Three, that while 
Schillebeeckx saw creation as an ongoing act of God in which human beings are called to 
participate, and that he affirmed the role of human creativity and freedom in the shaping 
of history, he was not a Pelagian.857 Human beings cannot “save” themselves. Thus, he 
states, “on the one hand, eschatological hope is not a passive state of waiting for the 
future, but, on the other hand, neither is it self-redemption, as though the promised future 
could be realized by human achievement.”858 Therefore, I am not claiming that 
interreligious dialogue is the key to the achievement of the total salvation of humankind. 
Final salvation only comes from God; nevertheless, the ability to glimpse bits and pieces 
of salvation in our own experience is what makes faith in final salvation from God 
                                                        
 
857 One of Schillebeeckx’s critiques of critical theorists, particularly Harbermas, was that they “tend to give 
a Pelagian interpretation to the emancipative praxis, regarding it as something that can always be achieved 
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Works of Edward Schillebeeckx Vol 5: The Understanding of Faith, Ed. Shoof, Sterkens, Borgman, Shreiter 
(New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), 130, originally published in Tijdschrift voor Theologie 11 (1971): 113-
139.  
858 Edward Schillebeeckx, “The New Image of God, Secularization, and Man’s Future on Earth,” in The 
Collected Works of Edward Schillebeeckx, Vol 3: God The Future of Man, Ed. Shoof, Sterkens, Borgman, 




possible. Since this world is a religiously pluralist one, the ability to experience this-
worldly salvation now does depends on the ability to address the problems facing 
humankind in dialogue with those who may believe differently. This does not mean that 
final salvation will never come about if we do not dialogue enough, as if human beings 
can control God or influence the timing of the eschaton. However, human beings can 
influence how credible the hope of final salvation from God appears in our history 
through their efforts to bring healing to those who are suffering. 
Schillebeeckx famously stated that “we cannot suddenly experience God in the 
church’s liturgy if we never perceive God outside the church in our everyday experiences 
of our fellow human beings and the world.”859 Indeed, one’s ability to experience God in 
the Catholic liturgy stems from experiences of God in one’s day-to-day life. Again, this 
means, in a religiously pluralist world, one cannot preclude the influence of non-
Christians and secular traditions. Whenever we witness actions that respond to human 
suffering in a way that contributes to people’s healing and well-being, we get a glimpse 
of salvation. These actions are not performed solely by Christians, nor are they only 
motivated by Christian sources and teachings. While Catholics may be inspired by the 
task to build “the kingdom of God” in this world, a Muslim may be prompted by the 
notion that every human being is created a khalifa, or moral agent of Allah, to accept the 
charge of establishing social justice and cosmic harmony.860 Likewise, a Buddhist may be 
motivated by the desire to generate positive karma. Just as one cannot say that all 
                                                        
 
859 Edward Schillebeeckx, The Collected Works of Edward Schillebeeckx, Vol 10: Church, The Human 
Story of God, Ed. Shoof, Sterkens, Borgman, Shreiter (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), 25, originally 
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860 Amina Wadud, Inside the Gender Jihad: Women’s Reform in Islam (Oxford: Oneworld, 2006), 35.  
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religions are the same and can be reduced to a least common denominator, one cannot 
deny that unique traditions and cultures produce unique praxes and perspective that may 
contribute new and necessary elements to the healing of the humanum. The Christian can 
experience fragments of salvation in the encounter with another tradition, even if he or 
she does not accept all the beliefs in that tradition and holds that final salvation comes to 
all of humanity through Jesus Christ. One can maintain one’s Christian identity while 
regarding non-Christians as equal companions and partners in the effort to heal the 
threatened humanum. 
C. What does it mean to be a Christian Disciple Today?  
 
 To be a disciple means to “follow Jesus,” just as Jesus’s original followers are 
referred to as disciples in the New Testament. Yet, being a disciple today looks different 
and has different implications than it did for the first Christians. This is not only because 
today’s Christians no longer have Jesus with them in bodily form, or can no longer copy 
his actions directly, or ask him questions. The world itself has changed and become more 
complex. Advances in science and technology have increased human knowledge and 
capabilities, yet have also presented us with new issues and concerns that were not on the 
minds of Jesus and the early disciples. Thus, for Schillebeeckx, discipleship cannot be an 
exact imitation of Jesus. Rather it consists of “responding to one’s own new situations 
from an intense experience of God.”861 
 Jesus himself was not confronted with the question of how to understand the 
relationship between Christianity and non-Christian religions. Neither Christianity nor 
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Islam were established religions during Jesus’s lifetime. In fact, Jesus was Jewish and 
remained so throughout his entire ministry. There was no branch of study called theology 
of religions and therefore, Jesus certainly never identified himself as an inclusivist or 
pluralist!  However, we can look at Jesus’s interactions with those on the margins of 
society in the New Testament in order to discern how his example could apply within the 
context of religious pluralism. Certainly, one can take a cue from Jesus’s attitude of 
openness toward those around him.  
In Mark 7:24-30 and Matthew 15:21-28, we have the example of Jesus’s 
encounter with a Syrophoenician woman in the region of Tyre and Sidon. This woman 
was a pagan, not a Jew, and from a region that could be considered an enemy of Israel. 
The woman asks Jesus to heal her daughter. Jesus ignores her at first, but then tells her “I 
was sent only to the lost sheep of Israel.” When she continued to beg, Jesus again tells 
her “it is not fair to take the children’s food and throw it to the dogs.” Ever persistent, the 
Syrophoenician woman replies, “Yes, Lord, yet even the dogs eat the crumbs that fall 
from their masters table.” Jesus is surprised by this reply, realizes the woman’s great 
faith, and ultimately heals her daughter. Here, we see how Jesus’s mind was changed by 
someone outside of his own religious tradition. This pagan woman expanded Jesus’s 
conception of the humanum. We are not told that Jesus abandoned Judaism nor did he 
adopt this woman’s pagan beliefs. We are also not told that the woman became a follower 
of Jesus. Yet, she becomes a partner with Jesus in bringing about fragments of salvation, 
not only accomplished in the healing of her daughter, but in that fact that Jesus 
acknowledges her faith and went forth with the knowledge that he should respond to the 
suffering of those outside of his own religious and cultural milieu. In the words of New 
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Testament Scholar Sharon Ringe, this encounter “sets forth who Jesus is as the Christ of 
God.” She states, 
Elsewhere [in the Gospels], those who see themselves as the privileged 
people in social or religious terms are shown struggling to comprehend this Christ 
who so often offends them, while the “poor”— the economically poor and 
socially outcast, the sick, the oppressed, the rejected— respond joyfully to the 
good news of God’s reign. Here Jesus himself must learn about being that sort of 
Christ from one of the poorest of the poor and most despised of the outcast— a 
Gentile woman on her own before God and humankind. Her gifts and her ministry 
become the vehicle of the gospel to Jesus and to us.862 
 
Following Jesus in today’s religiously pluralist world is not an exact science. Nor 
do we have stories of Jesus in every single situation we can possibly encounter today. 
However, the story of the Syrophoenician woman at least tells us that religious others 
have important wisdom to offer and can expand our visions of the humanum. Just as 
Jesus’s understanding of his own ministry was changed by a religious other, our own 
ideas about how to best follow Jesus in today’s world may be impacted by our 
interactions with non-Christians, and enhanced by non-Christian beliefs and practices. To 
be a disciple of Jesus today means always maintaining an attitude of openness toward 
those who believe differently than we do, and to see them as co-collaborators in our 
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